

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

BENJI D. REED,

Plaintiff,

Civil Action No.
9:11-CV-0250 (TJM/DEP)

v.

JOHN DOE No. 1; JOHN DOE No 2; and
M. SOTO,

Defendants.

APPEARANCES:

OF COUNSEL:

FOR PLAINTIFF:

BENJI D. REED, *Pro Se*¹
04-B-3302
Elmira Correctional Facility
1879 Davis St
P.O. Box 500
Elmira, NY 14901-0500

¹ The court's records list the plaintiff as being confined in the Southport Correctional Facility "Southport", based upon a change of address notice filed by Reed on February 22, 2012. See Dkt. No. 20. According to publically available information, however, Reed is now being held in the Elmira Correctional Facility. See <http://nysdoccslookup.doccs.ny.gov/GCA00P00/WINQ130> (screenshot attached). Plaintiff is reminded of his obligation under the court's rules to notify the court and defendants' counsel of any further address changes in order to facilitate communications with him. See N.Y.N.D.L.R. 10.1(c)(2).

FOR DEFENDANT SOTO:

HON. ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN
Attorney General of the State
of New York
The Capitol
Albany, NY 12224

JAMES SEAMAN, ESQ.
Assistant Attorney General

DAVID E. PEEBLES
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

REPORT, RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Benji D. Reed, a New York State prison inmate who is proceeding *pro se* and *in forma pauperis*, has commenced this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against various prison officials, alleging deprivation of his civil rights. While the scope of his complaint has been winnowed, and it now raises only claims of cruel and unusual punishment and unlawful retaliation against one named and two unidentified “Doe” defendants, as originally filed that pleading asserted an array of claims stemming from incidents occurring at two separate correctional facilities.

In response to plaintiff’s complaint the sole remaining named defendant has moved for dismissal of all claims against him for failure to state a plausible cause of action upon which relief may be granted. The plaintiff, in turn, has applied for leave to amend his complaint, and for appointment of counsel to represent him *pro bono*. For the reasons set

forth below, I recommend that defendant's motion to dismiss be granted, and will deny plaintiff's application for leave to amend, on the basis of futility in light of my recommendation regarding the legal sufficiency of his existing claims, as well as his request for assignment of counsel.

I. BACKGROUND²

Plaintiff is a prison inmate entrusted to the custody of the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision ("DOCCS"). See *generally* Complaint (Dkt. No. 1). At the times relevant to the claims remaining in the action, he was designated to Eastern, located in Napanoch, New York. *Id.* at ¶ 3.

The events giving rise to plaintiff's claims were set in motion on September 14, 2010, when Reed developed an illness he attributed to food consumed in the mess hall at Eastern. Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) ¶¶ 32-37. Plaintiff maintains that the food causing his intestinal issues was

² The following recitation is drawn principally from plaintiff's amended complaint, the contents of which have been accepted as true for purposes of the pending motion. See *Erickson v. Pardus*, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (citing *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007)); see also *Cooper v. Pate*, 378 U.S. 546, 546, 84 S. Ct. 1733, 1734 (1964). In light of the severance and transfer of plaintiff's claims arising out of his confinement at the Southport Correctional Facility to the Western District of New York, I have included only the facts relevant to his remaining claims, all of which involve events at the Eastern Correctional Facility ("Eastern").

known by defendant John Doe No. 1 to have been contaminated, and should have been inspected by defendant John Doe No. 2 prior to being served to the inmates. Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) ¶¶ 41-42.

Plaintiff was initially treated on the following day at the facility's medical clinic, along with several other affected inmates, and given "dymotabs" to address the condition. Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) ¶ 38. The medication was subsequently discontinued on that same day, however, and plaintiff was confined to his cell and placed on a water diet for one day. *Id.* at ¶¶ 39-40.

While at Eastern, plaintiff was designated to undergo alcohol and substance abuse treatment in a program ("ASAT") overseen by defendant M. Soto, a counselor at the facility. See Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) ¶¶ 6, 31. Based apparently upon his absence from ASAT treatment while confined to his cell due to illness, plaintiff received a misbehavior report authored by defendant M. Soto accusing him of lying regarding his location on September 15, 2010, after being asked why he did not appear for ASAT treatment, and for failing to follow facility rules regarding attendance in the program. Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) ¶¶ 46-47. At a subsequent disciplinary hearing conducted to address the accusations set forth in the misbehavior

report, however, the charges were dismissed. *Id.* at ¶ 49.

Following plaintiff's return to the ASAT program he was called into defendant Soto's office and, after a conversation during which Reed refused to discuss the conviction that led to his incarceration, he was forced by Soto to sign a refusal to participate in ASAT training. *Id.* at ¶¶ 50-56. Plaintiff was then removed from the ASAT program and escorted to his cell, where he remained in keeplock pending a hearing stemming from the issuance of a new misbehavior report alleging his refusal to participate in the ASAT program.³ *Id.* at ¶¶ 57-61. At a subsequent hearing, conducted on October 12, 2010, Reed was exonerated of all charges and was permitted to return to the ASAT program. *Id.* at ¶¶ 64-65. As a result of issuance of the two misbehavior reports, while at

³ Keeplock is a form of confinement restricting an inmate to his or her cell, separating the inmate from others, and depriving the inmate of participation in normal prison activities. *Gittens v. LeFevre*, 891 F.2d 38, 39 (2d Cir. 1989); *Warburton v. Goord*, 14 F. Supp.2d 289, 293 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (citing *Gittens*); *Tinsley v. Greene*, No. 95-CV-1765, 1997 WL 160124, at *2 n. 2 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 1997) (Pooler, D.J. & Homer, M.J.) (citing, *inter alia*, *Green v. Bauvi*, 46 F.3d 189, 192 (2d Cir. 1995)) (Copies of all unreported decisions cited in this document have been appended for the convenience of the *pro se* plaintiff.). Inmate conditions while keeplocked are substantially the same as in the general population, the primary exception being that keeplocked inmates do not leave their cells for out-of-cell programs, and are usually allowed less time out of their cells on the weekends. *Lee v. Coughlin*, 26 F. Supp. 2d 615, 628 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).

Eastern plaintiff was keeplock-confined for a total of fourteen days.⁴ See Plaintiff's Memorandum (Dkt. No. 18) p. 6 of 18.

Plaintiff was subsequently transferred out of Eastern and into the Southport Correctional Facility, located in Pine City, New York, in December 2010. Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) ¶ 71.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff commenced this action on March 8, 2011. Complaint (Dkt. No. 1). Plaintiff's complaint named the two Doe defendants, M. Soto, and seven corrections employees assigned to Southport as defendants, and asserted claims under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12,101 *et seq.*, and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, additionally setting forth a pendent claim of negligence. By order issued on August 2, 2011, based upon an initial review of plaintiff's complaint and accompanying *in forma pauperis* application, Senior District Judge McAvoy ordered all claims arising from events occurring at Southport severed, and directed that those claims be transferred to the Western

⁴ Plaintiff's opposition memorandum also intimates that he lost good time credits as a result of the relevant events. See Plaintiff's Memorandum (Dkt. No. 18) at p. 6 of 18. There is no factual support for this statement, however, in either plaintiff's complaint or the attached exhibits.

District of New York. Dkt. No. 4.

In lieu of answering plaintiff's complaint defendant Soto, the sole remaining named defendant in this action, moved on October 17, 2011 for dismissal of plaintiff's claims, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Dkt. No. 11. In his motion defendant argues that plaintiff's complaint fails to allege a plausible claim upon which relief may be granted, and that in any event he is entitled to qualified immunity from suit. *Id.* Plaintiff has since submitted a response in opposition to defendant's motion. Dkt. No. 18.

Following the filing of defendant's dismissal motion, plaintiff moved on December 7, 2011 for leave to file an amended complaint, pursuant to Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Dkt. No. 14. In his motion Reed asserts that amendment is sought to permit elimination of the claims and references to the defendants affected by the transfer to the Western District of New York, and to clarify and expand upon facts set forth in his original complaint relating to events at Eastern. See Motion for Leave to Amend (Dkt. No. 14) ¶¶ 1-2. Plaintiff has also requested appointment of counsel to represent him in the action, *pro bono*. Dkt. No. 15. Defendant Soto has since responded in opposition to those motions,

by letter dated January 6, 2011 from his counsel, Megan A. Brown, Esq., arguing that the motion for leave to amend should be denied as futile for the same reasons as set forth in his dismissal motion, and taking no position with regard to plaintiff's request for appointment of counsel. Dkt. No. 17.

Defendant's dismissal motion, which is now ripe for determination, has been referred to me for the issuance of a report and recommendation, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Northern District of New York Rule 72.3(c). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). The remaining two motions brought by the plaintiff fall within my non-consensual jurisdiction, and therefore will be addressed in the form of an order from this court.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Defendant's motion to dismiss a complaint, brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, calls upon a court to gauge the facial sufficiency of that pleading, utilizing as a backdrop a pleading standard which, though unexact in its requirements, "demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation" in order to withstand scrutiny. *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662,

129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 554, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, (2007)). Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While modest in its requirement, that rule commands that a complaint contain more than mere legal conclusions; “[w]hile legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” *Ashcroft*, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.

To withstand a motion to dismiss, a complaint must plead sufficient facts which, when accepted as true, state a claim that is plausible on its face. *Ruotolo v. City of New York*, 514 F.3d 184, 188 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S. Ct. at 1974). As the Second Circuit has observed, “[w]hile *Twombly* does not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, it does require enough facts to ‘nudge [plaintiff’s] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.’” *In re Elevator Antitrust Litig.*, 502 F.3d 47, 50 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S. Ct. at 1974).

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal motion, the court must accept the material facts alleged in the complaint as true and draw all inferences

in favor of the non-moving party. *Cooper v. Pate*, 378 U.S. 546, 546, 84 S. Ct. 1723, 1734 (1964); *Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP*, 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir. 2003), *cert. denied*, 540 U.S. 823, 124 S. Ct. 153 (2003); *Burke v. Gregory*, 356 F. Supp. 2d 179, 182 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) (Kahn, J.). The burden undertaken by a party requesting dismissal of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) is substantial; the question presented by such a motion is not whether the plaintiff is likely ultimately to prevail, “but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.” *Log On America, Inc. v. Promethean Asset Mgmt. L.L.C.*, 223 F. Supp.2d 435, 441 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (quoting *Gant v. Wallingford Bd. of Educ.*, 69 F.3d 669, 673 (2d Cir. 1995) (citations and quotations omitted)).

When assessing the sufficiency of a complaint against this backdrop, particular deference should be afforded to a *pro se* litigant whose complaint merits a generous construction by the court when determining whether it states a cognizable cause of action. *Erickson v. Pardus*, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (“[A] *pro se* complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”) (quoting *Estelle v. Gamble*, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 292 (1976) (internal quotations

omitted)); *Davis v. Goord*, 320 F.3d 346, 350 (2d Cir. 2003) (citation omitted); *Donhauser v. Goord*, 314 F. Supp.2d 119, 121 (N.D.N.Y. 2004) (Hurd, J.).

B. Plaintiff's Retaliation Claim

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Soto, motivated by Reed's use of the medical facilities at Eastern, issued two false misbehavior reports to him in September 2010. In response, Soto argues that plaintiff's vague and conclusory allegations offered in support of this retaliation claim are insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.

When adverse action is taken by prison officials against an inmate, motivated by the inmate's exercise of a right protected under the Constitution, including the provisions of the Eighth Amendment, a cognizable retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lies. See *Franco v. Kelly*, 854 F.2d 584, 588-90 (2d Cir. 2008). Claims by inmates that adverse actions taken by prison workers are, of course, easily incanted, and inmates often attribute adverse action, including the issuance of misbehavior reports, to retaliatory animus; courts must therefore approach such claims "with skepticism and particular care." *Dawes v. Walker*, 239 F.3d 489, 491 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing *Flaherty v. Coughlin*, 713 F.2d 10, 13

(2d Cir. 1983)), *overruled on other grounds*, *Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.*, 534 U.S. 506 (2002); *Davis*, 320 F.3d at 352 (same).

In order to state a *prima facie* claim under section 1983 for retaliatory conduct, a plaintiff must advance non-conclusory allegations establishing that 1) the conduct at issue was protected; 2) the defendants took adverse action against the plaintiff; and 3) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action - in other words, that the protected conduct was a “substantial or motivating factor” in the prison officials’ decision to take action against the plaintiff. *Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle*, 429 U.S. 274, 287, 97 S. Ct. 568, 576 (1977); *Dillon v. Morano*, 497 F.3d 247, 251 (2d Cir. 2007); *Dawes*, 239 F.3d at 492 (2d Cir. 2001). If the plaintiff succeeds in carrying this burden, then to avoid liability the defendants must show by a preponderance of the evidence that they would have taken action against the plaintiff “even in the absence of the protected conduct.” *Mount Healthy*, 429 U.S. at 287, 97 S. Ct. at 576. If taken for both proper and improper reasons, state action may be upheld if the action would have been taken based on the proper reasons alone. *Graham v. Henderson*, 89 F.3d 75, 79 (2d Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).

Affording plaintiff the deference which he is due as a *pro se* litigant and broadly construing his complaint, it appears that plaintiff is claiming the September misbehavior reports were issued in retaliation for his having sought medical treatment due to a sudden illness.⁵ As defendant correctly argues, the mere allegation that a false misbehavior report has been issued to an inmate, standing alone, does not rise to level of constitutional significance. *Boddie v. Schnieder*, 105 F.3d 857, 862 (2d Cir. 1997); *Freeman v. Rideout*, 808 F.2d 949, 951 (2d Cir.1986), *cert. denied*, 485 U.S. 982, 108 S. Ct. 1273 (1988)). The further assertion that the false misbehavior report was prompted by the accused inmate having engaged in protected activity, however, can suffice to support a cognizable claim of unlawful retaliation. *Franco*, 854 F.2d at 589.

Having assumed plaintiff's ability to establish that he engaged in protected activity, the court's focus turns next to the question of whether he has sufficiently alleged that he experienced adverse action at the hands of the defendant. In the prison context, "[o]nly retaliatory conduct that would deter a similarly situated individual of ordinary firmness from

⁵ In his motion defendant Soto has assumed, for the sake of argument, that plaintiff's resort to seeking medical treatment within the facility constituted protected activity sufficient to trigger the First Amendment's protection against retaliation, and I will do likewise.

exercising his or her constitutional rights constitutes an adverse action for a claim of retaliation.” *Dawes*, 239 F.3d at 493; see also *Davis*, 320 F.3d at 353. The adverse action inquiry is a contextual one. *Davis*, 320 F.3d at 353. Courts should bear in mind that “[p]risoners may be required to tolerate more ... than average citizens, before a [retaliatory] action taken against them is considered adverse.” *Id.*

The adverse action alleged by the plaintiff in support of his retaliation claim consists of the issuance of two false misbehavior reports. The filing of a false misbehavior report can qualify as an adverse action for purposes of a First Amendment retaliation. See *Gill v. Pidlypchak*, 389 F.3d 379, 384 (2d Cir.2004). The false misbehavior reports at issue led to plaintiff’s keeplock cell confinement for a period of fourteen days. At this early procedural juncture, I am unable to conclude that this allegation is insufficient to support a plausible finding of adverse action. See *Edwards v. Horn*, No. 2012 WL 76012, at * 16 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2012) (citing *Gill*, 389 F.3d at 384) (false misbehavior report and placement in keeplock constitutes adverse action)).

The third requirement for pleading a cognizable retaliation claim involves linking the protected activity and adverse action alleged. It is in

connection with this element that plaintiff's retaliation claim fails. In cases involving claims of retaliation based on the filing of allegedly false misbehavior reports, "[t]he difficulty lies in establishing a retaliatory motive." *Barclay v. New York*, 477 F. Supp. 2d 546, 558 (N.D.N.Y. 2007). When evaluating whether a misbehavior report is the product of retaliatory animus, an analysis most typically undertaken on a motion for summary judgment, courts generally look to several factors as bearing upon any potential nexus between the protected conduct and the misbehavior report, including "temporal proximity, prior good discipline, finding of not guilty at the disciplinary hearing, and statements by defendants as to their motives." *Id.* (citations omitted); see also *Rivera v. Goord*, 119 F. Supp. 2d 327, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).

In this instance, plaintiff's complaint is lacking in any factual allegations that would establish the requisite nexus between his visit to the prison infirmary and defendant Soto's issuance of misbehavior reports. Indeed, in his complaint Reed hypothesizes that Soto disbelieved his explanation concerning his whereabouts at the time of his absence from the ASAT program, prompting him to issue the misbehavior reports. See, e.g., Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) ¶¶ 54, 65. This allegation by the plaintiff

suggests a non-retaliatory motivation for defendant's issuance of the misbehavior reports at issue.

In light of the plaintiff's failure to state facts sufficient to satisfy this critical element of a retaliation claim, I recommend that the defendant's motion be granted, and that plaintiff's retaliation cause of action under the First Amendment be dismissed.

C. Verbal Harassment/False Misbehavior Report Claims

Liberally construed, plaintiff's complaint could be interpreted as also asserting a claim, independent of retaliation, under the Eighth Amendment for harassment and for issuance of false misbehavior reports.

As was previously observed, the mere issuance of a false misbehavior report, standing alone, is insufficient to support a cognizable claim under the Eighth Amendment or otherwise on behalf of a prison inmate; a "prison inmate has no general constitutional right to be free from being falsely accused in a misbehavior report." *Boddie v. Schnieder*, 105 F.3d 857, 862 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing *Freeman v. Rideout*, 808 F.2d 949, 951 (2d Cir. 1986), *cert. denied*, 485 U.S. 982, 108 S. Ct. 1273 (1988)). As such, plaintiff's claim related to the filing of a false misbehavior report, independent of his First Amendment retaliation cause of action, is subject

to dismissal.

Defendant also interprets plaintiff's complaint as alleging that he was generally harassed by Soto, and that Soto stated to other inmates that Reed was a monster with whom they should not associate. These allegations appear to be calculated to state a violation of his Eighth Amendment's right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Reed's complaint, however, fails to allege any conduct that would warrant Eighth Amendment protection. As a general matter, mere verbal harassment, including that accompanied by the use of profanity, without any corresponding physical injury does not support a cognizable claim under section 1983, however boorish and unprofessional the alleged conduct may be. See *Purcell v. Coughlin*, 790 F.2d 263, 265 (2d Cir. 1986); *Gill v. Hoadley*, 261 F. Supp. 2d 113, 129 (N.D.N.Y. 2003); *Aziz Zarif Shabazz v. Pico*, 994 F. Supp. 460, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). Nor do threats amount to a constitutional violation. *Malsh v. Austin*, 901 F. Supp. 757, 763 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). Because plaintiff's complaint lacks allegations that would plausibly support an Eighth Amendment violation claim, I recommend dismissal of that cause of action, to the extent that his complaint may properly be construed as raising such a claim.

D. Leave to Amend

Following the filing of plaintiff's dismissal motion, plaintiff sought leave to amend his complaint to flesh out certain factual allegations in support of his claims. See Dkt. No. 14. At this juncture the court must determine whether to permit the amendment now sought, and additionally whether the plaintiff should be granted leave to amend in any event in an effort to cure the deficiencies perceived with regard to his existing claims against defendant Soto.

1. Leave to Amend Generally

Motions for leave to amend are governed by Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which provides, in pertinent part, that unless amendment as a matter of right is permitted—under circumstances not applicable here—a party may amend its pleading “only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave. The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Under Rule 15(a), leave to amend ordinarily should be liberally granted absent undue delay, bad faith, dilatory tactics, undue prejudice in being served with the proposed pleading, or futility. *Foman v. Davis*, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S. Ct. 227, 230 (1962); *Elma RT v. Landesmann Int’l Mktg. Corp.*, No.

98-CIV.-662, 2000 WL 297197, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2000) (citing *Foman*).

Notwithstanding the familiar and well-accepted precept that leave to amend should be granted freely and is typically permitted, if a claim contained in a proposed amended complaint would be vulnerable in the face of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, then permitting amendment would be an act of futility that should not be sanctioned. See, e.g., *Saxholm AS v. Dynal, Inc.*, 938 F. Supp. 120, 124 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); *In re Boesky Sec. Litig.*, 882 F. Supp. 1371, 1379 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). If, on the other hand, a proposed claim sets forth facts and circumstances that may entitle the pleader to relief, then futility is not a proper basis on which to deny the right to amend. *Saxholm*, 938 F. Supp. at 124 (citing *Allstate Ins. v. Administratia Asigurarilor De Stat*, 875 F. Supp. 1022, 1029 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) and *Mathon v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A.*, 875 F. Supp. 986, 1003 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (leave to replead granted where court could not say that under no circumstances would proposed claims provide a basis for relief)).

The court has reviewed plaintiff's proposed amended complaint, and finds that it suffers from the same deficiencies as are noted above with respect to his initial complaint. Accordingly, plaintiff's motion for leave to

file the proposed amended complaint accompanying his motion will be denied on basis of futility.⁶ *Ruffolo v. Oppenheimer & Co.*, 987 F.2d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 1993) (citations omitted); *accord Brown v. Peters*, 95-CV-1641, 1997 WL 599355, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Sep. 22, 1997) (Pooler, J.) (“[T]he court need not grant leave to amend where it appears that amendment would prove to be unproductive or futile.”) (citation omitted).

2. Leave to Amend to Cure Perceived Deficiencies

Ordinarily, a court should not dismiss a complaint filed by a *pro se*

⁶ In his proposed amended complaint plaintiff seeks to add a claim for denial of equal protection, alleging that because he was issued a misbehavior report for exercising his right to seek medical care while another inmate was permitted to attend the medical clinic, his right to equal protection was denied. See Proposed Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 14-1) ¶ 60.

The Equal Protection Clause directs state actors to treat similarly situated people alike. See *City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Ctr.*, 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3254 (1985). To prove a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she was treated differently than others similarly situated as a result of intentional or purposeful discrimination directed at an identifiable or suspect class. See *Giano v. Senkowski*, 54 F.3d 1050, 1057 (2d Cir.1995) (citing, *inter alia*, *McCleskey v. Kemp*, 481 U.S. 279, 292, 107 S. Ct. 1756, 1767 (1987)). The plaintiff must also show that the disparity in treatment “cannot survive the appropriate level of scrutiny which, in the prison setting, means that he must demonstrate that his treatment was not reasonably related to [any] legitimate penological interests.” *Phillips v. Girdich*, 408 F.3d 124, 129 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting *Shaw v. Murphy*, 532 U.S. 223, 225, 121 S.Ct. 1475 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

While plaintiff’s complaint alleges that he was treated differently than another inmate, conspicuously absent from his proposed amended complaint is the allegation of any fact plausibly suggesting that the difference in treatment was the result of an intentional or purposeful discrimination directed at an identifiable or suspect class. For this reason, I find that the proposed amended complaint does not state a plausible equal protection claim.

litigant without granting leave to amend at least once if there is any indication that a valid claim might be stated. *Branum v. Clark*, 927 F.2d 698, 704-05 (2d Cir.1991) (emphasis added); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) (leave to amend “shall be freely given when justice so requires”); see also *Mathon*, 875 F. Supp. at 1003 (leave to replead granted where court could not say that under no circumstances would proposed claims provide a basis for relief). The court must next determine whether plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of this general rule, given the procedural history of the case.

I am unable to conclude that if given the opportunity plaintiff nonetheless would be unable to set forth allegations sufficient to avoid dismissal of his claims at this early stage in the litigation. If he opts to amend, however, the plaintiff is advised that the law requires that “complaints relying on the civil rights statutes are insufficient unless they contain some specific allegations of fact indicating a deprivation of rights, instead of a litany of general conclusions that shock but have no meaning.” *Hunt v. Budd*, 895 F. Supp. 35, 38 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (McAvoy, C.J.) (citing *Barr v. Abrams*, 810 F.2d 358, 363 (2d Cir. 1987) (other citations omitted)); *Pourzandvakil v. Humphry*, No. 94-CV-1594, 1995 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 7136, at *24-25 (N.D.N.Y. May 22, 1995) (Pooler, D.J.) (citation omitted). Such an amended complaint will replace the existing second amended complaint, and therefore must be a wholly integrated and complete pleading that does not rely upon or incorporate by reference any pleading or document previously filed with the court. See *Harris v. City of N.Y.*, 186 F.3d 243, 249 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing *Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc.*, 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). The proposed amended complaint also specifically allege facts indicating the involvement of each of the named defendants in the constitutional deprivations alleged, providing sufficient detail to establish the they were tangibly connected to those deprivations. See *Bass v. Jackson*, 790 F.2d 260, 263 (2d Cir. 1986).

E. Appointment of Counsel

In addition to seeking leave to amend, plaintiff has applied to the court for appointment of counsel. As a threshold matter, prior to requesting appointment of *pro bono* counsel, a party must first demonstrate that he or she has been unable to obtain counsel through the private sector or public interest firms. *Cooper v. A. Sargenti Co., Inc.*, 877 F.2d 170, 173-74 (2d Cir. 1989) (quoting *Hodge v. Police Officers*, 802

F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1986)). Given that plaintiff has not provided the court with information regarding any efforts by him to obtain counsel, his request is subject to denial on this basis alone.

Turning to the merits of his application, I find that Reed has not demonstrated entitlement to appointment of counsel under the applicable statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) affords district courts broad – though not limitless – discretion in determining whether to appoint counsel to represent indigent civil litigants. *Hodge*, 802 F.2d at 60. In *Hodge*, the Second Circuit noted that when exercising that discretion the court

should first determine whether the indigent's position seems likely to be of substance. If the claim meets this threshold requirement, the court should then consider the indigent's ability to investigate the crucial facts, whether conflicting evidence implicating the need for cross-examination will be the major proof presented to the fact finder, the indigent's ability to present the case, the complexity of the legal issues and any special reason in th[e] case why appointment of counsel would be more likely to lead to a just determination.

Id. at 61-62; see also *Terminate Control Corp. v. Horowitz*, 28 F.3d 1335, 1341 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing *Hodge*). As can be seen, of the criteria enunciated by the Second Circuit to be considered when determining whether assignment of *pro bono* counsel is appropriate, the most

important is the merits – that is, “whether the indigent’s position [is] likely to be of substance.” *Cooper*, 877 F.2d at 172 (citations and internal quotations omitted). Where a plaintiff does not provide a court with evidence, as opposed to mere allegations, relating to his or her claims, that party does not meet this threshold requirement. See *Herman v. Runyon*, No. 96 CIV. 6080, 1997 WL 118379, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 1997).

Each case must be decided on its own facts. *Velasquez v. O’Keefe*, 899 F. Supp. 972, 974 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (McAvoy, J.) (citing *Hodge*, 802 F.2d at 61). Although the Constitution guarantees indigent litigants “meaningful access” to the courts, it does not entitle all such parties to receive the benefit of *pro bono* representation. *Hodge*, 802 F.2d at 60. While, as was previously indicated, the appointment of counsel to represent indigent parties in civil suits is authorized by statute, when that authority is exercised the court is required to call upon attorneys to donate their time *pro bono* to the benefit of indigent litigants and the court. Accordingly, in deference to the limited resources available to the court to serve the interests of the many indigent litigants who pursue claims before it, and recognizing the “thankless burden” associated with such

assignments, *Miller v. Pleasure*, 296 F.2d 283, 285 (2d Cir. 1961), *cert. denied*, 370 U.S. 964, 82 S. Ct. 1592 (1962), courts should not grant such applications indiscriminately, but instead must exercise good judgment and restraint in doing so. *Cooper*, 877 F.2d at 172.

In this instance, plaintiff has failed to make a sufficient showing to warrant appointment of counsel to represent him at this early stage in the litigation. Plaintiff's application for appointment of counsel will therefore be denied, without prejudice to renewal.⁷

IV. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATION

The claims now remaining before this court, following severance and transfer of a portion of plaintiff's original complaint to the Western District of New York, include causes of action against two John Doe defendants arising from plaintiff's alleged investigation of contaminated food, as well as claims of retaliation, harassment, and cruel and unusual punishment against defendant M. Soto. Because the Doe defendants in this case have not yet been identified and thus have not yet appeared in the action, the court has not been called upon to gauge the sufficiency of plaintiff's

⁷ In accordance with the customary practice of this court, once a case passes through the discovery and motion phases and becomes trial ready, *pro bono* counsel is usually appointed for an indigent *pro se* inmate litigant to assist in preparation for and during the trial, either as attorney of record or as standby counsel.

claims against those defendants.⁸ Turning to plaintiff's claims against defendant Soto, based upon a review of the allegations set forth in plaintiff's complaint, I recommend that all claims against defendant Soto be dismissed, with leave to replead, and find it unnecessary to address his alternative argument, to the effect that he is entitled to qualified immunity from suit.

Turning to plaintiff's pending motions, I conclude that his motion for leave to amend should be denied, based upon futility, but that he nonetheless should be afforded an opportunity to further amend his

⁸ Because only "persons" may act under color of state law, a complaint seeking money damages pursuant to § 1983 must name one or more individuals as defendants. See *Walker v. State of Connecticut*, No. 3:06CV165, 2006 WL 1981783, *2 (D. Conn. 2006); *Connor v. Hurley*, No. 00Civ.8354LTSAJP, 2004 WL 885828, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). It is not uncommon for a *pro se* plaintiff to include a "John Doe" or other unknown defendants, together with named defendants in a complaint. Generally, in such cases the complaint is served upon the named defendants, and the plaintiff is directed to pursue discovery to identify the John Doe(s) and to thereafter seek leave to amend the complaint to name them as defendants. In the event the plaintiff chooses to abandon his claims against defendant Soto, leaving only the two "Doe" defendants in the case, I recommend the court allow plaintiff to name the superintendent of Eastern as a defendant – even though there is no suggestion of his or her personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violations – solely for the purpose of effecting service and so that issue may be joined. In that event, once issue is joined, plaintiff may seek through discovery the identity of the John Doe defendant(s). See *Peralta v. Doe*, No. 04-CV-6559P, 2005 WL 357358, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2005) (citing *Valentin v. Dinkins*, 121 F.3d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 1997)) (district court should assist *pro se* incarcerated litigants with their inquiry into the identities of unknown defendants and "may pursue any course that it deems appropriate to a further inquiry into the identity" of the unknown defendant); *Harvey v. Corrections Officer*, 9:09-CV-0517 (N.D.N.Y.) (LEK/GHL) (order filed 6/1/09 permitting plaintiff to name superintendent as a defendant for purposes of service and discovery).

complaint in an effort to cure the deficiencies cited in this report and recommendation in connection with his allegations against defendant Soto. I further find, however, that he has failed to establish a basis for appointment of counsel to represent him, *pro bono*, at this early procedural juncture in this litigation.

Based upon the foregoing it is hereby respectfully,


RECOMMENDED that the motion of defendant M. Soto to dismiss plaintiff's claims against him in this action (Dkt. No. 11) be GRANTED, and that all claims against that defendant be DISMISSED, with leave to file an amended complaint as directed above within thirty days from the date of the filing a decision and order acting upon my recommendation of dismissal; and it is further

ORDERED, that plaintiff's motions for leave to amend (Dkt. No. 14) and for appointment of counsel (Dkt. No. 15) be DENIED in all respects, without prejudice to renewal.

NOTICE: Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may lodge written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court within FOURTEEN days of service of this report. FAILURE TO SO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(d),

72; *Roland v. Racette*, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993).

It is hereby ORDERED that the clerk of the court serve a copy of this Report and Recommendation upon the parties in accordance with this court's local rules.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "David E. Peebles", is written over a horizontal line.

David E. Peebles
U.S. Magistrate Judge

Dated: July 26, 2012
Syracuse, NY

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Inmate Information

[Inmate Information Data Definitions](#) are provided for most of the elements listed below. When a detailed definition is available for a specific element, you may click on the element's label to view it.

Identifying and Location Information	
As of 07/18/12	
DIN (Department Identification Number)	04B3302
Inmate Name	REED, BENJI D
Sex	MALE
Date of Birth	02/24/1981
Race / Ethnicity	BLACK
Custody Status	IN CUSTODY
Housing / Releasing Facility	ELMIRA
Date Received (Original)	12/07/2004
Date Received (Current)	12/07/2004
Admission Type	NEW COMMITMENT
County of Commitment	ONEIDA
Latest Release Date / Type (Released Inmates Only)	

Crimes of Conviction	
If all 4 crime fields contain data, there may be additional crimes not shown here. In this case, the crimes shown here are those with the longest sentences.	
As of 07/18/12	
Crime	Class
ATT MURDER 2ND	B
CRIM POSS WEAP 3RD SUB 4-8 VFO	D
CRIM POSS WEAP 3RD SUB 1,2,3	D

Sentence Terms and Release Dates

Under certain circumstances, an inmate may be released prior to serving his or her minimum term and before the earliest release date shown for the inmate.

As of 07/18/12

Aggregate Minimum Sentence	0012 Years, 10 Months, 08 Days
Aggregate Maximum Sentence	0015 Years, 00 Months, 00 Days
Earliest Release Date	05/18/2017
Earliest Release Type	PAROLE ELIGIBILITY DATE
Parole Hearing Date	01/2017
Parole Hearing Type	INITIAL RELEASE APPEARANCE
Parole Eligibility Date	05/18/2017
Conditional Release Date	05/18/2017
Maximum Expiration Date	07/10/2019
Maximum Expiration Date for Parole Supervision	
Post Release Supervision Maximum Expiration Date	
Parole Board Discharge Date	



Not Reported in F.Supp., 1997 WL 160124 (N.D.N.Y.)
(Cite as: 1997 WL 160124 (N.D.N.Y.))

C

Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.

United States District Court, N.D. New York.

Larry TINSLEY, Plaintiff,

v.

Gary GREENE, Deputy Superintendent of Great Meadow Correctional Facility; Jim Lanfear, Maintenance Supervisor, Great Meadow Correctional Facility; Gary Yule, Corrections Officer, Great Meadow Correctional Facility; and David Roberts, Senior Counselor, Great Meadow Correctional Facility,
Defendants.

No. 95-CV-1765 (RSP/DRH).

March 31, 1997.

Larry Tinsley, Pro Se.

Dennis C. Vacco, New York State Attorney General,
[Darren O'Connor](#), Assistant Attorney General, of counsel,
for Defendants.

ORDER

POOLER, District Judge.

*1 The above matter comes to me following a report-recommendation and order by Magistrate Judge David R. Homer, duly filed on the 13th day of September, 1996. Dkt. No. 24. Following ten days from the service thereof, the clerk has sent me the entire file, including any objections thereto. Plaintiff Larry Tinsley filed objections. Dkt. Nos. 25, 26.

In his report-recommendation, Magistrate Judge Homer advises that Tinsley failed to establish or raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding the nature of his

confinement. Report-recommendation, Dkt. No. 24, at 9-10. There is no dispute that prison officials confined Tinsley to keeplock and loss of some privileges for 60 days after they conducted a search of his cell, found a marijuana cigarette in the cell, and found Tinsley guilty of possessing a controlled substance after a Tier III disciplinary hearing. Tinsley's conviction and sentence were affirmed on administrative appeal. In his lawsuit under [42 U.S.C. § 1983](#), Tinsley raises several charges to the manner in which defendants conducted the search and disciplinary hearing. However, Tinsley failed to specify in any manner that his punishment posed an "atypical and significant hardship on [him] in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." [Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, ---, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 1300, 132 L.Ed.2d 418, --- \(1995\)](#). Without this showing, plaintiff failed to allege a deprivation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process liberty interest, and his civil rights claim must fail. *Id.*

In his objections to the report-recommendation, Tinsley makes general attacks regarding the alleged bias of Magistrate Judge David Homer and argues that the magistrate judge has misconstrued his claims. Plaintiff also asks me to reconsider defendants' summary judgment motion and review plaintiffs memorandum opposing the motion. However, Tinsley has not raised any allegation regarding the nature of his punishment, which is the threshold issue under *Sandin*. I have reviewed the entire file in this matter, including plaintiff's many submissions, and I find that he failed to raised any issue of fact to support an alleged deprivation of his due process liberty interests. Magistrate Judge Homer's thorough report-recommendation is neither biased nor a mischaracterization of plaintiffs claims.

For the foregoing reasons, it is therefore

ORDERED that the report-recommendation of September 13, 1996, is approved, and

ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion for default summary judgment is denied as moot, and

Not Reported in F.Supp., 1997 WL 160124 (N.D.N.Y.)
(Cite as: 1997 WL 160124 (N.D.N.Y.))

ORDERED that defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted, and it is further

ORDERED that the clerk serve a copy of this order upon the parties by regular mail.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

HOMER, United States Magistrate Judge.

REPORT-RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER ^{FN1}

^{FN1} This matter was referred to the undersigned for report and recommendation by United States District Judge Rosemary S. Pooler pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and N.D.N.Y.L.R. 72.3(c).

The plaintiff a New York State Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) inmate currently confined at the Great Meadow Correctional Facility (Great Meadow), brought this pro se action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff alleges that defendants violated his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments in connection with a search of his cell and ensuing disciplinary hearing. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages as well as injunctive relief.

*2 Presently pending are defendants' motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 17), plaintiff's letter-memorandum requesting summary judgment by default (Docket No. 11), and plaintiff's motions for a pre-trial conference (Docket No. 20) and for appointment of counsel (Docket No. 21). For the reasons stated below, it is recommended that the defendants' motion be granted and that plaintiff's motions be denied.

I. BACKGROUND

On October 30, 1995, while plaintiff was incarcerated at Great Meadow, defendant Greene received information from a confidential source that plaintiff was concealing escape materials. Defendant Greene ordered the search of plaintiff's prison cell. The search was executed by

Corrections Officer Rando and defendant Yule and was supervised by Sergeant Smith. No escape materials were found. However, the officers found a rolled cigarette in plaintiff's cell. The cigarette tested positive for marijuana. Plaintiff was placed in keeplock ^{FN2} and was given a contraband receipt for the cigarette that was removed from his cell.

^{FN2}. "Keeplock is a form of disciplinary confinement segregating an inmate from other inmates and depriving him of participation in normal prison activities." Green v. Bauvi, 46 F.3d 189, 192 (2d Cir.1995); N.Y. Comp.Codes R. & Regs. tit. 7, § 301.6 (1995).

Plaintiff was served with a misbehavior report which charged him with possession of a controlled substance. A Tier III disciplinary hearing ^{FN3} was commenced on November 3, 1995 before defendant Lanfear as the hearing officer. During the hearing, plaintiff claimed that defendant Greene failed to corroborate the reliability of the confidential informant, the search was improperly supervised, he did not receive the requisite contraband slip, defendants did not remove any contraband item from plaintiff's cell, and defendants failed to sign the misbehavior report. Plaintiff also objected when witnesses were not called in the order he had requested.

^{FN3}. DOCS regulations provide for three tiers of disciplinary hearings depending on the seriousness of the misconduct charged. A Tier III hearing, or superintendent's hearing, is required whenever disciplinary penalties exceeding thirty days may be imposed. N.Y. Comp.Codes R. & Regs. tit. 7, §§ 254.7(iii), 270.3(a) (1995); Walker v. Bates, 23 F.3d 652, 654 (2d Cir.1994), *cert. denied*, 515 U.S. 1157, 115 S.Ct. 2608, 132 L.Ed.2d 852 (1995).

At the conclusion of the hearing on November 7, 1995, defendant Lanfear found plaintiff guilty based upon the

statement in the misbehavior report submitted by C.O. Rando endorsed by C.O. Yule. Testimony during hearing by C.O. Yule verified the report and stated the substance

Not Reported in F.Supp., 1997 WL 160124 (N.D.N.Y.)
(Cite as: 1997 WL 160124 (N.D.N.Y.))

was found in Tinsley's cell. Testimony during hearing by Sgt. Sawyer stated he received the item found by C.O. Rando and tested same which proved positive for controlled substance. Testimony was considered during hearing by Tinsley.

Defs.' Statement Pursuant to Rule 7.1(f) (Docket No. 17), Ex. A, p. 16. Plaintiff was sentenced to confinement in keeplock for sixty days and loss of packages, commissary and telephone privileges for sixty days. Shortly after this action was commenced, plaintiff's conviction and sentence were affirmed on administrative appeal.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A. Legal Standard

Under [Fed.R.Civ.P. 56\(c\)](#), if there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact ... the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law ... where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party." See [Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.](#), 475 U.S. 574, 585-86, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The burden to demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists falls solely on the moving party. [Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Giammettei](#), 34 F.3d 51, 54 (2d Cir.1994); see also [Heyman v. Commerce and Industry Ins. Co.](#), 524 F.2d 1317, 1320 (2d Cir.1975). Once the moving party has provided sufficient evidence to support a motion for summary judgment, the opposing party must "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial" and cannot rest on "mere allegations or denials" of the facts asserted by the movant. [Fed.R.Civ.P. 56\(e\)](#); accord [Rexnord Holdings, Inc. v. Bidermann](#), 21 F.3d 522, 525-26 (2d Cir.1994).

*3 The trial court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmovant. [American Cas. Co. of Reading Pa. v. Nordic Leasing, Inc.](#), 42 F.3d 725, 728 (2d Cir.1994); see also [Eastway Construction Corp. v. City of New York](#), 762 F.2d 243, 249 (2d Cir.1985). The nonmovant may defeat summary judgment by producing specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. [Celotex Corp. v.](#)

[Catrett](#), 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

B. Discussion

The defendants move for summary judgment on the grounds that (1) plaintiff's due process allegations fail to state a claim, (2) plaintiff's hearing was conducted in accordance with constitutional requirements, (3) the search of plaintiff's cell did not violate any of plaintiff's constitutional rights, and (4) defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

1. Due Process Liberty Interest

Plaintiff contends that his due process rights were violated because the November 3-7, 1995 disciplinary hearing was improperly executed, and as a result, he was wrongly confined to sixty days keeplock.^{FN4} In their motion for summary judgment, defendants contend that under [Sandin v. Conner](#), 515 U.S. 472, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995), plaintiff lacked any liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.

^{FN4} New York regulations permit placement in keeplock for both disciplinary and administrative reasons. These include, among others, punishment for misconduct and protective custody. [N.Y. Comp.Codes R. & Regs. tit. 7, § 301.1-.7 \(1995\)](#).

A due process claim as alleged by plaintiff will lie under [section 1983](#) only where the alleged violation infringed a cognizable liberty interest. [Allison v. Kyle](#), 66 F.3d 71, 74 (5th Cir.1995). Under [Sandin](#), a court must first determine whether the deprivation of which an inmate complains merits the protections afforded by the Due Process Clause. A protected liberty interest

will be generally limited to freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force, nonetheless imposes *atypical and*

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(Cite as: 1997 WL 160124 (N.D.N.Y.))

significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.

Id. at 2300 (emphasis added). The Court held that confinement of the plaintiff for thirty days in a segregated housing unit infringed no liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. *Id.* at 2302.

At first blush *Sandin* appeared to mark a radical change in the litigation of inmates' due process claims. It appeared to suggest that the number of sufficiently stated claims would be drastically reduced. See [Orellana v. Kyle, 65 F.3d 29, 31-32 \(5th Cir.1995\)](#), *cert. denied*, [516 U.S. 1059, 116 S.Ct. 736, 133 L.Ed.2d 686 \(1996\)](#) ("it is difficult to see that any other deprivations in the prison context, short of those that clearly impinge on the duration of confinement, will henceforth qualify for constitutional 'liberty' status.... [T]he ambit of [inmates'] due process liberty claims has been dramatically narrowed.").

Indeed, several circuit courts have rejected prisoners' due process claims under *Sandin* where the deprivation complained of was solely confinement in segregated housing. See, e.g., [Pichardo v. Kinker, 73 F.3d 612, 613 \(5th Cir.1996\)](#) (indefinite confinement in administrative segregation for affiliation with gang not atypical and significant under *Sandin*); [Luken v. Scott, 71 F.3d 192, 193 \(5th Cir.1995\)](#), *cert. denied*, [517 U.S. 1196, 116 S.Ct. 1690, 134 L.Ed.2d 791 \(1996\)](#) (segregation without more implicates no liberty interest); [Rimmer-Bev v. Brown, 62 F.3d 789, 790-91 \(6th Cir.1995\)](#) (placement in administrative segregation not atypical and significant in context of life sentence).

*4 Several judges in this district have adopted this position. See [Polanco v. Allan, No. 93-CV-1498, 1996 WL 377074, at *2 \(N.D.N.Y. July 5, 1996\)](#) (McAvoy, C.J.) (confinement in a special housing unit (SHU) for up to one year not protected by Due Process Clause); [Figueroa v. Selsky, No. 91-CV-510 \(N.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 1995\)](#) (Scullin, J.) (seven and one-half months in SHU not protected); [Delaney v. Selsky, 899 F.Supp. 923, 927 \(N.D.N.Y.1995\)](#) (McAvoy, C.J.) (197 days in SHU not protected); [Ocasio v. Coughlin, No. 94-CV-530 \(N.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 1996\)](#) (Scullin, J.) (180 days in SHU not protected); [Gonzalez v. Coughlin, No. 94-CV-1119](#)

(N.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 1996) (Report-Recommendation of M.J. Hurd) (163 days in keeplock not protected), *adopted*, (N.D.N.Y. May 6, 1996) (Cholakakis, J.), *appeal docketed*, No. 96-2494 (2d Cir. June 10, 1996); [Taylor v. Mitchell, No. 91-CV-1445 \(N.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 1996\)](#) (Cholakakis, J.) (sixty days in SHU not protected); [Cargill v. Casey, No. 95-CV-1620, 1996 WL 227859, at *2 \(N.D.N.Y. May 2, 1996\)](#) (Pooler, J.) (dismissing as frivolous complaint alleging due process violation resulting in keeplock confinement for thirty days). Under these cases, based solely on its duration, plaintiff's confinement in keeplock for sixty days would not constitute a cognizable liberty interest under *Sandin*.

Other circuits, however, have viewed *Sandin* less as a durational, bright line bar to statement of a claim than as an additional issue of fact for litigation. See, e.g., [Bryan v. Duckworth, 88 F.3d 431, 433-34 \(7th Cir.1996\)](#) (question of fact whether disciplinary segregation was atypical and significant under *Sandin*); [Williams v. Fountain, 77 F.3d 372, 374 n. 3 \(11th Cir.1996\)](#) (noting *Sandin* decided by only 5-4 majority and holding that segregation for one year provided basis for assuming atypical and significant deprivation under *Sandin*); [Gotcher v. Wood, 66 F.3d 1097, 1101 \(9th Cir.1995\)](#) (placement in disciplinary segregation presents issue of fact whether it constitutes an atypical and significant deprivation under *Sandin*).

The Second Circuit appears generally to be following the Seventh, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits. The Second Circuit has not yet definitively addressed the effect of *Sandin* on its prior holdings. See [Rodriguez v. Phillips, 66 F.3d 470, 480 \(2d Cir.1995\)](#). It has recently held, however, that *Sandin* does apply retroactively and, it appears, that a plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the deprivation in question imposed an atypical and significant hardship. See [Frazier v. Coughlin, 81 F.3d 313, 317 \(2d Cir.1996\)](#); [Samuels v. Mockry, 77 F.3d 34, 37-38 \(2d Cir.1996\)](#); see also [Giakoumelos v. Coughlin, 88 F.3d 56, 62 \(2d Cir.1996\)](#) (dicta that whether confinement in SHU is "atypical and significant" under *Sandin* presents question of fact). One judge in this district has concluded from these cases that fact-finding is required to resolve whether a deprivation is atypical and significant. Compare [Silas v. Coughlin, No. 95-CV-1526, 1996 WL 227857, at *1 \(N.D.N.Y. April 29, 1996\)](#) (Pooler, J.) (denying motion to dismiss due process claim where plaintiff was confined in SHU for 182 days, holding that Second Circuit's

Not Reported in F.Supp., 1997 WL 160124 (N.D.N.Y.)
(Cite as: 1997 WL 160124 (N.D.N.Y.))

interpretation of *Sandin* mandated further fact-finding as to nature of plaintiff's alleged deprivation from confinement), with *Cargill v. Casey*, *supra* (due process claim based on confinement in keeplock for thirty days dismissed as frivolous).

*5 Under these cases, consideration must be given to whether a plaintiff has established, or raised, a genuine question of fact concerning his disciplinary confinement. Here, plaintiff has raised no question of fact concerning his confinement in keeplock. Plaintiff has not alleged rare, unique or unusual hardships of the kind cited in *Sandin* as examples of atypical and significant deprivations. [515 U.S. at ---, 115 S.Ct. at 2300](#) (transfer to a mental hospital and involuntary administration of psychotropic drugs), or that detention in keeplock imposed a hardship on plaintiff because of his special, unique or unusual condition while incarcerated. *See Delaney v. Selsky*, 899 F.Supp. at 927-28 (question of fact whether confinement in SHU created atypical and significant deprivation for inmate who alleged such confinement caused back problems because of his unusual height of nearly seven feet).

Segregated confinement is a known and usual aspect of incarceration in the New York prison system. *See Sandin v. Conner*, [515 U.S. at ---, 115 S.Ct. at 2301](#) ("Discipline by prison officials in response to a wide range of misconduct falls within the expected parameters of the sentence imposed by a court of law."). The existence of keeplock has been authorized by statute, [N.Y. Correct. Law § 112\(1\)](#) (McKinney 1987), and implemented by DOCS regulations. [N.Y. Comp.Codes R. & Regs. tit. 7, § 301.6 \(1995\)](#). Those regulations describe the conditions and restrictions of confinement in keeplock. *Id.* at pts. 302-05. The deprivations are, therefore, part of the New York prison "regime ... to be normally expected" by one serving a sentence in that system. *Sandin v. Conner*, [515 U.S. at ---, 115 S. Ct. at 2302](#).

Moreover, confinement in keeplock or SHU may result not only from the imposition of discipline, as here. Inmates may also be placed in keeplock or SHU for reasons of administration, [N.Y. Comp.Codes R. & Regs. tit. 7, § 301.4\(b\) \(1995\)](#); protection, *id.* at § 301.5; detention, *id.* at § 301.3; reception, diagnosis and treatment, *id.* at pt. 306; or for any other reason. *Id.* at 301.7(a). The conditions for inmates confined in keeplock,

including plaintiff, are the same regardless of the reason for placement there. *Id.* at pts. 302-05. ^{FN5}

^{FN5}. Inmates confined for reasons of protection receive somewhat greater privileges. *See, e.g., N.Y. Comp.Codes R. & Regs. tit. 7, § 330.4 (1995)* (three hours per day outside cell).

Inmates in the New York system have no right to be incarcerated in any particular institution, cell or block of cells, nor do they enjoy a right to be housed in the general prison population or to participate in any particular program offered at an institution. *Cf. Meachum v. Fano*, [427 U.S. 215, 226, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 49 L.Ed.2d 451 \(1976\)](#) (no right to remain in particular prison created by state law); *Wolff v. McDonnell*, [418 U.S. 539, 557, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 \(1974\)](#) (right to good time credits created by state statute). Such matters are committed to the discretion of prison authorities. This grant of broad discretion to prison authorities comports with a principle rationale of *Sandin* that

federal courts ought to afford appropriate deference and flexibility to state officials trying to manage a volatile environment.... Such flexibility is especially warranted in the fine-tuning of the ordinary incidents of prison life, a common subject of prisoner claims....

*6 [515 U.S. at --- - ---, 115 S.Ct. at 2299-2300](#).

Here, plaintiff contends at best that his keeplock confinement was "atypical and significant" under *Sandin* because it subjected him to retaliation, caused closer monitoring by DOCS, affected his transfer to other institutions, and impaired his eligibility for certain prison programs. Pl. Mem. of Law at p. 21. These contentions are conclusory and unsupported in any way. They are also unsworn and unsigned. For these reasons alone, plaintiff's contentions should be rejected as failing to raise any issue of fact under *Sandin*.

On their merits as well, however, these contentions should be rejected. While there may be cases where confinement in keeplock might subject an inmate to retaliation from

Not Reported in F.Supp., 1997 WL 160124 (N.D.N.Y.)
(Cite as: 1997 WL 160124 (N.D.N.Y.))

other inmates or guards such that keeplock confinement imposed “atypical and significant” hardships, no such hardship has been demonstrated here by the non-specific, conclusory assertions of plaintiff. As to the contentions regarding plaintiff’s monitoring status and his eligibility for transfer and prison programs, all concern matters for which plaintiff has no special rights or interests, all were known to follow from disciplinary confinement as a regular part of DOCS’ regime, and plaintiff has asserted no hardship atypical or significant as to him concerning these matters.

For these reasons plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating the existence of any factual issue under *Sandin*. Accordingly, defendants’ motion on this ground should be granted.

2. Due Process

Defendants assert that, notwithstanding *Sandin*, plaintiff was not denied due process.

The Due Process Clause requires that an inmate faced with disciplinary confinement has a right to at least twenty-four hours advance notice of the charges against him and to be informed of the reasons for the action taken and the evidence relied upon by the hearing officer. In addition, an inmate has the right to call witnesses and present evidence in his defense “when permitting him to do so would not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564-66, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974); McCann v. Coughlin, 698 F.2d 112, 121-22 (2d Cir.1983). These rights implicitly include the right to make a statement in the inmate’s defense and the right to marshal the facts. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 472, 103 S.Ct. 864, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983); see also Patterson v. Coughlin, 761 F.2d 886, 890 (2d Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1100, 106 S.Ct. 879, 88 L.Ed.2d 916 (1986).

Where an inmate is illiterate or where the charges are unusually complex, the inmate is entitled to seek the assistance of another inmate or an employee. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 570. The Second Circuit has extended this right, and directed that inmates who are

confined pending a hearing be provided with some form of assistance. Eng v. Coughlin, 858 F.2d 889, 897-98 (2d Cir.1988). Corrections officials are required only to provide inmates with the opportunity to exercise these due process rights. See, e.g., Maid v. Henderson, 533 F.Supp. 1257, 1273 (N.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 714 F.2d 115 (2d Cir.1982) (“although [the inmate] had the right to call witnesses at his hearing, there is no evidence in the record that he ever invoked this right”).

*7 Here, plaintiff argues first that the hearing officer failed to call witnesses in the requested order. However, due process does not mandate that plaintiff be permitted to call his witnesses in a particular order.

Second, plaintiff alleges that the hearing officer failed to conduct an in camera inquiry into the original source of information on which the search was authorized to determine if that source was reliable. However, the issues at the hearing were the results of the search, not the reasons why the search was initiated. The hearing officer’s decision did not rest in any part on the information from the confidential informant. Due process thus did not require inquiry into the reliability of the original information.

Third, plaintiff contends that although the original misbehavior report contains the signatures of both defendant Yule and Officer Rando, his copy reflects only defendant Yule’s signature. However, an inmate has no right to receive a statement of charges signed by any particular official.^{FN6}

^{FN6}. A misbehavior report is to be made by the employee who has observed the incident. Where another employee has personal knowledge of the facts, he shall, where appropriate, endorse his name on the other employee’s report. N.Y. Comp.Codes R. & Regs. tit. 7, § 251-3.1(b) (1995). The misbehavior report here was signed by J. Rando and endorsed by G. Yules as an employee witness, and it is endorsed by the area supervisor. See Defs.’ Statement Pursuant to Rule 7.1(f), Ex. A, p. 1, Inmate Misbehavior Report.

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(Cite as: 1997 WL 160124 (N.D.N.Y.))

Fourth, plaintiff claims that defendant Roberts failed to provide him with various documents plaintiff requested pursuant to New York's Freedom of Information Law after the disciplinary hearing concluded. This claim as well falls outside the scope of the Due Process Clause as described by the cases discussed above. Defendants' failure to provide the requested documents did not violate plaintiff's constitutional right.

Accordingly, defendants' motion should be granted on this ground as well. ^{FN7}

^{FN7}. Throughout his complaint and pleadings, plaintiff refers jointly to his right to due process/equal protection. The facts and arguments in plaintiff's complaint and pleadings point only to a due process claim. No facts or arguments relating to the Equal Protection Clause are asserted. Nevertheless, to the extent plaintiff's complaint is deemed to assert a claim for violation of the Equal Protection Clause, defendants' motion for summary judgment should be granted as to that claim as well.

3. Cell Search

Plaintiff alleges that the search of his cell on October 30, 1995 violated his Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. ^{FN8} In Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984), the Supreme Court held that "the Fourth Amendment proscription against unreasonable searches does not apply within the confines of the prison cell." *Id.* at 526. Searches of prison cells, even arbitrary searches, implicate no protected constitutional rights. DeMaio v. Mann, 877 F.Supp. 89, 95 (N.D.N.Y.1995) (Kaplan, J.). Plaintiff thus may assert no cause of action here based on an alleged violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. ^{FN9} Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to claims regarding the search of plaintiff's cell should be granted.

^{FN8}. In his complaint plaintiff also appears to allege that the search violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process because he received a receipt for the seizure of the

marijuana five hours after the search was conducted and never received any report of the search. To the extent plaintiff asserts such a claim, summary judgment should be granted to the defendants for the reasons set forth in subsections 1 and 2 above.

^{FN9}. Nor can an inmate recover under section 1983 for intentional destruction of his personal property by a state employee, as long as the state provides a meaningful post-deprivation remedy. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. at 533. New York provides such a remedy in section 9 of the New York Court of Claims Act. Smith v. O'Connor, 901 F.Supp. 644, 647 (S.D.N.Y.1995). Plaintiff may pursue any claim regarding destruction of his personal property in state court.

4. Qualified Immunity

Defendants argue in the alternative that they are entitled to summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity.

A government official is entitled to qualified immunity if his or her conduct did not violate "a clearly established" constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982); see also Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 500 (2d Cir.1994). The contours of the right must be established to the extent that a reasonable official would recognize his acts violated that right. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987).

The following factors must be considered to determine whether a right is clearly established:

*8 (1) whether the right in question was defined with "reasonable specificity"; (2) whether the decisional law of the Supreme Court and the applicable circuit court support the existence of the right in question, and (3) whether under pre-existing law a reasonable defendant official would have understood that his or her acts were unlawful.

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Jermosen v. Smith, 945 F.2d 547, 550 (2d Cir.1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 962, 112 S.Ct. 1565, 118 L.Ed.2d 211 (1992). A determination in favor of a public officer based on qualified immunity is appropriate when, at the time the officer was acting, the right in question was not clearly established or, even if the right was established, it was not objectively reasonable for the official to recognize that his conduct violated the right. Richardson v. Selsky, 5 F.3d 616, 621 (2d Cir.1993); Ying Jing Gan v. City of New York, 996 F.2d 522 (2d Cir.1993).

Here, among other reasons, the defendants could not reasonably have known that the search of plaintiff's cell violated any of his Fourth Amendment rights or that plaintiff's due process rights were violated by the failure to call witnesses in the order requested by plaintiff. Cf. Walker v. Bates, 23 F.3d 652, 656-57 (2d Cir.1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1157, 115 S.Ct. 2608, 132 L.Ed.2d 852 (1995) (prison disciplinary hearing officer entitled to qualified immunity in suit claiming violation of due process from denial of prisoner's right to call witnesses in disciplinary hearing); Cookish v. Powell, 945 F.2d 441, 449 (1st Cir.1991) (prison official entitled to qualified immunity from charge of violating prisoner's Fourth Amendment rights by conducting body cavity search in view of prison guards of opposite sex). Therefore, the defendants' motion on this ground should be granted.

III. APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

Also pending is a renewed application by plaintiff for appointment of counsel (Docket No. 21). A review of the file in this matter reveals that the issues in dispute in this case are not overly complex. Further, there has been no indication that plaintiff has been unable to investigate the critical facts of this case. Finally, no special reason appears why appointment of counsel at this time would be more likely to lead to a just determination of this litigation. Therefore, based upon the existing record in this case, appointment of counsel is unwarranted.^{FN10}

^{FN10} Also pending is plaintiff's motion for a pre-trial conference and evidentiary hearing (Docket No. 23). This motion is untimely and is hereby denied. Plaintiff has also moved for summary judgment by default (Docket No. 11) in

response to defendants' request for an extension of time to answer the complaint. This extension was granted by order dated March 15, 1996 and defendants have answered. Accordingly, it is recommended that this motion be denied as moot.

IV. CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, for the reasons stated above, it is

RECOMMENDED that defendants' motion for summary judgment be GRANTED; and it is further

RECOMMENDED that plaintiff's motion for summary judgment by default be DENIED; and it is hereby

ORDERED that plaintiff's renewed motion for appointment of counsel is DENIED without prejudice; and it is further

ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for a pre-trial conference and an evidentiary hearing is DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court serve a copy of this Report-Recommendation and Order, by regular mail, upon the parties to this action.

*9 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may lodge written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN TEN DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir.1993); Small v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir.1989); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, 6(a), 6(e).

N.D.N.Y., 1997.
Tinsley v. Greene

Not Reported in F.Supp., 1997 WL 160124 (N.D.N.Y.)
(Cite as: 1997 WL 160124 (N.D.N.Y.))

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Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.

United States District Court,

S.D. New York.

William EDWARDS, Plaintiff,

v.

Martin HORN, et al., Defendants.

No. 10 Civ. 6194(RJS)(JLC).

March 8, 2012.

*ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION*

RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, District Judge.

*1 *Pro se* Plaintiff William Edwards brings this action pursuant to [42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986](#), alleging that at various times, Defendants violated his constitutional rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments during his incarceration at five different facilities on Rikers Island. By Order dated September 1, 2010, this matter was referred to the Honorable James L. Cott, Magistrate Judge. On April 4, 2011, Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint under [Rule 12\(b\) \(6\) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure](#). On March 3, 2011, Judge Cott set a deadline of March 4, 2011 for Plaintiff to submit an opposition to Defendants' motion. Although Judge Cott thrice extended this deadline—on May 18, 2011, June 8, 2011, and June 29, 2011—Plaintiff never submitted an opposition. Accordingly, Judge Cott properly considered Defendants' motion fully submitted.

On February 14, 2012, Judge Cott issued the attached forty-six page Report and Recommendation (the "Report"), recommending that the motion to dismiss be granted except as to Plaintiff's retaliatory termination claim against Defendant Rosa to the extent that Plaintiff seeks nominal or punitive damages. In the Report, Judge Cott advised the parties that failure to file timely objections to the Report would constitute a waiver of those objections. See [28 U.S.C. § 636\(b\)\(1\)\(C\)](#); [Fed.R.Civ.P. 72\(b\)](#). No party has filed objections to the Report, and the

time to do so has expired. Cf. [Frank v. Johnson, 968 F.2d 298 \(2d Cir.1993\)](#).

When no objections to a report and recommendation are made, the Court may adopt the report if there is no clear error on the face of the record. [Adee Motor Cars, LLC v. Amato, 388 F.Supp.2d 250, 253 \(S.D.N.Y.2005\)](#); [La Torres v. Walker, 216 F.Supp.2d 157, 159 \(S.D.N.Y.2000\)](#). After reviewing the record, the Court finds that Judge Cott's well-reasoned and careful Report is not facially erroneous. Accordingly, the Court adopts the Report in its entirety and, for the reasons set forth therein, grants Defendants' motion to dismiss as to all but one of Plaintiff's claims. The court denies the motion as to Plaintiff's retaliatory termination claim against Defendant Rosa, and only to the extent that Plaintiff seeks nominal or punitive damages against her. The Clerk of the Court is respectfully directed to terminate the motion located at Doc. No. 88.

SO ORDERED.

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

JAMES L. COTT, United States Magistrate Judge.

To The Honorable Richard J. Sullivan, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff William Edwards, proceeding pro se, brings this action pursuant to [42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986](#) alleging that Defendants violated his constitutional rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments during his incarceration in various facilities on Rikers Island. Edwards also alleges that he was discriminated against in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Defendants move to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to [Rule 12\(b\)\(6\) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure](#). For the reasons discussed below, I recommend that the motion to dismiss be granted except as to Edwards' retaliatory termination claim against Defendant Rosa.

I. BACKGROUND

Slip Copy, 2012 WL 760172 (S.D.N.Y.)

(Cite as: 2012 WL 760172 (S.D.N.Y.))

A. Factual Background

*2 The following facts are taken from the Complaint and are accepted as true for purposes of this motion. (See Complaint, dated June 23, 2010 (“Compl.”) (Dkt. No. 2)). Edwards brings this suit pursuant to [42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985](#), and [1986](#) and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (the “ADA”), [42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.](#), against 44 current and former New York City employees and two John Doe Defendants: Commissioner Martin Horn, Warden Bailey, Warden J. Davis, Warden E. Duffy, Warden Michael Hourihan, Warden Riordan, Warden Robert Shaw, Correctional Officer (“CO.”) Dinolfo, CO. Grima, CO. Hernandez, CO. Holmes, CO. Lagos, CO. Lewis, CO. Maynard, CO. Morales, CO. Noon, CO. Reyes, CO. Richardson, CO. Rosa, CO. Smalls, CO. Smith, CO. Sumpter, Captain Alleyve, Captain Bethacourt, Captain Calle, Captain G. Davis, Captain Polak, Marybeth Campfield, Ms. Carrera, Mrs. M. Cattafesta, Mr. K. Guerrant, Cook Hannah, Deputy Hill, Florence Hunter, Ms. Jenkins, Ms. K. Johnson ^{FN1}, Ms. G. Lee, Ms. P. Mimms, Mr. R. Mulvena, Ms. B. Musmacher, Ms. R. Padmore, Karen Powell, James Robinson, and Ms. Steven (together, “Defendants”). (See Compl. at 1–5). ^{FN2}

^{FN1}. In the case caption on the first page of the Complaint, Edwards mistakenly identifies Defendant Johnson as “Ms. K. Jonhson.” (Compl. at 1).

^{FN2}. In Section I.b of the Complaint, Edwards lists 38 Defendants. Six additional Defendants—Carrera, Cattafesta, Duffy, Grima, Powell, and Steven—do not appear on this list, but are named in the case caption on the first page of the Complaint.

Edwards alleges that Defendants deprived him of his constitutional rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments during his incarceration at several facilities on Rikers Island: the Anna M. Kross Center (“AMKC”), the Eric M. Taylor Center (“EMTC”), the George Motchan Detention Center (“GMDC”), the George R. Vierno Center (“GRVC”), and the Robert N. Davoren Complex (“RNDC”). At the time he filed his Complaint, Edwards was an inmate at the Clinton Correctional Facility, and he is currently on parole. (See Letter, dated Dec. 11, 2011 (Dkt. No. 135)).

Throughout his roughly 100 paragraph, single-spaced, 25–page Complaint, Edwards does not present his allegations by cause of action, nor does he clearly articulate exactly what causes of action he is asserting, as many allegations appear to overlap and lack clarity. ^{FN3} Several of Edwards' allegations deal with Defendants' actions in relation to a separate lawsuit Edwards brought in the Northern District of New York, [Edwards v. Selsky, No. 04 Civ. 493\(FJS\)\(DRH\), 2008 WL 190385 \(N.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2008\)](#) (“*Selsky*” or the “NDNY action”), which was dismissed for failure to prosecute. The Court has made every effort to identify and address all possible claims asserted in the Complaint. ^{FN4} The Court is able to identify 12 potential causes of action spanning separate dates from July 25, 2007 to April 5, 2010. Specifically, Edwards asserts the following claims: (1) verbal harassment; (2) deprivation of access to free telephone calls; (3) deprivation of access to legal services; (4) mail tampering; (5) denial of required food portions; (6) unconstitutional strip search; (7) violation of due process rights within the prison's disciplinary and grievance system; (8) excessive force and denial of medical treatment; (9) deprivation of access to the prison's grievance system; (10) retaliation; (11) conspiracy; and (12) disability discrimination under the ADA. Edwards seeks \$75,000,000 in damages, attorneys' fees, a reimbursement of penalties incurred due to two allegedly false infractions, injunctive relief in the form of expunging those false infractions, injunctive relief terminating Defendants from their positions in the New York City Department of Correction (“DOC”) and permanently enjoining them from city, state, or federal employment, and a permanent restraining order to prevent Defendants from committing any future similar violations. (Compl. ¶ V). Edwards does not present these allegations in a narrative fashion, but instead describes dozens of grievance letters that he has submitted to DOC staff at the various Rikers Island facilities over the course of nearly three years. To avoid repetition, the Court will describe the factual background relating to Edwards' specific allegations in the context of the relevant legal discussion below.

^{FN3}. Accordingly, while Defendants do not argue as much, the Complaint could also be

Slip Copy, 2012 WL 760172 (S.D.N.Y.)

(Cite as: 2012 WL 760172 (S.D.N.Y.))

dismissed under Rule 8(a)(2), which requires a pleading to contain “a short and plain statement” of the claims.

[FN4](#). Edwards has attached more than 300 pages of documents to his Complaint, consisting of grievance letters, notices of infraction, and inmate grievance committee decisions. These materials can be properly considered in deciding Defendants' motion to dismiss. *See, e.g., Sira v. Morton*, 380 F.3d 57, 67 (2d Cir.2004) (citations omitted). However, while the Court will consider these materials in support of the claims asserted in the Complaint—indeed, nearly every paragraph advises the reader to “see attached exhibit” but fails to cite to a specific page—the Court will not attempt to identify the potentially innumerable causes of action that could be construed from the hundreds of allegations contained solely in the attachments.

B. Procedural Background

*3 Edwards filed the Complaint on August 18, 2010. (Dkt. No. 2). On October 29, 2010, the United States Marshals executed service of the Summons and Complaint on 32 of the 44 named defendants.^{[FN5](#)} Over the course of the next several months, with the assistance of the Office of Corporation Counsel, the United States Marshals, and the Court, Edwards has attempted to serve the remaining 12 named defendants. (*See* Dkt. Nos. 56, 62, 69, 70, 75, 119, 120, 129). To date, Edwards has successfully served nine additional Defendants and appears to have served a number of Defendants twice.^{[FN6](#)} Accordingly, there are three named Defendants who have not been served—Bethacourt, Davis, and Johnson—and two John Doe Defendants who have not been identified.^{[FN7](#)}

[FN5](#). This set of defendants consists of Sumpter (Dkt. No. 11), Horn (Dkt. No. 12), Cattafesta (Dkt. No. 13), Hunter (Dkt. No. 15), Guerrant (Dkt. No. 17), Lagos (Dkt. No. 18), Shaw (Dkt. No. 19), Campfield (Dkt. No. 20), Reyes (Dkt. No. 21), Davis (Dkt. No. 22), Hernandez (Dkt. No. 23), Holmes (Dkt. No. 24), Rosa (Dkt. No. 25), Smith (Dkt. No. 26), Mulvena (Dkt. No. 27), Polak (Dkt. No. 28), Noon (Dkt. No. 29),

Duffy (Dkt. No. 31), Dinolfo (Dkt. No. 32), Mimms (Dkt. No. 34), Bailey (Dkt. No. 35), Lewis (Dkt. No. 36), Alleyve (Dkt. No. 37), Calle (Dkt. No. 39), Hannah (Dkt. No. 41), Hourihan (Dkt. No. 43), Jenkins (Dkt. No. 44), Maynard (Dkt. No. 45), Padmore (Dkt. No. 48), Richardson (Dkt. No. 49), Riordan (Dkt. No. 50), and Smalls (Dkt. No. 51).

[FN6](#). Since October 29, 2010, Edwards has served the following Defendants: Lee (service executed on Dec. 2, 2010 (Dkt. No. 61)); Powell (service executed on Mar. 29, 2011 (Dkt. No. 98)); Steven (service executed on Feb. 24, 2011 (Dkt. No. 110)); service executed on Mar. 31, 2011 (Dkt. No. 99)); Grima (service executed on Mar. 2, 2011 (Dkt. No. 107)); service executed on Mar. 14, 2011 (Dkt. No. 100)); Robinson (service executed on Mar. 29, 2011 (Dkt. No. 101)); Musmacher (service executed on Mar. 14, 2011 (Dkt. No. 102)); Hill (service executed on Feb. 24, 2011 (Dkt. No. 112)); service executed on Mar. 14, 2011 (Dkt. No. 103)); Horn (service executed on Mar. 31, 2011 (Dkt. No. 97)); and Carrera (service executed on Oct. 6, 2011 (Dkt. No. 131)).

[FN7](#). As to Defendant Bethacourt, the Office of Corporation Counsel advised the Court by letter dated June 8, 2011 that it is unable to locate records that would assist in identifying Bethacourt. Accordingly, as stated in the Court's Order dated June 9, 2011 (Dkt. No. 120), it does not appear that any further action can be taken to identify this Defendant. As to Defendant Davis, the Office of Corporation Counsel advised the Court by letter dated February 16, 2011 that the Legal Bureau of the DOC would accept service on his behalf. By Order dated September 1, 2011, the Court directed Edwards to serve Davis by September 26, 2011 (Dkt. No. 129), but the docket sheet does not reflect any attempt to effect service. Lastly, on October 31, 2011, Edwards attempted to serve Defendant Johnson but was unsuccessful because she was not located at the address provided by the Office of

Slip Copy, 2012 WL 760172 (S.D.N.Y.)

(Cite as: 2012 WL 760172 (S.D.N.Y.))

Corporation Counsel. (*See* Order, dated Dec. 12, 2011 (Dkt. No. 134), at 1). Edwards was directed to again attempt to serve Johnson by January 27, 2012 (*Id.*), but no proof of service has been filed.

During the pendency of his lawsuit, Edwards has submitted several requests to the Court. By Order dated November 1, 2010, the Court denied Edwards' request for an order prohibiting certain employees at the Southport Correctional Facility, where Edwards was incarcerated at the time, from tampering with his legal and personal mail. (Dkt. No. 8). By Orders dated November 30, 2010 and April 14, 2011, the Court denied Edwards' motions for default judgment against certain Defendants (Dkt.Nos.56, 92), and Edwards' interlocutory appeal of the November 30 Order was denied by the Second Circuit on May 26, 2011. (Dkt. No. 118). By Orders dated February 9, 2011, I declined Edwards' request that I disqualify myself from this action and also denied his motion for the appointment of counsel. (Dkt.Nos.73–74). Lastly, on March 8, 2011, I denied Edwards' request for sanctions in connection with Corporation Counsel's providing Edwards with service addresses for Defendants. (Dkt. No. 81).

On April 4, 2011, Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint under [Rule 12\(b\)\(6\) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure](#). (*See* Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss, dated Apr. 4, 2011 (“Def.Mem.”) (Dkt. No. 89)).^{FN8} Defendants assert that Edwards has failed to state a claim as to his verbal harassment, deprivation of telephone access, unconstitutional strip search, mail tampering, denial of food, denial of legal services, due process, grievance processing and protocol, excessive force and medical treatment, conspiracy, and retaliation causes of action. (Def. Mem. at 16–45). In addition, Defendants argue that Edwards' claims against Defendants Bailey, Cattafesta, Davis, Hill, Horn, Hourihan, Powell, and Riordan fail for lack of personal involvement, all defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, and Edwards' claims are barred by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (the “PLRA”).^{FN9} (*Id.* at 14–16, 45–48). Pursuant to the Court's Order dated March 3, 2011, Edwards' deadline to submit an opposition to Defendants' motion was May 4, 2011. (Dkt. No. 80). However, despite receiving several extensions—first to

May 18 (Dkt. No. 90) then to June 8 (Dkt. No. 116) and June 29 (Dkt. No. 122)—Edwards has not submitted any opposition. Accordingly, the Court considers Defendants' motion fully submitted.

[FN8](#). Although the motion to dismiss was not filed on behalf of any of the unserved Defendants (*see* Def. Mem. at 2–3 n. 2), Counsel has stated that the arguments raised apply equally to all Defendants. Accordingly, in light of my recommendation to dismiss all claims against all Defendants except the retaliatory termination claim against Defendant Rosa, *see infra* Section ILK, the Court should *sua sponte* dismiss the Complaint as to Defendants Bethacourt, Davis, John Doe # 1, John Doe # 2, and Johnson.

[FN9](#). Defendants have not moved to dismiss any of Edwards' claims on the ground that he has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, as he is required to have done under the PLRA. *See* [42 U.S.C. § 1997e\(a\)](#) (“No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [Section 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”). While exhaustion under [Section 1997e\(a\)](#) is mandatory, *see* [Porter v. Nussle](#), 534 U.S. 516, 524, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002), non-exhaustion “is an affirmative defense that is waiveable.” [Handberry v. Thompson](#), 446 F.3d 335, 342 (2d Cir.2006) (citations, alterations, and quotation marks omitted); *see also* [Jones v. Bock](#), 549 U.S. 199, 216, 127 S.Ct. 910, 166 L.Ed.2d 798 (2007); [Hemphill v. New York](#), 380 F.3d 680, 686 (2d Cir.2004). Here, because Defendants have not argued that Edwards failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, the non-exhaustion defense has been waived. *See, e.g.,* [Ortiz v. Dep't of Corr. of the City of N.Y.](#), No. 08 Civ. 2195(RJS)(HBP), 2011 WL 2638137, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 2011) (defendant's failure to raise non-exhaustion constitutes waiver) (Report and Recommendation), [adopted](#), 2011 WL 2638140

Slip Copy, 2012 WL 760172 (S.D.N.Y.)

(Cite as: 2012 WL 760172 (S.D.N.Y.))

(S.D.N.Y. Jul.5, 2011); Hobson v. Fischer, No. 10 Civ. 5512(SAS), 2011 WL 891314, at *2 n. 22 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.14, 2011) (finding waiver even where grievance “appears not to have been fully exhausted” under PLRA).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Applicable Legal Standards

*4 A plaintiff's failure to oppose a 12(b)(6) motion does not by itself merit dismissal of a complaint. See Goldberg v. Danaher, 599 F.3d 181, 183–84 (2d Cir.2010); McCall v. Pataki, 232 F.3d 321, 322–23 (2d Cir.2000). “[T]he sufficiency of a complaint is a matter of law that the court is capable of determining based on its own reading of the pleading and knowledge of the law. If a complaint is sufficient to state a claim on which relief can be granted, the plaintiff's failure to respond to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion does not warrant dismissal.” *Id.* Consequently, as with all Rule 12(b)(6) motions, in deciding an unopposed motion to dismiss, a court is to “assume the truth of a pleading's factual allegations and test only its legal sufficiency” according to the principles below. *Id.* at 322.

A complaint will not survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss if it “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Although “a complaint attacked by a 12(b)(6) motion does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (quotation marks and citations omitted). “To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must set out only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Hollander v. Copacabana Nightclub, 624 F.3d 30, 32 (2d Cir.2010) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)). “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] ... a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950 (citation omitted). A complaint thus may only survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss if it has “facial plausibility” and pleads enough facts to allow the court to “draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” *Id.* at 1949.

Given that Edwards is proceeding *pro se*, the Court must “construe [his Amended Complaint] broadly and interpret it to raise the strongest arguments it suggests.” Sharpe v. Conole, 386 F.3d 482, 484 (2d Cir.2004) (citation omitted). Furthermore, “when the plaintiff proceeds *pro se* ... a court is obliged to construe his pleadings liberally, particularly when they allege civil rights violations.” McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir.2004) (citation omitted). Nevertheless, “a *pro se* litigant [is] bound by the same rules of law ... as those [litigants] represented by counsel.” Fertig v. HRA Med. Assistance Program, No. 10 Civ. 8191(RPP), 2011 WL 1795235, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 6, 2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

B. Verbal Harassment

Edwards asserts that several Defendants, in violation of Section 1983, used harassing, threatening, and profane language towards him on 17 separate occasions taking place between July 25, 2007 and September 1, 2008. (Compl.¶¶ III, 2, 6, 8, 17, 19, 22, 24, 30, 33, 37, 38, 53, 55, 61, 83, 91(b)). In separate allegations, he claims that Defendants Campfield, Dinolfo, Grima, Hannah, Hernandez, Holmes, Lewis, Maynard, Morales, Noon, Reyes, Richardson, Smalls, and Smith, called him a “snitch” in front of other inmates, mocked his disability, falsely informed him that he had a visitor when in fact he did not have a visitor, and directed racial slurs and profane language toward him. (*Id.*). These claims should be dismissed. The Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment, Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976), but its protection does not extend to verbal harassment of an inmate by correction officers without any resulting “appreciable injury.” Roseboro v. Gillespie, 791 F.Supp.2d 353, 373 (S.D.N.Y.2011) (quoting Purcell v. Coughlin, 790 F.2d 263, 265 (2d Cir.1986)).

*5 Verbal harassment, by itself, is not a constitutional violation. See, e.g., Tafari v. McCarthy, 714 F.Supp.2d 317, 364 (N.D.N.Y.2010) (“[v]erbal harassment itself does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation [.]” and “[v]erbal abuse, vulgarity, and even threats are insufficient to rise to the level of constitutional

Slip Copy, 2012 WL 760172 (S.D.N.Y.)

(Cite as: 2012 WL 760172 (S.D.N.Y.))

violations”) (quotation marks and citation omitted); Davidson v. Bartholome, 460 F.Supp.2d 436, 446 (S.D.N.Y.2006) (no relief to inmate “simply because [an officer] made a hostile or derogatory comment”); Lunney v. Brureton, No. 04 Civ. 2438(LAK) (GWG), 2005 WL 121720, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2005) (no claim because merely “insulting” or “disrespectful” comments “do not give rise to a constitutional violation”) (quotation marks and citations omitted) (Report and Recommendation), adopted, 2005 WL 433285 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.23, 2005). Absent any appreciable injury, courts routinely dismiss claims of verbal harassment brought under Section 1983. See, e.g., Felder v. Fillion, 368 F. App'x 253, 256 (2d Cir.2010) (verbal harassment did not violate Eighth Amendment where plaintiff did not present evidence of resulting injury); Johnson v. Eggersdorf, 8 F. App'x 140, 143 (2d Cir.2001) (“allegations of verbal harassment are insufficient to base a [Section] 1983 claim if no specific injury is alleged”). Because Edwards does not allege any injury whatsoever, let alone one that could be considered “appreciable,” Defendants' alleged threats, verbal harassment, or profane language do not give rise to constitutional violations and should therefore be dismissed.

C. Denial of Required Telephone Calls

Edwards alleges that since his incarceration began on January 23, 2008, he has not been provided with a free telephone call as required by the “DOC Telephone System.” (Compl.¶46).^{FN10} Edwards further alleges that he submitted a grievance on June 3, 2008 regarding his deprivation of free telephone calls. (*Id.*). However, “[p]hone restrictions do not impinge on a prisoner's constitutional rights where an inmate has alternate means of communicating with the outside world.” Henry v. Davis, No. 10 Civ. 7575(PAC)(JLC), 2011 WL 3295986, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2011) (citing cases) (Report and Recommendation), adopted, 2011 WL 5006831 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.20, 2011). Because inmates “have no right to unlimited telephone calls[.]” Bellamy v. McMickens, 692 F.Supp. 205, 214 (S.D.N.Y.1998) (citation omitted), Edwards must, but fails to, allege that he was stripped of alternate methods of communication to state a violation of his constitutional rights. See, e.g., Paulino v. Menifee, No. 00 Civ. 5719(RCC)(KNF), 2001 WL 243207, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2001) (refusing to issue injunction

restoring phone privileges where inmate did not allege that alternate means of communication were inadequate). Edwards' claim regarding the denial of free telephone calls should therefore be dismissed.

^{FN10} In the context of his claim for the denial of free telephone calls, Edwards provides different dates for the start of his incarceration, stating January 23, 2008 in his Complaint and January 24, 2008 in an attached exhibit. (Compl. ¶ 46; Dkt. No. 2–3 at 4). These cited dates, however, appear to be inconsistent with the commencement of Edwards' incarceration, as his earliest allegation in this lawsuit takes place on July 25, 2007 while he was housed at the AMKC. (*Id.* ¶ III). In any event, regardless of whether Edwards has been denied free telephone calls since July 2007 or January 2008, his cause of action should be dismissed because he has failed to state an actionable claim.

D. Deprivation of Access to Legal Services

*6 Edwards alleges numerous deprivations of access to legal services by Defendants Campfield, Musmacher, and Smalls. As to Campfield, Edwards alleges that in March 2008 she denied him a legal manila envelope, lost his legal documents pertaining to the NDNY action, and denied him legal services. (Compl. ¶¶ 31, 36). As to Musmacher, Edwards asserts that she denied him legal services for more than a month around August 2008 and discriminated against him by providing legal services to Latino detainees when Edwards was “next ... on line” to receive such services. (*Id.* ¶¶ 56–57). As to Smalls, Edwards claims that she denied him extra time in the prison facility's law library in August 2008. (*Id.* ¶ 61). Each of these claims should be dismissed.

The Supreme Court has recognized that an inmate does not have “an abstract, freestanding right to a law library or legal assistance.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996). Rather, a prison facility must ensure that its inmates have “ ‘a reasonably adequate opportunity to present claimed violations of fundamental constitutional rights to the courts.’ ” *Id.* (quoting Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 825, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977)). Accordingly, for a defendant's conduct to provide a basis for an inmate to

Slip Copy, 2012 WL 760172 (S.D.N.Y.)

(Cite as: 2012 WL 760172 (S.D.N.Y.))

invoke his right of access to the courts, it must cause “actual injury” or “materially prejudice[]” the inmate. [Salvatierra v. Connolly, No. 09 Civ. 3722\(SHS\)\(DF\), 2010 WL 5480756, at *21 \(S.D. N.Y. Sept. 1, 2010\)](#) (citations and quotation marks omitted) (Report and Recommendation), [adopted, 2011 WL 9398 \(S.D.N.Y. Jan.3, 2011\)](#).

Here, Edwards does not state sufficient facts to constitute any injury or material prejudice. He does not claim any injury suffered because of Defendants' alleged denials of legal services, legal supplies, extra time in the law library, or alleged discrimination in favor of Latino detainees. While he asserts that Campfield's losing his legal documents in connection with the NDNY action prevented him from “prosecuting” that action (Compl.¶ 36), he fails to provide any specifics as to his purported inability to prosecute. He does not elaborate on, for example, what documents he believes were lost and what actions he was prevented from taking in his litigation, which is especially relevant since Edwards appears to have participated in the NDNY lawsuit in some capacity, but failed to keep the court apprised of his mailing address. See [Selsky, 2008 WL 190385, at *1–3](#). Accordingly, because Edwards has not identified any injury or material prejudice as a result of his alleged deprivation of access to legal services, these claims should be dismissed.

E. Mail Tampering

Edwards' mail tampering claims are based on allegations of interference with his outgoing non-legal mail and his incoming and outgoing legal mail at the EMTC and AMKC. Specifically, Edwards first alleges that on November 1, 2007 he wrote a letter to Michael Caruso at the DOC that was never sent from the EMTC. (Compl.¶ 16). Second, Edwards alleges that his “legal mail” addressed to Caruso never left the EMTC and was returned to him on November 27, 2007. ([Id. ¶ 27](#)). Next, Edwards submitted a grievance on September 8, 2008 alleging that his “personal and legal mail” addressed to a co-defendant never left the AMKC because it was returned for insufficient postage despite being marked with a postage stamp. ([Id. ¶ 70](#)). Edwards' fourth claim of mail tampering relates to the NDNY action. He asserts that Defendant Davis failed to forward his incoming legal mail to the correct address, despite Edwards' instruction for him

to do so, and that as a result, his NDNY lawsuit was dismissed. ([Id. ¶ 47](#)). Lastly, Edwards alludes to an allegation of tampering with his outgoing “legal and personal mail” against unnamed AMKC staff, which he documented in a November 18, 2008 grievance letter. ([Id. ¶ 94](#)). None of these claims should withstand a motion to dismiss.

*7 Both legal and non-legal mail are protected by the First Amendment's “right to the free flow of incoming and outgoing mail.” [Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 351 \(2d Cir.2003\)](#). “[A] prison official's interference with an inmate's mail may violate his First Amendment right to free speech, which includes the ‘right to be free from unjustified governmental interference with communication.’ “ [Cancel v. Goord, No. 00 Civ.2042\(LMM\), 2001 WL 303713, at *5 \(S.D.N.Y. Mar.29, 2001\)](#) (citation omitted). In addition, “the Supreme Court has recognized that ‘the implications of outgoing correspondence for prison security are of a categorically lesser magnitude than the implications of incoming materials.’ “ [Id.](#) (quoting [Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413, 109 S.Ct. 1874, 104 L.Ed.2d 459 \(1989\)\).](#)

With these principles in mind, Edwards' allegations as to outgoing non-legal mail-non-legal mail being afforded less protection than legal mail, [Davis, 320 F.3d at 351](#)—fail to state a claim because he does not assert that Defendants actually tampered with his mail, only that his mail never left the facility. Moreover, instead of establishing plausible mail tampering claims for his outgoing non-legal mail, Edwards' alleged facts make mail tampering an unlikely possibility. For example, Edwards' allegation that his November 1, 2007 letter to Michael Caruso never left the EMTC is based solely on the fact that Caruso never answered the letter. (Compl.¶ 16). Caruso's failure to respond to Edwards' letter, of course, does not necessarily suggest that it was never sent by EMTC staff. Absent any allegations that Defendants opened the letter, withheld it from being sent, or otherwise took any adverse action to make it plausible that EMTC staff tampered with Edwards' outgoing mail, Edwards' claim is merely speculative. Similarly, Edwards' allegation in his September 8, 2008 grievance that a letter to a co-defendant was returned to him for insufficient postage despite having a postage stamp does not suggest mail tampering, but rather that

Slip Copy, 2012 WL 760172 (S.D.N.Y.)

(Cite as: 2012 WL 760172 (S.D.N.Y.))

Edwards had failed to affix sufficient postage. (*Id.* ¶ 70). In any event, an isolated failure to mail an inmate's letter does not state a constitutional violation. *See, e.g., Battice v. Phillip*, No. 04 Civ. 669(FB)(LB), 2006 WL 2190565, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2006) (defendant's failure to deliver plaintiff's mail, even if intentional, is “simply *de minimis* and therefore outside the ambit of constitutional protection”) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Finally, Edwards' claim regarding mail tampering in November 2008 is devoid of any facts that could state a cause of action. (Compl.¶ 94).

As to Edwards' claims regarding interference with his incoming and outgoing legal mail, the Court notes that such interference “implicates a prison inmate's rights to access to the courts and free speech as guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.” *Davis*, 320 F.3d at 351. To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must allege that correction officers “regularly and unjustifiably” interfered with his mail, depriving him of his constitutional rights. *Shepherd v. Fisher*, No. 08 Civ. 9297(LTS)(RLE), 2011 WL 3278966, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2011) (citations and quotation marks omitted). To assert such a claim, a prisoner must allege that the defendant's actions (1) were “deliberate and malicious” and (2) “resulted in actual injury” to the plaintiff. *Cancel*, 2001 WL 303713, at *4 (quoted in *Davis*, 320 F.3d at 351). Actual injury exists where interference with legal mail results in “the dismissal of an otherwise meritorious legal claim.” *Id.* However, “[m]ere delay in being able to work on one's legal action or communicate with the courts does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.” *Id.* at 352 (citations and quotation marks omitted).

*8 None of Edwards' claims of interference with his legal mail—both those related to incoming and outgoing mail—sufficiently states an actual injury. Edwards fails to allege that he suffered any injury in connection with DOC staff's alleged failure to send his outgoing legal mail on November 27, 2007, September 8, 2008, or November 18, 2008, assuming that Edwards' “legal mail” is in fact legal mail. (Compl.¶¶ 27, 70, 94). For the same reason, Edwards' claim pertaining to incoming mail from the NDNY does not state a constitutional violation. This claim is based on Defendant Davis' alleged failure to adhere to

Edwards' request to have his mail sent to a forwarding address. For support, Edwards appears to rely on language in Judge Scullin's order that the magistrate judge's report and recommendation was returned to the Court marked “unable to forward.” (Compl.¶ 47). The NDNY action, however, was not dismissed solely because certain documents were returned to the Court. Rather, the case was dismissed for Edwards' failure, for more than one year, to prosecute the action, which included his failure to keep the court and defendants apprised of his address, appear for a deposition, or pay a sanction, despite being aware of the pending litigation. *See Selsky*, 2008 WL 190385, at *1–3. Even if Davis had complied with Edwards' forwarding request, the court's decision to dismiss the complaint for Edwards' “repeated and ongoing failures to fulfill his obligations to notify the [c]ourt and counsel of his address and to cooperate in discovery” would likely have remained unchanged. *Id.* at *3. The alleged failure to forward did not, therefore, cause “the dismissal of an otherwise meritorious legal claim.” *Cancel*, 2001 WL 303713, at *4 (citation omitted).

Moreover, Edwards does not plead that Defendants blocked his outgoing legal mail in connection with the NDNY action. Indeed, Edwards could not assert such an argument, since, as Judge Scullin noted, he had previously mailed documents to the court during the pendency of his lawsuit. *See Selsky*, 2008 WL 190385, at *1–2. Accordingly, Edwards cannot establish the requisite injury needed to state a cause of action for the deprivation of his constitutional right of access to the courts. Edwards' mail tampering claims should therefore be dismissed.

F. Denial of Required Food Portions

Edwards alleges that on several occasions Defendants Lagos, Lewis, and Richardson deprived him of required food portions, including “prescribed therapeutic diet ‘soy milk’ “ on April 19, 2008 (Compl.¶ 38), a second chicken patty on or around May 2008 (*Id.* ¶ 43), a “morning meal” on July 31, 2008 (*Id.* ¶ 53), and an “afternoon meal” on or around October 2008. (*Id.* ¶ 90). Each of these claims should be dismissed. The Eighth Amendment requires that prisoners be provided with “nutritionally adequate food that is prepared and served under conditions which do not present an immediate danger to the health and well being of the inmates who consume it.” *Robles v. Coughlin*, 725

Slip Copy, 2012 WL 760172 (S.D.N.Y.)

(Cite as: 2012 WL 760172 (S.D.N.Y.))

F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir.1983) (per curiam) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Courts have found the Eighth Amendment to be implicated only where a prisoner's allegations involve a serious and continued deprivation of nutritionally adequate food. *See, e.g., Reeder v. Artus*, No. 09 Civ. 575(DNH)(DRH), 2010 WL 3636138, at *11 (N.D.N.Y. July 27, 2010) (seven out of twelve days without meals constituted sufficient deprivation to survive motion to dismiss) (Report and Recommendation), adopted, 2010 WL 3636132 (N.D.N.Y. Sept.9, 2010).

*9 Edwards does not allege that the alleged denials of food placed his health and well being in any immediate danger. *See, e.g., Martinez v. Lape*, No. 09 Civ. 0665(TJM)(RFT), 2011 WL 4527943, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2011) (Report and Recommendation), adopted, 2011 WL 4528980 (N.D.N.Y. Sept.28, 2011) (no Eighth Amendment claim where inmate failed to allege how expired food and juice posed an immediate risk to health); *Bee v. Krupp*, No. 08 Civ. 10141(SHS)(KNF), 2009 WL 2981910, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2009) (“visible globs of spit” in food did not violate Eighth Amendment). Nor do the allegations, which are alleged to have taken place on four separate dates over a span of six months, suggest that Edwards was in any danger. Accordingly, Edwards' claims regarding deprivation of meals should be dismissed.

G. Unconstitutional Strip Search

Edwards alleges that an unspecified officer subjected him to an “institutional” strip search on an unspecified date in violation of the Fourth Amendment. (Compl.¶ 13). Edwards argues that this strip search was unconstitutional because he was convicted of a misdemeanor and not a felony. (*Id.*). While the Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable searches,” *Bell v. Wolfish*, 441 U.S. 520, 558, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (citation omitted), it is not unreasonable for prison officials to perform routine random strip searches on prison inmates. *See N.G. v. Connecticut*, 382 F.3d 225, 230–32 (2d Cir.2004). Edwards' reliance on the distinction between inmates convicted of misdemeanors and those convicted of felonies is misplaced, as that distinction is only relevant as to pre-trial detainees. *See Shain v. Ellison*, 356 F.3d 211, 214 (2d Cir.2004) (“clearly established Fourth Amendment precedent ... preclude[s] jails from strip

searching misdemeanor arrestees absent a reasonable suspicion that weapons or other contraband were concealed”); *Walsh v. Franco*, 849 F.2d 66, 70 (2d Cir.1988) (“indiscriminate strip-searching of misdemeanor arrestees is unconstitutional”). Here, Edwards admits that he was convicted at the time of his strip search. (Compl.¶ 13). *See, e.g., Castro-Sanchez v. NY. State Dep't of Corr. Servs.*, No. 10 Civ. 8314(DLC), 2011 WL 6057837, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.6, 2011) (strip search claim dismissed because routine random searches of inmates are constitutional). Accordingly, Edwards' claim should be dismissed.

H. Deprivation of Due Process Rights Within Prison's Disciplinary System

Edwards alleges that he was denied certain rights during two disciplinary proceedings heard by Defendant Davis on September 30, 2008, which can be broadly construed as a claim asserting a deprivation of procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. (Compl.¶¶ 86, 87b, 89, 95, 97–99). The disciplinary hearings appear to relate to Edwards' alleged violations of “numerous [] rules within the inmate misbehavior rule book” on September 20, 2008 and September 24, 2008. (*Id.* ¶¶ 86, 87). Edwards takes issue with several aspects of the disciplinary hearings, including that: (1) Davis found him guilty of the infraction without conducting an investigation into Edwards' claim that he never received a copy of the rule book (*Id.* ¶ 86); (2) Davis failed to provide him with certain documentary evidence that “could have help [ed]” Edwards defend himself, including Edwards' “orange detention card,” his “injury report,” and a video tape of the alleged infraction (*Id.* ¶¶ 86, 87b); (3) no witnesses to Edwards' violations “endor[s]e[d]” the infraction against him (*Id.* ¶ 87); and (4) Edwards never received responses to notices of appeal and letters submitted to Horn, Hourihan, Hunter, and Robinson regarding his fine and punitive segregation. (*Id.* ¶¶ 86, 87b, 89, 94–99). In addition, Edwards appears to challenge his resulting discipline, which included a \$25.00 “surcharge” and 30 days of punitive segregation. (*Id.* ¶¶ 87, 87b).

*10 Edwards' cause of action for deprivation of his procedural due process rights fails because he does not allege sufficient facts to state an actionable claim. “In evaluating due process claims, the threshold issue is always whether the plaintiff has a property or liberty interest protected by the Constitution.” *Perry v.*

Slip Copy, 2012 WL 760172 (S.D.N.Y.)

(Cite as: 2012 WL 760172 (S.D.N.Y.))

McDonald, 280 F.3d 159, 173 (2d Cir.2001) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Prisoners subject to disciplinary proceedings can show a liberty interest only where “an institution’s disciplinary decision results in an ‘atypical and significant hardship ... in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.’” Luna v. Pico, 356 F.3d 481, 487 n. 3 (2d Cir.2004) (quoting Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995)). In determining whether an inmate endured atypical and significant hardship during punitive segregation, the Second Circuit instructs courts to consider both the duration and conditions of the confinement. See Palmer v. Richards, 364 F.3d 60, 64 (2d Cir.2004) (“[f]actors relevant to determining” whether inmate endured atypical hardship include “the extent to which the conditions of the disciplinary segregation differ from other routine prison conditions and the duration of the disciplinary segregation imposed compared to discretionary confinement”) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

The Second Circuit has expressly declined to provide a bright-line rule as to what length of time in punitive confinement implicates a prisoner’s constitutional rights; however, general guidelines have been defined. See *id.* Confinement for 101 days or fewer under typical punitive segregation conditions “generally do[es] not constitute ‘atypical’ conditions of confinement.” Bunting v. Nagy, 452 F.Supp.2d 447, 456 (S.D.N.Y.2006) (quoting Sealey v. Giltner, 197 F.3d 578, 589 (2d Cir.1999)); Colon v. Howard, 215 F.3d 227, 231 (2d Cir.2000). By contrast, 305 days or more of confinement has been deemed an atypical and a significant hardship. *Id.* at 231–32. Even if an inmate is segregated for fewer than 101 days, a violation of his liberty interest may be implicated if “the conditions were more severe than the normal [punitive segregation] conditions ... or a more fully developed record showed that even relatively brief confinements under normal [punitive segregation] conditions were, in fact, atypical.” Davis v. Barrett, 576 F.3d 129, 133 (2d Cir.2009) (quoting Palmer, 364 F.3d at 65); see also Ortiz v. McBride, 380 F.3d 649, 654–55 (2d Cir.2004). Indeed, “‘the conditions of confinement are a distinct and equally important consideration’ in determining whether the prisoner has suffered a due process violation.” Sales v. Barizone, No. 03 Civ. 6691(RJH), 2004 WL 2781752, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.2, 2004) (quoting Palmer, 364 F.3d at

64–65).

Here, Edwards claims that he was confined to punitive segregation for 30 days. Several courts have concluded that, absent unusual conditions, 30 days of segregation is not an atypical or significant hardship under *Sandin*. See, e.g., Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486 (30 days’ disciplinary segregation not atypical and significant hardship); Duncan v. Keane, No. 95 Civ. 1090(SHS), 1997 WL 328070, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 13, 1997) (30 days in keeplock not atypical or significant hardship) (citation omitted); Harris v. Keane, 962 F.Supp. 397, 404 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (23 days in keeplock not atypical or significant hardship as “[t]he Second Circuit’s post-*Sandin* decisions are unanimous that keeplock of 60 days or less in New York prisons is not an atypical hardship”) (quotation marks and citations omitted); Zamakshari v. Dvoskin, 899 F.Supp. 1097, 1108 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (60 days in confinement does not implicate liberty interest). Given the duration of his segregation and Edwards’ failure to allege that the conditions of his confinement were atypical and significant, Edwards’ punishment does not implicate a liberty interest. Similarly, Edwards’ \$25.00 “surcharge” was not an atypical hardship. See, e.g., Byrd v. Cornell Corr., Inc., 60 F. App’x 191, 193–94 (10th Cir.2003) (\$50 fine and 30 days’ segregation not atypical and significant hardship). Thus, neither Edwards’ punitive segregation nor his \$25 fine implicates the requisite liberty interest to state a due process claim.^{FN11} Because of the absence of any protected liberty interest—and because Edwards’ allegations cannot be construed to allege a protected property interest—any failures by the hearing officer to conduct a thorough investigation of Edwards’ claims, including the provision of certain documentary evidence and witnesses, do not support a cause of action for the denial of due process. See, e.g., Torres v. Mazzuca, 246 F.Supp.2d 334, 341–42 (S.D.N.Y.2003) (inmate cannot claim due process violations at hearing where 12-day disciplinary confinement did not implicate protected liberty interest). Edwards’ procedural due process claims should therefore be dismissed.

^{FN11} Edwards also alleges a claim for the deprivation of his procedural due process rights in connection with a September 24, 2008 disciplinary hearing. This claim fails because

Slip Copy, 2012 WL 760172 (S.D.N.Y.)

(Cite as: 2012 WL 760172 (S.D.N.Y.))

Edwards cannot establish the requisite liberty interest, as he does not allege that he was subject to any discipline as a result of Davis' finding him guilty on September 24, 2008. (Compl.¶ 86).

Even if Edwards had alleged disciplinary confinement resulting from the September 28 hearing, and assuming that that confinement implicated a liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment, Edwards still cannot state a claim for deprivation of due process. Citing to the Notice of Disciplinary Disposition Form # 6500D attached to the Complaint (Dkt. No. 2–7 at 1), Edwards alleges that he was “never called down” for the hearing and that the hearing officer, Defendant Davis, was biased in favor of finding him guilty of the underlying infraction. (Compl.¶ 86). While an inmate “has a right to a fair and impartial hearing officer [,]” Kalwasinski v. Morse, 201 F.3d 103, 108 (2d Cir.1999) (citation omitted), and one who “does not prejudge the evidence[,]” Patterson v. Coughlin, 905 F.2d 564, 570 (2d Cir.1990), Edwards fails to plead any specific facts, beyond his conclusory allegation of bias, to suggest that Davis was predisposed to finding him guilty. Moreover, despite Edwards' claim that he was never called down for a disciplinary hearing, Edwards' signature appears next to a notation on the Form # 6500D that the hearing was adjourned by Edwards himself.

I. Excessive Force and Denial of Required Medical Treatment

*11 Edwards asserts two allegations of physical injury, which the Court construes as excessive force claims, and a related allegation that he was denied medical treatment. (Compl.¶¶ 91, 91b). Edwards asserts that on November 1, 2008, Defendant Grima hit him in the head with a “pushdraw” and then refused Edwards' request for medical treatment. (*Id.* ¶ 91). He also argues that Grima inflicted “personal physical harm” upon him after Grima pressed the “emergency personal alarm device.” (*Id.* ¶ 91b). Neither of these claims should survive Defendants'

motion to dismiss.

The constitutional basis for Edwards' excessive force and deliberate indifference to medical needs claims is the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989); Hemmings v. Gorczyk, 134 F.3d 104, 108 (2d Cir.1998) (per curiam). Any actionable claim under the Eighth Amendment consists of a subjective component, which focuses on the defendant's motive for his conduct, and an objective component, which focuses on the conduct's effect. See, e.g., Wright v. Goord, 554 F.3d 255, 268 (2d Cir.2009). The subjective component “requires a showing that the defendant had the necessary level of culpability, shown by actions characterized by wantonness ...” *Id.* (citations and quotation marks omitted). In the excessive force context, this means “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6–7, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992). In the medical needs context, the defendant must act with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind[,]” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991), which means that he must “know[] of and disregard[] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). The Eighth Amendment's objective component “focuses on the harm done, in light of contemporary standards of decency” and whether “the alleged wrongdoing was objectively harmful enough to establish a constitutional violation.” Wright, 554 F.3d at 268 (citations and quotation marks omitted). For deliberate indifference claims, “the alleged deprivation must be sufficiently serious ... that a condition of urgency, one that may produce death, degeneration, or extreme pain exists.” Hathaway v. Coughlin, 99 F.3d 550, 553 (2d Cir.1996) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

Edwards' allegations of excessive force and denial of medical treatment fail to meet either the subjective or objective components under the Eighth Amendment. Both claims of excessive force are devoid of any specific information regarding the extent of a temporary or

Slip Copy, 2012 WL 760172 (S.D.N.Y.)

(Cite as: 2012 WL 760172 (S.D.N.Y.))

permanent injury, if any, and the level of pain that Edwards endured. The entirety of Edwards' first allegation of excessive force is that Grima "hit [him] in [the] head with the pushdraw that's part of the officers [sic] station" (Compl.¶ 91), which falls far short of what is needed to state a claim of excessive force. As to his second allegation, Edwards states only that Grima "caused [him] personal physical harm" after Grima pressed his "emergency personal alarm device[.]" but he fails to elaborate on what exactly Grima did, how and where it harmed Edwards, and what injury Edwards suffered. (*Id.* ¶ 91b). Edwards' medical treatment claims are similarly deficient, as he alleges only that Grima "said 'no' " after Edwards requested medical assistance and then sent Edwards away to pack up his belongings. (*Id.* ¶ 91). These allegations do not shed light on whether any injury that Edwards suffered was sufficiently serious to warrant medical attention, whether Grima knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to Edwards' health, or even whether there was any risk to Edwards' health. Accordingly, Edwards has failed to state claims for excessive force and denial of medical treatment, and those claims should be dismissed.

J. Deprivation of Access to Prison Grievance System

*12 Throughout the Complaint, Edwards claims that he submitted several grievance letters and complaints to numerous Defendants, who he alleges denied, ignored, never answered, and/or improperly processed his grievances on various dates from July 2007 through February 2009. (Compl.¶¶ 1–15, 17–20, 21–33, 36–39, 41–45, 48–51, 54–85, 88, 90, 91b, 92–94, 96). As one example, Edwards states that on September 18, 2007, he wrote a complaint letter to Defendant Horn about Defendant Rosa's use of her cellular phone while on duty, which caused a "security breach." (*Id.* ¶ 7). Edwards alleges that he was denied access to the grievance system because Defendant Mulvena failed to file that grievance (or any of his other grievances) and Defendant Horn did not follow up regarding the complaint. (*Id.*).

While a plaintiff has a right "to meaningful access to the court and to petition the government for the redress of grievances" under the First Amendment, *Shell v. Brzezniak*, 365 F.Supp.2d 362, 369–70 (W.D.N.Y.2005) (citation omitted), the failure to process a grievance does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. *See, e.g.,*

id. at 370 ("inmate grievance programs created by state law are not required by the Constitution and consequently allegations that prison officials violated those procedures does not give rise to a cognizable [Section] 1983 claim") (citation omitted); *Torres*, 246 F.Supp.2d at 342 ("Prison grievance procedures do not confer any substantive right upon an inmate requiring the procedural protections envisioned by the Fourteenth Amendment.") (citations omitted); *Cancel*, 2001 WL 303713, at *3–4 (violation of grievance procedures does not give rise to claim under First Amendment). Courts regularly dismiss claims brought to remedy alleged violations of inmate grievance procedures. *See, e.g., id.; Muhammad v. McMickens*, No. 86 Civ. 7376(SWK), 1988 WL 7789, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.25, 1998). Accordingly, because Edwards' claims for alleged violations of the inmate grievance process have no constitutional basis, those claims should be dismissed.^{FN12}

^{FN12.} Related to the allegations about the grievance system, Defendants also assert that Edwards' failure to allege personal involvement for Defendants Bailey (*Id.* ¶¶ 37, 41, 48, 52), Caruso (*Id.* ¶¶ 16, 27), Cattafesta (*Id.* ¶ 80), Davis (*Id.* ¶¶ 13, 26, 47), Hill (*Id.* ¶ 63), Horn (Compl.¶¶ 7, 9, 10, 12, 14–16, 21, 23, 25, 28, 29, 32–35, 39, 41–43, 45, 52, 59, 79, 97), Hourihan (*Id.* ¶¶ 50, 61, 66, 68, 77, 95, 98), Powell (*Id.* ¶¶ 57, 78), and Riordan (*Id.* ¶ 6) provide an independent basis for dismissal. (Def. Mem. at 14–16). "It is well settled in this Circuit that personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under [Section] 1983." *Farrell v. Burke*, 449 F.3d 470, 484 (2d Cir.2006) (citation and quotation marks omitted). An official's failure to respond to a prisoner's letter of protest and request for an investigation, as Edwards is alleging in his Complaint, "is insufficient to hold that official liable for the alleged violations." *Johnson v. Wright*, 234 F.Supp.2d 352, 363 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, Edwards' claims against these Defendants should be dismissed on this ground as well.

Slip Copy, 2012 WL 760172 (S.D.N.Y.)

(Cite as: 2012 WL 760172 (S.D.N.Y.))

K. Retaliation

Edwards alleges that on 17 separate occasions between July 2007 and November 2008, Defendants Campfield, Grima, Hannah, Holmes, John Doe # 1, John Doe # 2, Lagos, Lee, Maynard, Polak, Richardson, Rosa, Shaw, Smalls, and Sumpter retaliated against him in response to his submitting, or informing Defendants that he intended to submit, grievance letters. Edwards' allegations of retaliation include the use of verbal threats or harassment, issuance of infractions, transfers between prison facilities, denials of meals, loss of legal documents, and termination from part-time employment he had while on Rikers Island.

To prove a First Amendment retaliation claim under [Section 1983](#), a prisoner must show “(1) that the speech or conduct at issue was protected, (2) that the defendant took adverse action against the plaintiff, and (3) that there was a causal connection between the protected speech and the adverse action.” [Dawes v. Walker](#), 239 F.3d 489, 492 (2d Cir.2001) (citations omitted), *overruled on other grounds*, [Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.](#), 534 U.S. 506, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002). For a retaliation claim to survive a motion to dismiss, it must be “supported by specific and detailed factual allegations, not stated in wholly conclusory terms.” [Friedl v. City of New York](#), 210 F.3d 79, 86 (2d Cir.2000) (citation and quotation marks omitted). An “unsupported, speculative, and conclusory” allegation of retaliatory conduct may be dismissed on the pleadings. [Boddie v. Schnieder](#), 105 F.3d 857, 862 (2d Cir.1997) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

*13 In reviewing Edwards' retaliation claims, the Court is mindful that “[v]irtually every prisoner can assert such a claim as to every decision which he or she dislikes.” [Flaherty v. Coughlin](#), 713 F.2d 10, 13 (2d Cir.1983). Indeed, while the “First Amendment protects prisoners from retaliation for filing grievances[.]” [Quezada v. Ercole](#), No. 09 Civ. 2832(DLC), 2011 WL 3251811, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jul.29, 2011) (citations omitted), the Court recognizes “the near inevitability of decisions and actions by prison officials to which prisoners will take exception and the ease with which claims of retaliation may be fabricated.” [Colon v. Coughlin](#), 58 F.3d 865, 872 (2d Cir.1995) (citing [Flaherty](#), 713 F.2d at 13). Moreover, courts should

carefully scrutinize an inmate's claims of retaliation because such allegations “pose a substantial risk of unwarranted judicial intrusion into matters of general prison administration.” [Hodges v. Wright](#), No. 10 Civ. 0531(GLS)(GHL), 2011 WL 5554866, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2011) (quoting [Dawes](#), 239 F.3d at 491) (citations omitted) (Report and Recommendation), [adopted](#), 2011 WL 5554880 (N.D.N.Y. Nov.15, 2011). Therefore, courts reviewing an inmate's retaliation claims should do so “with skepticism and particular care.” [Colon](#), 58 F.3d at 872 (citation omitted).

Edwards' allegations, in chronological order, are as follows: (1) in retaliation for submitting a grievance against Defendant Morales on July 25, 2007, Morales called Edwards' housing unit on August 1, 2007 and informed other officers that Edwards had a visitor, when in fact he did not, which caused him to wait in the inmate visitor process area for two hours (*Id.* ¶¶ 2, 4); (2) in retaliation for an incident where Defendant Hannah said she was made to apologize to Edwards for “making fun of [his] phsical [sic] disability/and deformity[.]” Hannah threatened Edwards on September 5, 2007 by saying “I'm going to get you back for that” (*Id.* ¶ 6); (3) in retaliation for filing a grievance against Defendant Rosa on September 18, 2007, Rosa fired Edwards from his job as a Suicide Prevention Aide and issued an infraction against him on October 31, 2007 (*Id.* ¶¶ 14–16); (4) on or around November 1, 2007, after Edwards informed Defendant Holmes that he intended to submit a grievance against her, Holmes caused Edwards to be transferred to another housing facility (*Id.* ¶ 17); (5) in retaliation for filing a grievance against Holmes on November 2, 2007, Holmes came to Edwards' housing unit and verbally abused him by “ridicul[ing] and mak[ing] fun of [his] physical disability and deformity” (*Id.* ¶ 19); (6) on or around November 15, 2007, in retaliation for filing a grievance against Rosa, Rosa informed John Doe officers that Edwards “like[s] to utilize the grievance mechanism against staff [.]” subsequent to which Edwards was subjected to an unauthorized transfer from “6–Lower” to “7–Lower” in the EMTC (*Id.* ¶ 20); (7) on or around November 25, 2007, in retaliation for Edwards' filing a grievance against Rosa, Defendants Hernandez and Smith retaliated against Edwards by informing another inmate that Edwards was a “snitch,” which “cause[d] [Edwards] physical harm by

Slip Copy, 2012 WL 760172 (S.D.N.Y.)

(Cite as: 2012 WL 760172 (S.D.N.Y.))

other inmate's [sic] within [the] housing unit" (*Id.* ¶¶ 24, 26); (8) in retaliation for submitting a grievance against Defendants Campfield and Reyes on or around March 22, 2008, Defendant Shaw had Edwards transferred out of the GRVC on March 25, 2008 (*Id.* ¶ 34); (9) on or around April 1, 2008, in retaliation for submitting a grievance against her, Campfield intentionally lost Edwards' legal documents relating to the NDNY action (*Id.* ¶ 36); (10) after filing a grievance on June 27, 2008, Edwards was transferred out of the GMDC that same day, which he says was approved by Defendant Bailey (*Id.* ¶¶ 48, 52); (11) after Edwards informed Defendant Richardson that he planned to file a grievance against her because she refused to turn off the lights in his jail cell on July 30, 2008, Richardson retaliated by denying Edwards his "morning meal" on July 31, 2008 (*Id.* ¶ 53); (12) in retaliation for filing a grievance against him, Richardson put a "hit out" by offering 20 boxes of Frosted Flakes cereal to any inmate that physically assaulted Edwards, for which Edwards filed a grievance on August 7, 2008 (*Id.* ¶ 55); (13) on August 18, 2008, in retaliation for informing a supervisor that Defendant Smalls was "only providing certain detainees with options on the hour every hour" in the law library, Smalls verbally abused Edwards (*Id.* ¶ 61); (14) on or around August 25, 2008, in retaliation for Edwards' use of the grievance mechanism against her, Defendant Smalls retaliated against Edwards through verbal abuse, threatening to have Edwards transferred, and informing other inmates that Edwards uses the grievance process (*Id.* ¶ 66); (15) on or around September 24, 2008, in retaliation for filing numerous grievances against them, Defendants Maynard and Musmacher conspired to retaliate against Edwards by threatening physical violence and issuing an infraction, which resulted in a disciplinary hearing on September 30, 2008 (*Id.* ¶¶ 83, 87, 87b); (16) after Edwards informed Defendant Lagos on October 17, 2008 that he planned to file a grievance against her because of alleged racial discrimination, Lagos retaliated by denying Edwards his "afternoon meal" on October 18, 2008 (*Id.* ¶ 90); and (17) after Edwards informed Defendant Grima that he intended to submit a grievance about his alleged physical assault with a "pushdraw" on November 1, 2008, Grima retaliated by threatening physical harm, pressing his "emergency personal alarm device," issuing an infraction, and causing Edwards to be transferred to a new housing unit (*Id.* ¶¶ 91, 91b).

1. Protected Activity

*14 It is well-established that "retaliation against a prisoner for pursuing a grievance violates the right to petition government for the redress of grievances" and is therefore actionable under [Section 1983](#). [Graham v. Henderson](#), 89 F.3d 75, 80 (2d Cir.1996) (citation omitted); *see, e.g., Mateo v. Fischer*, 682 F.Supp.2d 423, 433–34 (S.D.N.Y.2010) (filing of a grievance is a protected activity). However, expressing an intent to engage in a constitutionally protected activity—in this case, filing a grievance—is not protected activity. *See Henry v. Dinelle*, No. 09 Civ. 0456(GTS)(DEP), 2011 WL 5975027, at *7 n. 12 (citing cases) & n. 13 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2011) ("Hoping to engage in constitutionally protected activity is not itself constitutionally protected activity. At most, petitioner's actions could be construed as a 'threat' to assert his rights but that is not enough.") (citing [McKinnie v. Heisz](#), No. 09 Civ. 0188(BBC), 2009 WL 1455489, at *11 (W.D.Wis. May 7, 2009)). In light of these principles, Edwards' allegations of retaliation in response to his submitting grievance letters constitute protected activities. However, Edwards' allegations of retaliatory conduct arising from his expressing an intent to file a grievance—those allegations occurring on or about November 1, 2007 (Compl.¶ 17), July 31, 2008 (*Id.* ¶ 53), October 18, 2008 (*Id.* ¶ 90), and November 1, 2008 (*Id.* ¶¶ 91, 91b)—are not protected activities and therefore cannot form the basis of a claim for retaliation.^{FN13}

^{FN13} Moreover, of the four allegations of retaliation that are not based on protected activities, two cannot be considered adverse actions-concerning Defendant Richardson on July 31, 2008 (Compl.¶ 53) and Defendant Lagos on October 18, 2008 (*Id.* ¶ 90)—because both of these allege that these Defendants retaliated against Edwards by denying him a meal. The denial of meals on two occasions, separated by more than three months, is *de minimis* and not actionable. *See, e.g., Snyder v. McGinnis*, No. 03 Civ. 0902E (WMS), 2004 WL 1949472, at *11 (W.D.N.Y. Sept.2, 2004) (denial of food to plaintiff two times would not chill First Amendment activity).

Slip Copy, 2012 WL 760172 (S.D.N.Y.)

(Cite as: 2012 WL 760172 (S.D.N.Y.))

2. Adverse Actions

Having determined that four of Edwards' allegations of retaliation fail because he was not engaged in a constitutionally protected activity, the Court now considers whether the remaining 13 allegations meet the adverse action requirement. "[I]n the prison context [the Second Circuit has] defined 'adverse action' objectively, as retaliatory conduct that would deter a similarly situated individual of ordinary firmness from exercising ... constitutional rights." Gill v. Pidlypchak, 389 F.3d 379, 381 (2d Cir.2004) (citations and quotation marks omitted). An inmate can meet this requirement by "alleging a serious injury that is independent of a possible First Amendment chill, or by alleging that he has been chilled from engaging in the First Amendment activities that triggered the retaliation." Smith v. Maypes-Rhynders, No. 07 Civ. 11241(PAC)(MHD), 2009 WL 874439, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2009). "Otherwise, the retaliatory act is simply *de minimis* and therefore outside the ambit of constitutional protection." Dawes, 239 F.3d at 493 (citation omitted). "[T]his objective test applies even where a particular plaintiff was not himself subjectively deterred; that is, where he continued to file grievances and lawsuits." Gill, 389 F.3d at 381. In applying this objective test to determine whether conduct is *de minimis*, the Court must consider that "[p]risoners may be required to tolerate more ... than average citizens, before a [retaliatory] action taken against them is considered adverse." Davis, 320 F.3d at 353 (citation and quotation marks omitted).

a. Retaliatory Verbal Abuse

*15 Several of Edwards' allegations of retaliation are based on verbal harassment, abuse, or threats. (See Compl. ¶¶ 2, 4, 6 ("I'm going to get you back for that."), 19, 24 (calling Edwards a "snitch"), 26, 55 (putting a "hit out" on Edwards to any inmate that "fucks Edwards up"), 61 (calling Edwards a "crackhead" and "one arm faggot"), 66). While "some verbal threats, even if not serious enough to implicate the Eighth Amendment, can constitute an adverse action[.]" Mateo, 682 F.Supp.2d at 434 (citations omitted), "[n]on-specific verbal threats, harassing comments and hostile behavior do not constitute adverse actions sufficient to state a retaliation claim." Ross v. Westchester Cnty. Jail, No. 10 Civ. 3937(DLC), 2012 WL 86467, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.11, 2012). "[V]erbal threats may constitute adverse action, though whether they

constitute adverse action seems to depend on their specificity and the context in which they are uttered." Hofelich v. Ercole, No. 06 Civ. 13697(PKC), 2010 WL 1459740, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.8, 2010) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

Here, Edwards' claims of retaliatory verbal abuse do not include any allegations of harm, nor are they alleged with any specificity to suggest that they would deter others from exercising their constitutional rights. Several of his claims allege only that Edwards was forced to endure verbal abuse, but do not explain what was said and why that abuse was in any way adverse. And where Edwards has detailed the nature of the verbal abuse, his allegations are either *de minimis*—for example, in the case of being told he had a visitor when he in fact did not—amount to name-calling, or are insufficiently direct or specific to be adverse. See, e.g., Dawes, 239 F.3d at 492–93 (referring to plaintiff as an "informant" and "rat" in presence of other inmates not an adverse action); Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 109 (2d Cir.2000) (referring to transsexual inmate as "he/she" was "rudeness and name-calling" but not a constitutional violation); Purcell v. Coughlin, 790 F.2d 263, 265 (2d Cir.1986) (per curiam) (name-calling, without any appreciable injury, not a constitutional violation); Kemp v. LeClaire, No. 03 Civ. 844S (WMS), 2007 WL 776416, at *15 (W.D.N.Y. Mar.12, 2007) (threats of "your day is coming," "you'll be sent to your mother in a black box," and "you'll get your black ass kicked" not adverse actions); Battice, 2006 WL 2190565, at *6–7 (defendant's making fun of plaintiff's disability does not constitute adverse action). Accordingly, Edwards' charges of retaliation that allege only retaliatory verbal abuse—on August 1, 2007 (Compl.¶¶ 2, 4), September 5, 2007 (Id. ¶ 6), November 2, 2007 (Id. ¶ 19), November 25, 2007 (Id. ¶¶ 24, 26), August 7, 2008 (Id. ¶ 55), August 18, 2008 (Id. ¶ 61), and August 25, 2008 (Id. ¶ 66)—should be dismissed.

b. Retaliatory Loss of Legal Documents

*16 Courts have held that theft, confiscation, or destruction of an inmate's legal documents may constitute an adverse action. See, e.g., Smith, 2009 WL 874439, at *5 (theft of legal papers is adverse action). However, "mere delays in the transfer of [an inmate's] legal papers, even if motivated by retaliation, is not the type of adverse

Slip Copy, 2012 WL 760172 (S.D.N.Y.)

(Cite as: 2012 WL 760172 (S.D.N.Y.))

action required to support a retaliation claim.” *Ford v. Fischer*, No. 09 Civ. 723(DNH)(ATB), 2011 WL 856416, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2011); see, e.g., *Rivera v. Pataki*, No. 04 Civ. 1286(MBM), 2005 WL 407710, at *19 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2005) (several temporary incidents of interference with plaintiff’s legal documents not an adverse action). Here, because Edwards has pled an injury in connection with this allegation—Defendant Campfield’s allegedly retaliatory loss of his legal documents prevented him from prosecuting the NDNY action (Compl. ¶ 36), which was subsequently dismissed for failure to prosecute, see *Selsky*, 2008 WL 190385, at *1—it contains sufficient facts to constitute an adverse action.

c. Retaliatory Filing of Infractions

Edwards alleges that Defendants Maynard, Musmacher, and Rosa issued false infractions against him on or about October 31, 2007 (Compl. ¶¶ 14–16; Dkt. No. 2–6 at 18) and September 24, 2008 (*Id.* ¶¶ 83, 87, 87b) in retaliation for filing grievances. While an “inmate has no general constitutional right to be free from being falsely accused in a misbehavior report[.]” *Boddie*, 105 F.3d at 862, a misbehavior report issued in retaliation for an inmate’s exercise of a protected activity may constitute an adverse action. See *Gayle v. Gonyea*, 313 F.3d 677, 682 (2d Cir.2002) (“An allegation that a prison official filed false disciplinary charges in retaliation for the exercise of a constitutionally protected right, such as the filing of a grievance, states a claim under [Section] 1983.”) (citation omitted); see, e.g., *Gill*, 389 F.3d at 384 (false misbehavior report and placement in keeplock constitutes adverse action); *Mateo*, 682 F.Supp.2d at 434 (false misbehavior report constitutes adverse action). Accordingly, Edwards’ allegations that these Defendants filed false retaliatory infractions against him are sufficient to plead an adverse action.

d. Retaliatory Transfers

Edwards’ allegations that Defendants Bailey, Bethacourt, Hannah, John Doe # 1, John Doe # 2, Rosa, and Shaw transferred Edwards between prison facilities in retaliation for submitting grievances are also sufficient to establish an adverse action at the motion to dismiss stage. (See Compl. ¶¶ 20, 34, 48, 52). While a “prisoner has no liberty interest in remaining at a particular correctional facility ... prison authorities may not transfer [him] in retaliation for the exercise of constitutionally protected

rights.” *Davis v. Kelly*, 160 F.3d 917, 920 (2d Cir.1998) (citations omitted); see, e.g., *Soto v. Iacavino*, No. 01 Civ. 5850(JSM), 2003 WL 21281762, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2003) (prison housing transfer is adverse action for retaliation claim).

e. Retaliatory Termination

*17 Finally, Edwards’ allegation that Defendant Rosa fired him from his position as a Suicide Prevention Aide states sufficient facts to constitute an adverse action. (Compl. ¶¶ 14–16; Dkt. No. 2–6 at 18). “[A] claim for relief may be stated under [S]ection 1983 if otherwise routine administrative decisions are made in retaliation for the exercise of constitutionally protected rights.” *Gill v. Mooney*, 824 F.2d 192, 194 (2d Cir.1987) (citation omitted). More specifically, an inmate can bring a claim under *Section 1983* for termination of employment in retaliation for his exercise of constitutionally protected rights. See, e.g., *Baker v. Zlochowon*, 741 F.Supp. 436, 439 (S.D.N.Y.1990). The termination of Edwards’ job, if found to be retaliatory, could serve to “chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage” in a protected activity. *Thaddeus-X v. Blatter*, 175 F.3d 378, 397 (6th Cir.1999) (quoted in *Davis*, 320 F.3d at 353).

3. Causal Connection

Of his six allegations of retaliation that meet the adverse action requirement—those dated October 31, 2007, November 15, 2007, March 25, 2008, April 1, 2008, June 27, 2008, and September 24, 2008—all but one should be dismissed. Edwards has not alleged any facts, as he must, that his filing of grievances was a “substantial or motivating factor” for Defendants’ actions. *Bennett v. Goord*, 343 F.3d 133, 137 (2d Cir.2003) (citations omitted). In addressing the causal connection requirement, a court may consider: (1) the temporal proximity between the protected conduct and the alleged retaliatory act, (2) the inmate’s prior disciplinary record, (3) vindication at a hearing on the matter, and (4) any statements by the defendants regarding their motives. See *Colon*, 58 F.3d at 872–73. However, “a complaint which alleges retaliation in wholly conclusory terms may safely be dismissed on the pleadings alone.” *Flaherty*, 713 F.2d at 13.

With the exception of his claim arising on October 31, 2007, Edwards’ allegations of retaliation are wholly conclusory. Edwards does not set forth any specific facts,

Slip Copy, 2012 WL 760172 (S.D.N.Y.)

(Cite as: 2012 WL 760172 (S.D.N.Y.))

other than his repeated use of the word “retaliation,” to support his suspicion of retaliation or to suggest that Defendants were motivated in any way by Edwards' filing grievance letters. On several occasions, Edwards appears to rely on the mere fact that the purported adverse actions took place after he filed a grievance. To infer causation from the very fact that one activity preceded another, however, is insufficient here to adequately plead retaliatory intent. Temporal proximity may serve as circumstantial evidence of retaliation, *see, e.g., Colon*, 58 F.3d at 872, and the Second Circuit has found that such proximity can establish causality. *See Espinal v. Goord*, 558 F.3d 119, 129–30 (2d Cir.2009) (causal connection present where six months passed between protected activity and retaliatory beating); but see *Sloane v. Mazzuca*, No. 04 Civ. 8266(KMK), 2006 WL 3096031, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.31, 2006) (temporal proximity insufficient by itself to prove causation) (citations omitted); *Nunez v. Goord*, 172 F.Supp.2d 417, 431–32 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (same). But in this case, Edwards' reliance on temporal proximity does not make his claims plausible, as he fails to differentiate between his seemingly innumerable grievances or provide specific factual allegations, including but not limited to concrete dates, that might demonstrate any nexus between a specific grievance and a specific adverse action. *See, e.g., Andino v. Fischer*, 698 F.Supp.2d 362, 385 (S.D.N.Y.2010) (proximity between complaints and adverse actions the result of large number of grievances in short period of time).

*18 In addition to Edwards' failure to plead any facts suggesting retaliation, the facts that Edwards chose to include in the Complaint suggest a relationship between protected activity and adverse action that is too attenuated to plausibly constitute causation. For example, Edwards theorizes that on November 15, 2007 he was transferred by Defendant John Doe # 2 in retaliation for filing a grievance against Rosa, after Rosa informed John Doe # 1, who then informed John Doe # 2, of Edwards' use of the grievance mechanism. (Compl.¶ 20). However, absent any additional information, such as corroborating statements from other officers or inmates, it is simply not plausible to impute a retaliatory motive to John Doe # 2 by way of John Doe # 1 and Rosa. Edwards' allegations of March 25, 2008 suffer the same deficiency, as he aims to pin a

retaliatory motive not on the target of his protected activity, but on an entirely different Defendant. (*Id.* ¶ 34). Apart from any apparent temporal proximity, therefore, Edwards' allegations are wholly conclusory and should be dismissed. *See, e.g., Sioleski v. McGrain*, No. 10 Civ. 0665S (WMS), 2012 WL 32423, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Jan.5, 2012); *Douglas v. Smith*, No. 05 Civ. 1000(LEK)(DRH), 2008 WL 434605, at *15 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2008).

By contrast, Edwards is able to state an actionable claim of retaliatory termination against Rosa based on his allegations of October 31, 2007. Edwards states that on September 18, 2007, he submitted a grievance letter regarding Defendant Rosa's alleged use of her personal cell phone while on duty, which Edwards contends is a “security breach.” (Compl.¶ 7). Then, on October 31, 2007, while he was working as a Suicide Prevention Aide, Edwards alleges that Rosa stated, “Watch your mouth boy before I write you. You like writing anyway.” (Dkt. No. 2–6 at 18). Edwards asked another officer for a grievance form, intending to submit another grievance against Rosa, at which point Rosa stated: “What lies are you going to write on me now stupid nigger. The cellphone lie didn't work nigger. All you are nigger is a snitch don't worry, you're going to get yours. I'm going to make sure you get fuck up nigger.” (*Id.*). Moments later, Rosa returned and asked for Edwards' identification card, stating, “I'm writing you up nigger. Two can play that game and also nigger you're fired. Morales get this nigger out of here now.” (*Id.*).

These statements clearly suggest a retaliatory animus. *See, e.g., Baskerville v. Blot*, 224 F.Supp.2d 723, 732–33 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (defendant's comments during assault point to retaliatory animus). In mentioning the “cellphone lie,” which likely refers to Edwards' September 18 grievance about Rosa's use of her personal cell phone, Rosa's comments establish a clear causal link between Edwards' protected activity and Rosa's decision to terminate Edwards from his job and issue an infraction against him. *See, e.g., Headley v. Fisher*, No. 06 Civ. 6331(PAC)(KNF), 2008 WL 1990771, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2008) (causal connection exists where officer referred to protected activity during retaliatory assault). Accordingly, Edwards has stated a plausible claim of retaliatory termination against Rosa, and Defendants'

Slip Copy, 2012 WL 760172 (S.D.N.Y.)

(Cite as: 2012 WL 760172 (S.D.N.Y.))

motion to dismiss that claim should be denied.

L. Conspiracy

*19 Edwards alleges four conspiracy claims pursuant to [42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985](#), and [1986](#), specifically that (1) on October 31 and November 1, 2007, Rosa and Polak conspired to fire Edwards from his job as a Suicide Prevention Aide and issue an infraction against him (Compl.¶¶ 14–16); (2) as described in a complaint letter dated July 10, 2008, Defendant Johnson conspired with “the security staff to violate Edwards” constitutional rights by not filing his grievances (*Id.* ¶ 50); (3) as described in a complaint letter dated August 28, 2008, Defendants Johnson and Sumpter conspired to deny Edwards access to the prison's grievance system (*Id.* ¶ 69); and (4) as described in a September 24, 2008 grievance letter, Defendants Maynard and Musmacher conspired to issue threats of physical violence and submit a false infraction against Edwards. (*Id.* ¶ 83).

1. Conspiracy Under [Section 1983](#)

To state a conspiracy claim under [Section 1983](#), a plaintiff must show “(1) an agreement between [two or more state actors or] a state actor and a private party; (2) to act in concert to inflict an unconstitutional injury; and (3) an overt act done in furtherance of that goal causing damages.” [Ciambriello v. Cnty. of Nassau](#), 292 F.3d 307, 324–25 (2d Cir.2002) (citing [Pangburn v. Culbertson](#), 200 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir.1999)). “[A] plaintiff must show that defendants acted in a willful manner, culminating in an agreement, understanding, or meeting of the minds, that violated [his] rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or federal courts.” [Bussev v. Phillips](#), 419 F.Supp.2d 569, 586–87 (S.D.N.Y.2006) (quotation marks and citations omitted). “[C]omplaints containing only conclusory, vague, or general allegations [of conspiracy] ... are properly dismissed; diffuse and expansive allegations are insufficient, unless amplified by specific instances of misconduct.” [Ciambriello](#), 292 F.3d at 325 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Finally, “[a] violated constitutional right is a natural prerequisite to a claim of conspiracy to violate such right.” [Romer v. Morgenthau](#), 119 F.Supp.2d 346, 363 (S.D.N.Y.2000) (citation omitted). If a plaintiff fails to show an underlying constitutional violation on which to base a [Section 1983](#) conspiracy claim, the conspiracy claim fails as a matter of

law. See, e.g., [AK Tournament Play, Inc. v. Town of Wallkill](#), No. 09 Civ. 10579(LAP), 2011 WL 197216, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.19, 2011), *aff'd*, 444 F. App'x 475 (2d Cir.2011).

Each of Edwards' conspiracy claims should be dismissed because he has failed to state any underlying constitutional violations, with the exception of his retaliatory termination claim against Rosa. Moreover, even if the Court were to find that Edwards could state plausible constitutional claims as a predicate for conspiracy, he fails to state any non-conclusory allegations pertaining to the existence of a conspiracy, a meeting of the minds to support a conspiracy claim, or any overt acts which would suggest the existence of a conspiracy. Edwards' statements that certain Defendants “conspired” with others is not, by itself, sufficient to state an actionable claim for conspiracy. See [Nealy v. Berger](#), No. 08 Civ. 1322(JFB)(AKT), 2009 WL 704804, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2009) (“The mere use of the term ‘conspiracy’ ... is clearly insufficient to satisfy [Rule 12\(b\)\(6\)](#) in connection with a [Section 1983](#) conspiracy claim.”) (citation omitted). The only claim for which Edwards alleges any facts is that Rosa and Polak conspired to retaliate against him. However, the statements that he attributes to Polak—“my girl said you are fired” and “you are not getting your job back” (Compl.¶ 15)—do not suggest any understanding, agreement, or meeting of the minds between these two Defendants. Polak's reinforcement of Rosa's decision to fire Edwards, at best, suggests only that Polak sided with Rosa's decision, but it is not sufficient to state a conspiracy claim. Absent any actionable allegations of a conspiratorial understanding between Polak and Rosa, Edwards' conspiracy claims fail.

2. Conspiracy Under [Section 1985](#)

*20 [42 U.S.C. § 1985\(2\)](#) and [\(3\)](#) also provide relief for claims of conspiracy. To plead a claim under [Section 1985\(2\)](#), a plaintiff must show “(1) a conspiracy (2) for the purpose of impeding, hindering, obstructing, or defeating, in any manner, (3) the due course of justice in any State or Territory, (4) with intent to deny to any citizen the equal protection of the laws, or to injure him or his property for lawfully enforcing, or attempting to enforce, the right of any person, or class of persons, to the equal protection of the laws.” [Rodriguez v. City of New York](#), No. 05 Civ.

Slip Copy, 2012 WL 760172 (S.D.N.Y.)

(Cite as: 2012 WL 760172 (S.D.N.Y.))

10682(PKC) (FM), 2008 WL 4410089, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2008) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2)). The elements of a claim under [Section 1985\(3\)](#) are: “(1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of equal protection of the laws, ...; (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is ... deprived of any right of a citizen of the United States.” *Id.* (quoting [Brown v. City of Oneonta](#), 221 F.3d 329, 341 (2d Cir.2000)).

As with [Section 1983](#) conspiracy claims, [Section 1985](#) claims require a showing of an underlying constitutional violation. *See, e.g., Okoh v. Sullivan*, No. 10 Civ. 2547(SAS), 2011 WL 672420, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.24, 2011), *aff'd*, 441 F. App'x 813 (2d Cir.2011); [Bishop v. Best Buy, Co.](#), No. 08 Civ. 8427(LBS), 2010 WL 4159566, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.13, 2010). Because Edwards has not set forth sufficient facts to state any constitutional violations, with the exception of his retaliatory termination claim against Rosa, his [Section 1985](#) claims should be dismissed as well. Even if the Court were to find any underlying constitutional violations, including the surviving retaliation claim, the [Section 1985](#) claims should be dismissed because Edwards has failed to allege any facts, as he must, that Defendants' conspiracies were motivated not by any personal malice of the conspirators toward him, but rather by “some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' animus.” [United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 610 v. Scott](#), 463 U.S. 825, 828–29, 103 S.Ct. 3352, 77 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1983) (citation omitted); *accord* [Mian v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Secs. Corp.](#), 7 F.3d 1085, 1088 (2d Cir.1993) (per curiam); [Okoh](#), 2011 WL 672420, at *6.

3. Conspiracy Under [Section 1986](#)

To state a claim under [Section 1986](#), a plaintiff must state a valid claim under [Section 1985](#). “[Section 1986](#) imposes liability on individuals who have knowledge of a conspiracy under [[Section 1985](#)], but fail to take action to prevent them.” [Jenkins v. N.Y. City Dep't of Educ.](#), No. 10 Civ. 6159(BSJ)(THK), 2011 WL 5451711, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2011) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1986). A [Section 1986](#) claim “must be predicated upon a valid [[Section 1985](#)] claim.” [Brown](#), 221 F.3d at 341 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Because Edwards fails to

state a claim under [Section 1985](#) and otherwise fails to make any allegations that certain Defendants had knowledge of a conspiracy but failed to prevent it, the Court should also dismiss his [Section 1986](#) claim.

M. Disability Discrimination Claim

*21 Edwards asserts that on five occasions he was discriminated against on the basis of an alleged disability in violation of Title II of the ADA. (Compl. ¶¶ 6, 17, 19, 30, 61). To state a claim under Title II, which applies to inmates in state prisons, *see* [United States v. Georgia](#) 546 U.S. 151, 153, 126 S.Ct. 877, 163 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006), a prisoner must show: (1) “he is a ‘qualified individual’ with a disability”; (2) “he was excluded from participation in a public entity's services, programs or activities or was otherwise discriminated against by a public entity”; and (3) “such exclusion or discrimination was due to his disability.” [Phelan v. Thomas](#), 439 F. App'x 48, 50 (2d Cir.2011) (citing [Hargrave v. Vermont](#), 340 F.3d 27, 34–35 (2d Cir.2003)); *see* 42 U.S.C. § 12132.

Although Defendants have moved to dismiss the Complaint in its “entirety” (Def. Mem. at 49), they have failed to offer any specific arguments to dismiss Edwards' ADA claims. (*See* Def. Mem. at 3). Nevertheless, these claims should be dismissed. It appears from the Complaint that Edwards' alleged disability is that one of his arms is significantly shorter than the other, and his discrimination claims arise from Defendants' comments allegedly mocking this deformity. Leaving aside the question of whether Edwards' deformity falls under the ADA's definition of disability, Edwards fails to state that Defendants excluded him from participating in, or denied him the benefit of, any particular activity as a result of his alleged disability. Edwards' allegations of objectionable language are not sufficient to state a claim under the ADA.

N. Edwards' Potential Recovery Is Limited to Nominal or Punitive Damages From Rosa

In his Complaint, Edwards seeks both money damages and injunctive relief. (Compl.¶ V). However, because of qualified immunity, Edwards can only obtain monetary damages from Defendant Rosa and, because of the PLRA, that recovery is limited to nominal or punitive damages. In addition, Edwards' request for injunctive relief is moot because he is no longer in prison.

1. Qualified Immunity Precludes Money Damages,

Slip Copy, 2012 WL 760172 (S.D.N.Y.)

(Cite as: 2012 WL 760172 (S.D.N.Y.))

Except From Rosa

Qualified immunity provides a basis to preclude monetary damages, but not injunctive relief. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 432, 127 S.Ct. 2618, 168 L.Ed.2d 290 (2007) (citation omitted). “Qualified immunity shields federal and state officials from money damages unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, — U.S. —, —, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 2080, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). A state actor is afforded qualified immunity if either “(a) the defendant’s action did not violate clearly established law, or (b) it was objectively reasonable for the defendant to believe that his action did not violate such law.” Johnson v. Newburgh Enlarged Sch. Dist., 239 F.3d 246, 250 (2d Cir.2001) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Because Edwards has failed to plead facts showing that Defendants violated any constitutional right, with the exception of his claim for retaliatory termination against Rosa, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for each of Edwards’ claims.

*22 However, as to Edwards’ surviving retaliation claim, Defendant Rosa is not entitled to qualified immunity. Courts have long recognized, well before the time of Edwards’ allegations, that inmates have a constitutional right to seek redress of grievances without suffering retaliation. See Franco v. Kelly, 854 F.2d 584, 589 (2d Cir.1988); see, e.g., Baskerville, 224 F.Supp.2d at 737–38 (no qualified immunity for retaliation claim because right to file grievances without retaliation is well-established); Wells v. Wade, 36 F.Supp.2d 154, 160 (S.D.N.Y.1999) (same). Here, Edwards has alleged intentional conduct by Rosa in response to a protected activity, adequately stating a cause of action for retaliation. Moreover, Defendants have offered no argument that Rosa’s conduct was objectively reasonable. Accordingly, at the pleading stage, Rosa is not entitled to qualified immunity from monetary damages on Edwards’ retaliatory termination claim against her.

2. Any Money Damages from Rosa Are Limited to Nominal or Punitive Damages

In light of the qualified immunity finding above,

Edwards’ recovery of monetary damages, if any, is limited to Rosa. Because of the PLRA’s physical injury requirement, however, that recovery from Rosa cannot include compensatory damages. Defendants argue that all of Edwards’ claims are barred by the PLRA because he does not allege that he has suffered any physical injury. (Def. Mem. at 46–48). Section 1997e(e) of the PLRA provides that “[n]o Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury.” Thompson v. Carter, 284 F.3d 411, 416 (2d Cir.2002) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e)). The term “physical injury” is not statutorily defined; however, the injury complained of must be more than *de minimis* to meet the requirements of § 1997e(e). See Liner v. Goord, 196 F.3d 132, 135 (2d Cir.1999). Therefore, in the absence of a showing of physical injury, a prisoner cannot recover compensatory damages for mental or emotional injury. Thompson, 284 F.3d at 417. To recover punitive or nominal damages, however, a prisoner need not allege that he has sustained a physical injury. Id. at 418; see also Abreu v. Nicholls, No. 04 Civ. 7778(DAB)(GWG), 2011 WL 1044373, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2011) (Report and Recommendation); Walker v. Shaw, No. 08 Civ. 10043(CM), 2010 WL 2541711, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2010) (citing Robinson v. Cattaraugus, 147 F.3d 153, 162 (2d Cir.1998)).

Edwards does not allege that he has suffered any physical injury as a result of his alleged constitutional violations, including his allegation of excessive force, which does not mention any temporary or permanent physical injury as a result of Defendants’ actions. See *supra* Section ILL The only injuries that Edwards complains about are the “loss of amenity” and “limited liberty” as a result of his segregated confinement, and emotional distress arising from the “embarrass[ment]” caused by Defendants’ ridiculing his physical deformity. (Compl.¶ V). Neither of these injuries constitutes a physical injury under the PLRA. See, e.g., Henry, 2011 WL 3295986, at *4 (no physical injury where inmate complained of embarrassment); Wilson v. Phoenix House, No. 10 Civ. 7364(DLC), 2011 WL 3273179, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.1, 2011) (confinement not enough, by itself, to fulfill physical injury requirement). Accordingly, in the absence of any allegations of physical injury,

Slip Copy, 2012 WL 760172 (S.D.N.Y.)

(Cite as: 2012 WL 760172 (S.D.N.Y.))

Edwards' claims against Defendants (including his surviving retaliation claim against Rosa) should be dismissed insofar as he seeks compensatory damages, and he should be limited to seeking nominal or punitive damages from Rosa. *See, e.g., Brummell v. Stewart*, No. 09 Civ. 10326(PAC)(FM), 2011 WL 1306170, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2011) (Report and Recommendation) (claims seeking compensatory damages dismissed because no allegation of physical injury suffered); *Kasim v. Rivera*, No. 09 Civ. 9665(DLC), 2011 WL 166929, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2011) (request for compensatory damages for emotional injuries stricken from complaint).

3. Edwards' Request for Injunctive Relief Is Moot

*23 By letter dated December 11, 2011, Edwards informed the Court that he has been released from prison. (Dkt. No. 135). This factual development renders moot Edwards' request for injunctive relief. "The hallmark of a moot case or controversy is that the relief sought can no longer be given or is no longer needed." *Martin-Trigona v. Shiff*, 702 F.2d 380, 386 (2d Cir.1983). Under that principle, an inmate's request for injunctive and declaratory relief against correctional staff at a particular correctional institution becomes moot when the inmate is discharged. *See Muhammad v. City of NY, Dep't of Corr.*, 126 F.3d 119, 123 (2d Cir.1997); *see, e.g., Khalil v. Laird*, 353 F. App'x 620, 621 (2d Cir.2009) (injunctive and declaratory relief moot because inmate released from prison); *Sheppard v. Lee*, No. 10 Civ. 6696(GBD)(JLC), 2011 WL 5314450, at *4 n. 6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2011) (declaratory and injunctive relief claims moot because inmate no longer incarcerated) (Report and Recommendation), *adopted*, 2011 WL 6399516 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2011). Accordingly, because Edwards has been released from prison, his claims for injunctive relief should be dismissed.^{FN14}

^{FN14} In addition, Edwards cannot establish a likelihood of success on the merits or the possibility of irreparable injury as required for any injunctive relief. Even assuming he could however, and to the extent Edwards' claims for injunctive relief are not moot, the PLRA extends prospective relief "no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff[.]" 18 U.S.C. §

3626(a)(1)(A), and the relief Edwards seeks—terminating Defendants from their positions and enjoining them from future government employment—is not "narrowly drawn." *Id.*; *see also Barrington v. New York*, 806 F.Supp.2d 730, 750 (S.D.N.Y.2011) (proposed order directing installation of security cameras beyond narrow scope permitted by PLRA); *Easter v. CDC*, 694 F.Supp.2d 1177, 1188–90 (S.D.Cal.2010) (inmate not entitled to injunctive relief preventing officials from future supervision or control over him when inmate no longer in facility where attack took place, and no indication of imminent injury).

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, I recommend that Defendants' motion to dismiss be granted as to Edwards' claims for verbal harassment, deprivation of access to free telephone calls, deprivation of access to legal services, mail tampering, denial of required food portions, unconstitutional strip search, violation of due process rights within the prison's disciplinary and grievance system, excessive force and denial of medical treatment, deprivation of access to the prison's grievance system, retaliation (against all Defendants except Rosa for Edwards' termination), conspiracy, and disability discrimination under the ADA. I further recommend that the motion to dismiss be denied only as to Edwards' retaliatory termination claim against Defendant Rosa to the extent Edwards seeks nominal or punitive damages against her.

PROCEDURE FOR FILING OBJECTIONS

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from service of this Report to file written objections. *See also Fed.R.Civ.P. 6*. Such objections, and any responses to such objections, shall be filed with the Clerk of Court, with courtesy copies delivered to the chambers of the Honorable Richard J. Sullivan and to the chambers of the undersigned, United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, New York, New York, 10007. Any requests for an extension of time for filing objections must be directed to Judge Sullivan.

FAILURE TO FILE OBJECTIONS WITHIN

Slip Copy, 2012 WL 760172 (S.D.N.Y.)

(Cite as: 2012 WL 760172 (S.D.N.Y.))

FOURTEEN (14) DAYS WILL RESULT IN A WAIVER OF OBJECTIONS AND WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. See [*Thomas v. Arn*, 474 U.S. 140, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 \(1985\)](#); [*Wagner & Wagner, LLP v. Atkinson, Haskins, Nellis, Brittingham, Gladd & Carwile, P.C.*, 596 F.3d 84, 92 \(2d Cir.2010\)](#); [28 U.S.C. § 636\(b\)\(1\)](#); [Fed.R.Civ.P. 72](#). If Plaintiff does not have access to cases cited herein that are reported on LexisNexis or Westlaw, he should request copies from Defendants' counsel. See [*Lebron v. Sanders*, 557 F.3d 76, 79 \(2d Cir.2009\)](#).
S.D.N.Y.,2012.

Edwards v. Horn
Slip Copy, 2012 WL 760172 (S.D.N.Y.)
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Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.

United States District Court, S.D. New York.
ELMA RT and NAGYKOROS CANNING FACTORY
RT, Plaintiffs,
v.

LANDESMANN INTERNATIONAL MARKETING
CORPORATION, Landesmann International Marketing
Services GmbH, Mark Landesmann, individually, and
Tamas Batizi, individually, Defendants.

No. 98 CIV. 3662 LMM.

March 22, 2000.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MCKENNA, D.J.

***1** Plaintiffs Elma RT (“Elma”) and Nagykoros Canning Factory RT (“Nagykoros”), both Hungarian companies, brought this suit against defendants Landesmann International Marketing Corporation (“LIMC”), Mark Landesmann (“Landesmann”), Landesmann International Marketing Services GmbH (“LIMS”) and Tamas Batizi (“Batizi”), based on contracts for the sale of apple juice concentrate by plaintiffs to defendants. LIMC is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in New York, and Landesmann is LIMC's sole owner and CEO. LIMS is an Austrian corporation with a place of business in the United States, and Batizi is LIMS's managing director. The citizenship of Landesmann and Batizi is not specifically alleged, but the former is alleged to have been born in Austria but to reside in the United States, while the latter is alleged to be located in Austria.

Plaintiffs assert both federal question and diversity subject matter jurisdiction. Federal question subject matter jurisdiction is supplied by a claim under the Racketeer and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). On the face of the

amended complaint, however, diversity subject matter jurisdiction is not available, since both of the plaintiffs are alien corporations and at least one of the defendants, LIMS, is an alien as well. Lloyds Bank PLC v. Norkin, 817 F.Supp. 414, 417 (S.D.N.Y.1993) (collecting cases).

In their amended complaint, plaintiffs allege that LIMC committed breach of contract, fraud, and conversion. Plaintiff Nagykoros also seeks consequential damages against LIMC. In addition, plaintiffs jointly claim that defendants violated RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).

Defendants move to dismiss plaintiffs' amended complaint on three grounds. First, they argue it is actually a supplemental complaint, which was served without leave of the court, in violation of Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(d) (“Rule 15(d)”). Second, they claim the RICO and conversion counts fail to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) (“Rule 12(b)(6)”). Finally, they argue that the RICO count fails to plead fraud with particularity under Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b) (“Rule 9(b)”). For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint under Rule 15(d), but grants the motion to dismiss the conversion and RICO claims under Rule 12(b)(6). Because the RICO count is dismissed, the Court need not address whether that claim is pleaded with sufficient particularity under Rule 9(b).

I. Background

A. Plaintiff Elma

The following background is based upon plaintiffs' amended complaint, which is based partially on information and belief.

On November 14, 1997, Landesmann entered into a contract with Elma whereby Elma agreed to provide LIMC with thirty containers (approximately six hundred tons) of apple juice concentrate. Landesmann agreed to pay fifty percent of the contract price upon dispatch, and the remaining fifty percent within thirty-five days of the

Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2000 WL 297197 (S.D.N.Y.)
(Cite as: 2000 WL 297197 (S.D.N.Y.))

Bill of Lading.

***2** Pursuant to the contract, Elma delivered thirty containers of concentrate to LIMC, which accepted them without objection. LIMC made the initial payment for one-half the total amount owed. However, LIMC made no further payments to Elma. Instead, on February 9, 1998 (approximately the day on which the remaining payments were due) Landesmann informed Elma that LIMC was rejecting all thirty containers on quality grounds. Landesmann further demanded replacement of the concentrate and immediate reimbursement for all payments already made by LIMC, including shipping costs.

In response, Elma directed LIMC not to dispose of the concentrate. In addition, Elma requested: 1) an independent laboratory be named for testing of the concentrate, with costs to be split equally between ELMA and LIMC; 2) proof that the concentrate was handled properly in transit and subsequent storage; and 3) that LIMC disclose the location of the concentrate.

Landesmann, however, agreed to permit inspection only under the following conditions: 1) LIMC retain the sole right to name any testing facility; 2) Elma bear sole responsibility for payment of the testing costs; 3) the testing facility be allowed to disclose the results only to LIMC; and 4) the identity and location of the inventory not be disclosed to Elma. Elma objected to these demands, but agreed to replace the concentrate. Landesmann notified Elma by letter that he would accept replacement only if it was tendered in the New York/New Jersey area, instead of in Hungary, the location specified in the contract. In addition, Landesmann demanded full reimbursement for all expenses and costs, including financing. Finally, he demanded that Elma arrange, test, and send a substantial portion of the replacement cargo within three business days of receiving Landesmann's letter. When Elma refused these demands, Landesmann resold the concentrate.

B. Plaintiff Nagykoros

The facts alleged by Nagykoros are similar to those

alleged by Elma. In November of 1997, LIMC entered into three separate contracts with Nagykoros whereby Nagykoros agreed to provide LIMC with fifty containers of apple juice concentrate. Fifty percent of the contract price was to be paid after dispatch and transfer of possession, and the remaining fifty percent was to be paid within forty-five days after arrival. Pursuant to the agreement, Nagykoros delivered the fifty containers to LIMC, which received them without objection. LIMC then paid for one-half of the amount due on the first ten containers delivered. On February 4, 1998, however, Landesmann notified Nagykoros that LIMC was rejecting all fifty containers of concentrate on quality grounds.

Nagykoros directed Landesmann not to dispose of the concentrate, and informed him that, under Hungarian law, Nagykoros would suffer severe consequential damages if the contract was not fulfilled. Nagykoros also requested information to enable the stock of concentrate to be properly examined, suggested a neutral quality control agency for testing, and offered to pay for the testing if Landesmann's claim proved justified. Landesmann refused to permit inspection and testing of the apple juice concentrate unless: 1) the quality control agency be ordered that it was working on defendants' behalf; 2) Nagykoros prepay the control agency; and 3) the control agency keep the location of the inventory confidential.

***3** After weeks of inconclusive attempts between the parties to negotiate, Nagykoros informed Landesmann that if the parties did not reach a settlement of some kind, the Hungarian Ministry of Agriculture would fine Nagykoros approximately \$150,000, and Nagykoros would possibly default on bank loans. Landesmann, however, proceeded to resell the concentrate.

II. Discussion

A. [Rule 15\(d\)](#)

Defendants argue that plaintiffs' amended complaint alleges events which occurred after the original complaint was filed, and therefore is actually a supplemental complaint which, to be filed, requires leave of the Court under [Rule 15\(d\)](#). While plaintiffs dispute that theirs is a

Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2000 WL 297197 (S.D.N.Y.)
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supplemental complaint, the Court need not decide which party is correct. Even assuming the complaint is properly labeled “supplemental,” there is no compelling reason why this mislabeling should be fatal. Absent undue delay, bad faith, dilatory tactics, undue prejudice in being served with the proposed pleading, or futility, motions to serve a supplemental pleading will be freely granted. See Forman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). The fact that a complaint is improperly labeled as “amended” instead of “supplemental” should not prevent the Court from considering the merits of the pleading. See Sorel v. G & U, Inc., 103 F.R.D. 69, 73 (S.D.N.Y.1984). Thus, plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss on this ground is denied.

B. Rule 12(b)(6) Standards

On a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must accept the truth of and draw all reasonable inferences from the well-pleaded factual allegations. Mills v. Polar Molecular Corp., 12 F.3d 1170, 1174 (2d Cir.1993). The Court’s task is to “assess the legal feasibility of the complaint [and] not ... assay the weight of the evidence which might be offered in support thereof.” Geisler v. Petrocelli, 616 F.2d 636, 639 (2d Cir.1980); see also Riccuti v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 941 F.2d 119, 124 (2d Cir.1991). A complaint should only be dismissed “if ‘it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.’” Valmonte v. Bane, 18 F.3d 992, 998 (2d Cir.1994)(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).

C. Conversion

Plaintiffs allege that defendants committed conversion by refusing to pay the balance due for the concentrate, not accepting replacement, not allowing return of the rejected concentrate, and proceeding to re-sell the concentrate without plaintiffs’ consent. Defendants in turn move under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss plaintiffs’ conversion claim, arguing that it merely reasserts their breach of contract claim. This motion is granted.

Conversion is the unauthorized assumption and exercise of the right of ownership over goods belonging to another to

the exclusion of the owner’s rights. Vigilant Ins. Co. of America v. Housing Auth. of El Paso, Texas, 87 N.Y.2d 36, 44 (1995). Under New York law, it is well established that an action for conversion cannot be validly maintained where a plaintiff seeks damages merely for breach of contract. See Fraser v. Doubleday & Co., 587 F.Supp. 1284, 1288 (S.D.N.Y.1984). To sustain a conversion claim, a plaintiff must allege acts that constitute unlawful or wrongful behavior separate from a violation of contractual rights. See *id.*; see also In re Chateaugay Corp., 10 F.3d 944, 958 (2d Cir.1993) (holding that a tort claim will not arise where plaintiff is essentially seeking enforcement of the bargain); New York Univ. v. Continental Ins. Co., 87 N.Y.2d 308, 316 (1995) (holding that a defendant may be liable in tort where it breaches a duty of reasonable care distinct from its contractual obligations, and where it engages in tortious conduct separate and apart from its failure to fulfill its contractual obligations).

*4 To determine whether an action for conversion (or any other tort) exists in addition to an action for breach of contract, a court must first ask whether “the alleged obligation to do or not to do something that was breached could not have existed but for a manifested intent.” W. Page Keeton, et al., *Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts* § 92 (5th ed.1984). In other words, the Court must determine whether defendants had a duty separate from any duties imposed by defendants’ contractual obligations. If no such duty exists, then contract is the only theory upon which liability can rest. *Id.*

In the present case, defendants’ duty to return the concentrate, accept replacement, and refrain from resale exists solely because of the contract between the parties. Outside the contract, there was no pre-existing obligation imposed by law which required defendants to honor plaintiffs’ requests. This is apparent by the fact that if plaintiffs are successful on their breach of contract claim, they will be fully compensated for the balance due on the concentrate delivered to defendants, and therefore, no additional damages would be available to them under a theory of conversion.^{FNI} See Fraser, 587 F.Supp. at 1288. Plaintiffs’ argument that defendants’ conduct amounted to conversion because it violated the Uniform Commercial Code (“U.C.C.”) does not sway the Court otherwise. Indeed, this argument actually lends credence to the conclusion that any remedies they may be owed exist

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(Cite as: 2000 WL 297197 (S.D.N.Y.))

under a breach of contract claim alone, since the U.C.C. governs contract, not tort, disputes.

[FN1](#). Punitive damages may be awarded for conversion, but the defendants must allege that defendants acted with malice or reckless disregard of plaintiffs' rights. See [Ashare v. Mirkin, Barre, Saltzstein & Gordon, 435 N.Y.S.2d 438, 441 \(Sup.Ct.1980\)](#), modified on appeal to delete punitive damages, [441 N.Y.S.2d 408 \(2d Dep't.1981\)](#), aff'd, [54 N.Y.2d 891 \(1981\)](#). Plaintiffs have failed to allege malice or reckless disregard of their rights.

For the reasons stated above, plaintiffs' conversion claim is dismissed.

D. RICO

Plaintiffs also allege that defendants' conduct violated RICO. To state a claim for damages under [18 U.S.C. § 1962\(c\)](#), a complaint must specifically allege:

- (1) the existence of an enterprise which affects interstate or foreign commerce;
- (2) that the defendants were "employed by" or "associated with" the enterprise;
- (3) that the defendants participated in the conduct of the enterprise's affairs; and
- (4) that the participation was through a pattern of racketeering activity.

[Clifford v. Hughson, 992 F.Supp. 661, 665 \(S.D.N.Y.1998\)](#) (quoting [Town of West Hartford v. Operation Rescue, 915 F.2d 92, 100 \(2d Cir.1990\)](#)).

Defendants argue that plaintiffs have failed to properly

allege the existence of an "enterprise." Additionally, defendants argue that the amended complaint fails to allege the predicate acts [FN2](#) and "continuity" needed to show a "pattern of racketeering activity." They therefore move to dismiss plaintiffs' RICO claim under [Rule 12\(b\)\(6\)](#). Since the Court finds that plaintiffs have failed to allege "continuity," the RICO claim is dismissed.

[FN2](#). The predicate acts alleged in this case are mail and wire fraud.

Plaintiffs must allege "continuity" as a prerequisite for the existence of a "pattern of racketeering activity." See [H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 230 \(1989\)](#). In other words, the predicate acts must be related, and must constitute or threaten long-term criminal activity. *Id.* Such continuity can be either "closed" or "open-ended." *Id.* Plaintiffs apparently concede that closed-ended continuity is not present in this case. [FN3](#). Therefore, the issue before the Court is whether the requirements of open-ended continuity have been satisfied.

[FN3](#). Closed-ended continuity is established by proving a series of related predicate acts extending over a substantial period of time. [H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 230](#) (holding that predicate acts extending over a few weeks or months and threatening no future criminal conduct did not satisfy the requirement of continuity). The time period involved here, four months, clearly cannot be called "substantial."

*5 Open-ended continuity requires the threat of long-term racketeering activity. *Id.* This threat is indicated when the predicate acts themselves involve a distinct threat of such future racketeering activity, are part of the regular way of doing business for an ongoing entity (be it a criminal association or legitimate business), or are a regular means of conducting or participating in an ongoing RICO enterprise. *Id.* Ordinarily, however, courts will not find a threat of future racketeering in "cases concerning alleged racketeering activity in furtherance of endeavors that are not inherently unlawful, such as frauds in the sale of property" [United States v. Aulicino, 44 F.3d 1102, 1111 \(2d Cir.1995\)](#).

Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2000 WL 297197 (S.D.N.Y.)
(Cite as: 2000 WL 297197 (S.D.N.Y.))

In the present case, plaintiffs have inadequately pleaded open-ended continuity. In conclusory fashion, they allege only that “the fraudulent activities of the Enterprise continue to this day.” (Compl.¶ 250). However, they offer no specificity as to what the fraudulent activities involve. Moreover, they have not claimed that the alleged “enterprise” depends on the commission of fraudulent acts “in the conduct of its day to day affairs,” a factor courts have often looked to in determining whether fraudulent activity constitutes an entity’s “regular way of doing business.” *See, e.g., Mead v. Schaub*, 757 F.Supp. 319, 323 (S.D.N.Y.1991). Furthermore, plaintiffs fail to allege that defendants pursued an “inherently unlawful” goal. Under the facts alleged in the complaint, the only endeavor that could be attributed to defendants’ actions is the desire to resell goods for a profit, which is the lawful goal of nearly every business. As noted above, unless an “inherently unlawful” pursuit is involved, continuity is not ordinarily inferred.

With the dismissal of the RICO claim, the Court does not have federal subject matter jurisdiction, and, for the reason set forth above, it does not have diversity subject matter jurisdiction. The Court declines, pursuant to [28 U.S.C. § 1367\(c\)\(3\)](#), to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ remaining claims. Accordingly, the amended complaint is dismissed.

The Court grants plaintiffs leave to file a second amended complaint within 30 days of the date hereof.

SO ORDERED

S.D.N.Y.,2000.
Elma RT v. Landesmann Intern. Marketing Corp.
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2000 WL 297197 (S.D.N.Y.)

For all the above reasons, the Court dismisses plaintiffs’ RICO claim. [FN4](#)

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[FN4](#). Because the Court grants defendants’ motion to dismiss the RICO claim for lack of “continuity,” it is unnecessary to decide whether plaintiffs have alleged the existence of an “enterprise” distinct from defendants or the predicate acts needed to establish a “pattern of racketeering activity.” It is also unnecessary to decide whether the alleged predicate acts were pleaded with sufficient particularity under [Rule 9\(b\)](#). While the Court declines to opine as to the validity of these arguments, it appears likely that, in addition to the complaint’s shortcomings in alleging continuity, it is also deficient in the other areas challenged by defendants.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to [Rule 15\(d\)](#) is denied. However, defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ conversion and RICO claims under [Rule 12\(b\)\(6\)](#) is granted.



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(Cite as: 1997 WL 599355 (N.D.N.Y.))

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Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.

United States District Court, N.D. New York.

Kenneth BROWN, Plaintiff,

v.

Andrew PETERS, Warden, Watertown Correctional Facility; Joseph Williams, Warden, Lincoln Work-Release Center; Francis J. Herman, Senior Parole Officer Interstate Bureau; T. Stanford, Senior Parole Officer; Deborah Stewart, Parole Officer; John Doe # 1, Parole Agent, Watertown Correctional Facility; John Doe # 2, Parole Agent, Lincoln Work Release Center; Susan Bishop, Director of Interstate Compact, South Carolina; Cecil Magee, Parole Officer, South Carolina; Frank Barton, Parole Officer, South Carolina; John McMahan, Parole Officer, South Carolina, Defendants.
No. Civ.A. 95CV1641RSPDS.

Sept. 22, 1997.

Kenneth Brown, State Court Institute-Greene, Waynesburg, PA, plaintiff, pro se.

Dennis C. Vacco, New York State Attorney General, The Capitol Albany, NY, for defendants Peters, Herman Stewart, Doe # 1, Doe # 2, and Williams, [Jeffrey M. Dvorin](#), Assistant Attorney General, [Carl N. Lundberg](#), Chief Legal Counsel, South Carolina Department of Probation, Columbia, SC, for defendants Bishop, Magee, Barton, McMahan, and Stanford, [Carl N. Lundberg](#), of Counsel.

DECISION AND ORDER

POOLER, J.

*1 The above matter comes to me following a Report-Recommendation by Magistrate Judge Daniel Scanlon, Jr., duly filed on April 17, 1997. Following ten days from the service thereof, the Clerk has sent me the entire file, including any and all objections filed by the parties herein.

Plaintiff Kenneth Brown commenced this Section

1983 civil rights action on November 17, 1995. On February 12, 1996, Magistrate Judge Scanlon ordered Brown to submit an amended complaint alleging the specific acts committed by the individuals named as defendants which Brown claimed violated his constitutional rights. Brown filed an amended complaint on March 21, 1996. In his amended complaint, Brown alleged that defendants violated his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by failing to process properly his interstate compact paperwork, resulting in Brown being imprisoned pursuant to a parole hold when in fact he had never violated the conditions of his parole. For a more complete statement of Brown's claims, see his amended complaint. Dkt. No. 5.

On August 5, 1996, defendants Peters and Williams made a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to [Fed.R.Civ.P. 12\(b\)\(6\)](#). Dkt. No. 13; Dkt. No. 14, at 2. On August 19, 1996, defendants Bishop, Magee, Barton, and McMahan made a motion to dismiss the complaint against them or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. Dkt. No. 20. On October 17, 1996, defendants Herman, Stewart, and Stanford made a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Dkt. No. 34. On April 17, 1996, Magistrate Judge Scanlon recommended that all defendants' motions to dismiss be granted and that the complaint be dismissed. Dkt. No. 50.

On June 9, 1997, Brown filed objections to the magistrate judge's report-recommendation, having been granted additional time in which to do so. Dkt. No. 52. In addition, Brown filed on June 9, 1997, a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint and a copy of his proposed amended complaint. Dkt. No. 53. I turn first to the last motion filed, Brown's motion for leave to amend his complaint a second time.

Brown seeks to file a second amended complaint "setting forth in detail the personal involvement of each defendant and how their acts of commission and omission served to deprive plaintiff of Constitutionally secured rights." Dkt. No. 53. The district court has discretion whether to grant leave to amend. [Ruffolo v. Oppenheimer](#)

Not Reported in F.Supp., 1997 WL 599355 (N.D.N.Y.)

(Cite as: 1997 WL 599355 (N.D.N.Y.))

& Co., 987 F.2d 129, 131 (2d Cir.1993). In exercising that discretion, the court should freely grant leave to amend when justice so requires. Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). However, the court need not grant leave to amend where it appears that amendment would prove to be unproductive or futile. Ruffolo, 987 F.2d at 131.

Here, Brown moved to amend his complaint to add additional allegations against the named defendants. However, the additional allegations fail to cure the deficiency which forms the basis of defendants' motion to dismiss-the absence of defendants' personal involvement in a constitutional deprivation. Section 1983 imposes liability upon an individual only when personal involvement of that individual subjects a person to deprivation of a federal right. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). A complaint is fatally defective if it fails to allege personal involvement sufficient to establish that a supervisor was "directly and personally responsible for the purported unlawful conduct." Alfaro Motors, Inc. v. Ward, 814 F.2d 883, 886 (2d Cir.1987).

*2 Brown's proposed amended complaint alleges in conclusory fashion that defendants acted "in a grossly negligent and concerted manner which breached their duties owed to Plaintiff and is the proximate cause of [the violation of plaintiff's constitutional rights]." Proposed Am. Compl., at 3. Brown continues in the same vein, stating that defendants owed duties to plaintiff to carry out their jobs in a professional manner and they failed to carry out those duties appropriately. The complaint states that defendants held specific responsibilities, such as checking for outstanding warrants, which if performed properly should have alerted them to a problem. However, nowhere does the complaint set forth allegations that these defendants either participated directly in any constitutional infraction or that they were even aware of such an infraction. The proposed amended complaint merely alleges that these defendants failed in performing their supervisory and ministerial functions. "These bare assertions do not state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Smiley v. Davis, 1988 WL 78306, *2 (S.D.N.Y.).

This plaintiff previously has had the opportunity to amend his complaint for the same reason asserted here, to

allege personal involvement on the part of defendants. Brown's first amended complaint failed to accomplish that task, and it appears that even if allowed to amend again Brown would be unable to make the requisite allegations with sufficient specificity to sustain his complaint. Consequently, I find that amendment would be futile, and I deny Brown's motion for leave to amend his complaint.

I turn now to the magistrate judge's report-recommendation and defendants' motions. The magistrate judge recommends that I grant defendants' motions and dismiss the complaint as to all defendants. The report-recommendation clearly describes the grounds on which the magistrate judge recommends dismissal as to each defendant. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b) requires the district judge to make a *de novo* determination on "any portion of the magistrate's disposition to which specific, written objection has been made." Brown's objections fail to address directly any of the analysis. Brown's objections state (1) that he has been deprived of his constitutional rights; (2) that he has stated a cause of action; (3) that the court wrongly refused to appoint an attorney for him and wrongly stayed discovery pending the outcome of these motions; (4) that he seeks to file an amended complaint; (5) the standard of review for a Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion; (6) that he disagrees with the magistrate judge's recommendation to grant defendants' motions because the allegations in his complaint, which he repeats, show that his rights were violated; and (7) the text of the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments.

Even affording the objections the liberal reading required for *pro se* pleadings, I find that these objections fail to state any basis whatsoever, much less a specific one, for the court not to adopt the magistrate judge's rulings. They simply re-state the relief sought and the facts on which Brown grounds his complaint and conclude that the magistrate judge's conclusions are wrong. When the parties make only frivolous, conclusive, or general objections, the court reviews the report-recommendation for clear error. See Camardo v. General Motors Hourly-Rate Employees Pension Plan, 806 F.Supp. 380, 382 (W.D.N.Y.1992) (court need not consider objections which are frivolous, conclusive, or general and constitute a rehashing of the same arguments and positions taken in original pleadings); Chambrier v. Leonardo, 1991 WL

Not Reported in F.Supp., 1997 WL 599355 (N.D.N.Y.)

(Cite as: 1997 WL 599355 (N.D.N.Y.))

44838, *1 (S.D.N.Y.) (restatement of allegations already before the court and assertion that valid constitutional claim exists insufficient to form specific objections); Schoolfield v. Dep't of Correction, 1994 WL 119740, *2 (S.D.N.Y.) (objections stating that magistrate judge's decisions are wrong and unjust, and restating relief sought and facts upon which complaint grounded, are conclusory and do not form specific basis for not adopting report-recommendation); Vargas v. Keane, 1994 WL 693885, *1 (S.D.N.Y.) (general objection that report does not address violation of petitioner's constitutional rights is a general plea that report not be adopted and cannot be treated as objection within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 636), *aff'd*, 86 F.3d 1273 (2d Cir.), *cert. denied*, 519 U.S. 895, 117 S.Ct. 240, 136 L.Ed.2d 169 (U.S.1996). See also Scipio v. Keane, 1997 WL 375601, *1 (1997) (when objections fail to address analysis directly, court reviews report-recommendation for clear error); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b), Advisory Comm. Note (when no specific, written objections filed, "court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation").

*3 Because Brown fails to make specific objections or provide any basis for his general objections, I review the report-recommendation for clear error. After careful review, I conclude that the magistrate judge's report-recommendation is well-reasoned and is not clearly erroneous.^{FNI} The magistrate judge employed the proper standard, accurately recited the facts, and reasonably applied the law to those facts. Consequently, I adopt the report-recommendation.

^{FNI}. I note, however, that the report-recommendation would survive even *de novo* review.

CONCLUSION

Because plaintiff's proposed amendment demonstrates that amendment would be futile, I deny plaintiff's motion for leave to amend his complaint. I approve the magistrate judge's recommendation and grant defendants' motions to dismiss. Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed in its entirety.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

ORDER and REPORT-RECOMMENDATION

This matter was referred to the undersigned for report and recommendation by the Hon. Rosemary S. Pooler, United States District Judge, by Standing Order dated November 12, 1986. Currently before this Court are a number of motions. Defendants Peters and Williams have filed a motion to dismiss (dkt.13); defendants Bishop, Magee, Barton and McMahan have filed a motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative to dismiss (dkt.20); and defendants Herman, Stewart and Stanford also have filed a motion to dismiss (dkt.34). Plaintiff opposes these three motions (dkt.27, 29, 33, 38). Defendants Bishop, Magee and McMahan have filed a motion to stay discovery (dkt.41) and plaintiff has filed a motion to extend time (dkt.44) in which to file opposition to the latter motion for a stay of discovery.

The Court addresses these issues *seriatim*.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff's amended complaint, which he has brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleges the following facts. In October, 1991, plaintiff was incarcerated in the Watertown Correctional Facility in Watertown, New York. He applied for an interstate compact because he wanted to return to South Carolina to live with his common law wife, Pamela Reid. During the application process, he was interviewed by the facility's parole officer, identified only as defendant John Doe # 1. After signing the necessary papers, his application was forwarded to defendant Andrew Peters, the facility's superintendent, who reviewed, signed and forwarded the papers to the Interstate Bureau. Amend. Compl. at ¶¶ 1-2; Exs. A, B.

On or about January 15, 1992, while his compact was waiting for review at the Interstate Bureau, plaintiff was approved for work release and sent to the Lincoln Work Release Center in New York City. While at the center, plaintiff spoke to a parole officer, defendant John Doe # 2, and told him that he was seeking a compact that would return him to South Carolina upon his conditional release. Plaintiff claims the parole officer told him that he would handle the necessary paperwork, although the officer had had no experience with an interstate compact. Amend. Compl. at ¶¶ 3, 4.

*4 Plaintiff, meanwhile, asked Reid whether any

Not Reported in F.Supp., 1997 WL 599355 (N.D.N.Y.)

(Cite as: 1997 WL 599355 (N.D.N.Y.))

officials had contacted her in South Carolina regarding his prospective residence in that state. Upon discovering no one had contacted her, plaintiff asked a lawyer he knew, Navron Ponds, to inquire as to his compact status. In March, 1992, the lawyer spoke with defendant Susan Bishop, who is the director of the interstate compact program in South Carolina. Bishop allegedly told Ponds that plaintiff "was disapproved because there was a discrepancy about approving plaintiff[s] compact." The "discrepancy" was the fact that plaintiff owed the state of South Carolina eighty-six days of confinement from a previous sentence. Plaintiff claims Bishop told Ponds to contact defendants Cecil Magee and Frank Barton, who worked for the South Carolina Parole Department. Sometime in March, 1992, Ponds made some calls to Barton and Magee. A verbal agreement was reached, and plaintiff, upon speaking with Barton and Magee was told that his compact had been approved. He also was told that he should report to the South Carolina Department of Parole upon being released. Amend. Compl. at ¶¶ 5-7.

Prior to leaving the Lincoln Work Release Center, plaintiff processed paperwork related to his interstate compact. His paperwork was sent by Doe # 2 to defendant Joseph Williams, the superintendent of the center. Williams reviewed, signed and returned the paperwork to plaintiff. On May 1, 1992, upon his release from the center, plaintiff traveled to South Carolina. Three days later, he entered a South Carolina parole office and promptly was arrested because of the eighty-six days of confinement that he owed the state. Plaintiff's paperwork was given to defendant John McMahan, a parole officer. Plaintiff claims that McMahan never returned this paperwork to him. On May 20, 1992, the state of South Carolina revoked plaintiff's parole and plaintiff was returned to prison to serve the eighty-six days that he owed. When he asked McMahan what would happen to his one year of parole from New York, the officer allegedly told him that his New York parole would run concurrently with his South Carolina parole, and that when he finished his South Carolina parole, he would not owe any parole whatsoever. Plaintiff served the eighty-six days he owed and was released on July 31, 1992. Amend. Compl. at ¶¶ 8-10.

In February, 1993, plaintiff was arrested on robbery

charges in South Carolina. The charges ultimately were dropped, but he apparently encountered some difficulties regarding this arrest as a result of a parole hold that New York state had placed upon him. Bishop's office told him that it had nothing to do with his parole hold and that any problem that he had was between him and the state of New York. He talked to authorities in Albany, New York regarding the parole hold, but was not successful in his efforts to have the hold removed. On September 30, 1993, after had been extradited to New York as a fugitive from justice, plaintiff was given a preliminary hearing at Riker's Island, New York. The hearing officer found no probable cause that plaintiff had violated any condition of parole. He was released. Amend. Compl. at ¶¶ 11-14; Exs. C-J.

*5 Plaintiff claims that he would not have suffered hardships if his interstate compact had been handled correctly. He alleges that defendant Deborah Stewart failed to follow up and see whether plaintiff had arrived in South Carolina. If she had, he argues, she would have discovered that he had been arrested upon his arrival. He alleges that defendant Francis Herman, a parole officer at the Interstate Bureau failed to do his job by not investigating plaintiff's violation reports. Amend. Compl. at ¶¶ 15-17; Exs. F-I.

Plaintiff asserts that the foregoing amounts violations of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, wherefore he both compensatory and declaratory relief.

DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Dismiss by Williams and Peters.

Williams and Peters have filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint pursuant to [FED.R.CIV.P. 12\(b\)\(6\)](#) on the grounds that it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In a [Rule 12\(b\)\(6\)](#) motion, all factual allegations in the complaint must be taken and construed in plaintiff's favor. See [LaBounty v. Adler](#), 933 F.2d 121, 122 (2d Cir.1991) (citing [Ortiz v. Cornette](#), 867 F.2d 146, 149 (1989)). The Court's role is not to assess whether plaintiffs have raised questions of fact or demonstrated an entitlement to a judgment as a matter of law, as in a motion made pursuant to [FED.R.CIV.P. 56](#) for summary judgment, but rather to determine whether plaintiff's complaint sufficiently alleges all of the

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(Cite as: 1997 WL 599355 (N.D.N.Y.))

necessary legal elements to state a claim under the law. See Christopher v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc., 899 F.Supp. 1224, 1226 (S.D.N.Y.1995), (citing Ricciuti v. New York City Transit Authority, 941 F.2d 119, 124 (2d Cir.1991)). Factual allegations in brief or memoranda may not be considered. Fonte v. Board of Managers of Continental Towers Condominium, 848 F.2d 24, 25 (2d Cir.1988). The Court now turns to the issues presented.

Personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983. Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir.1994). As superintendents at New York State Correctional facilities, Williams and Peter may be found personally involved in the alleged deprivation of plaintiff's constitutionally protected rights by a showing that they: (1) directly participated in the infraction; (2) knew of the infraction, but failed to remedy the wrong; (3) created or continued a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occurred; or (4) were grossly negligent in managing subordinates who caused unlawful conditions or events. *Id.*, (quoting Williams v. Smith, 781 F.2d 319, 323-24 (2d Cir.1986)). Supervisory liability also may be imposed against Williams or Peters with a showing of gross negligence or deliberate indifference to plaintiff's constitutional rights. *Id.* Absent some personal involvement by Williams or Peters in the allegedly constitutionally infirm conduct of their subordinates, neither can be held liable under § 1983. Gill v. Mooney, 824 F.2d 192, 196 (2d Cir.1987).

*6 Plaintiff has not provided any evidence linking either Williams or Peters to his alleged constitutional deprivations. All that plaintiff has alleged is that Williams and Peters, as superintendents, have reviewed and signed paperwork relating to plaintiff's compact. Though it has long been held that *pro se* complaints are held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers" for the purpose of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 595-96, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972), plaintiff has not explained how the ministerial conduct of these two defendants was violative of the Constitution. Their motion to dismiss should be granted.

B. Motion for Summary Judgment or to Dismiss by Bishop, Magee, Barton and McMahan.

Bishop, Magee, Barton and McMahan have filed a motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative a motion to dismiss. The Court will treat their motion as a motion to dismiss. "[C]omplaints relying on the civil rights statutes are insufficient unless they contain some specific allegations of fact indicating a deprivation of rights, instead of a litany of general conclusions that shock but have no meaning." Barr v. Adams, 810 F.2d 358, 363 (2d Cir.1987). Plaintiff has not alleged specifically how the conduct of these four defendants infringed upon his constitutional rights. In his amended complaint, he contends that defendants violated the Constitution by "continuously breaching [[[their] duty]" to him. This language underscores the defect with the complaint: if it alleges anything at all, it alleges that defendants were negligent in handling plaintiff's interstate compact and parole. To state a cognizable § 1983 claim, the prisoner must allege actions or omissions sufficient to demonstrate deliberate indifference; mere negligence will not suffice. Hayes v. New York City Dept. of Corrections, 84 F.3d 614, 620 (2d Cir.1996); Morales v. New York State Dep't of Corrections, 842 F.2d 27, 30 (2d Cir.1988) (section 1983 does not encompass a cause of action sounding in negligence).

The Court finds that the claims against Bishop, Magee, Barton and McMahan should be dismissed.

C. Motion to Dismiss by Herman, Stewart and Stanford.

Plaintiff's claim against Stewart is that she failed to follow up and see whether plaintiff had arrived in South Carolina. Herman, he likewise asserts, failed to do his job because he did not investigate plaintiff's violation reports. Plaintiff has not alleged how these actions run afoul of the Constitution; and again, these claims seem to be grounded in negligence, which is not actionable under § 1983. Hayes, 84 F.3d at 620.

Plaintiff's claim against Stanford must fail because his complaint literally fails to state a claim against that defendant. Aside from naming Stanford as a defendant, and alleging that he was the appointed Senior Parole Officer at plaintiff's September 30, 1993 revocation hearing at Riker's Island, plaintiff does not detail how Stanford violated his constitutional rights. Absent some personal involvement by Stanford in the allegedly

Not Reported in F.Supp., 1997 WL 599355 (N.D.N.Y.)

(Cite as: 1997 WL 599355 (N.D.N.Y.))

constitutionally infirm conduct of his subordinates, he cannot be held liable under [§ 1983](#). [Gill](#), 824 F.2d at 196.

*7 Accordingly, the Court finds that Stanford, Stewart and Herman's motion to dismiss should be granted.

D. Plaintiffs "John Doe" Claims.

In so far as neither John Doe # 1 nor John Doe # 2 have been identified and served in this matter, the Court does not have jurisdiction over these parties and does not reach the merits of plaintiff's claims against them.

E. Discovery Motions.

Defendants Bishop, Magee and McMahan have filed a motion to stay discovery until the Court has made a ruling on their motion to dismiss. Plaintiff has filed a motion to extend the time in which he may file opposition to defendants' motion. Plaintiff, however, has filed his opposing response (dkt.47), therefore his instant discovery motion is denied as moot. In that the Court recommends granting defendants' motion to dismiss, discovery in this matter would be fruitless. Accordingly, defendants' motion for a stay of discovery pending the resolution of their motion to dismiss is granted.

CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing analysis, it is hereby

ORDERED, that plaintiff's motion to extend the time to file an opposing reply (dkt.44) is denied as moot; and it is further

ORDERED, that defendants Bishop, Magee and McMahan's motion to stay discovery until their motion to dismiss is decided (dkt.41) is granted; and it is further

RECOMMENDED, that defendants Peters and Williams' motion to dismiss (dkt.13) be granted; and it is further

RECOMMENDED, that defendants Bishop, Magee, Barton and McMahan's motion to dismiss (dkt.20) be granted; and it is further

RECOMMENDED, that defendants Herman, Stewart

and Stanford's motion to dismiss (dkt.34) be granted.

Pursuant to [28 U.S.C. § 636\(b\)\(1\)](#) and Local Rule 72.1(c), the parties have ten (10) days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. ***FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN TEN (10) DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW.*** [Roldan v. Racette](#), 984 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir.1993) (citing [Small v. Secretary of Health and Human Services](#), 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir.1989)); [28 U.S.C. § 636\(b\)\(1\)](#); [FED.R.CIV.P. 6\(a\), 6\(e\)](#) and [72](#).

N.D.N.Y.,1997.

Brown v. Peters

Not Reported in F.Supp., 1997 WL 599355 (N.D.N.Y.)

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(Cite as: 1997 WL 118379 (S.D.N.Y.))

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Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.

United States District Court, S.D. New York.
Jeanette HARMON, Plaintiff,

v.

Marvin T. RUNYON, Postmaster General, United
States Postal Service, Defendant.
No. 96 CIV. 6080(SAS).

Mar. 17, 1997.

Jeanette Harmon, pro se.

Aaron Katz, Asst. U.S. Atty., New York, N.Y., for
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM ORDER

SCHEINDLIN, District Judge.

*1 On August 12, 1996, plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 and § 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 to 634 for employment discrimination on the basis of her age, race and gender. On November 21, 1996, plaintiff applied for the appointment of counsel on the grounds that she lacks sufficient knowledge of the law to continue to maintain her claims *pro se*. For the reasons set forth below, plaintiff's application for appointment of counsel is denied with leave to renew.

Discussion As an initial matter, there is no constitutional right to appointed counsel in civil cases. Moreover, due to the scarcity of volunteer attorneys, the Second Circuit has cautioned against the routine appointment of *pro bono* counsel in civil cases. See Cooper v. A. Sargenti Co. Inc., 877 F.2d 170, 172 (2d Cir.1989). In Hodge v. Police Officers, 802 F.2d 58, 61-62 (2d Cir.1986), *cert.*

denied, 502 U.S. 986, 112 S.Ct. 596, 116 L.Ed.2d 620 (1991), the Second Circuit set forth the factors courts should consider in deciding whether to grant a *pro se* plaintiff's request for the appointment of counsel. As a threshold requirement, the court must decide whether the plaintiff's claim "seems likely to be of substance." Hodge, 802 F.2d at 61. If the plaintiff meets this requirement, the court must next consider factors including:

the indigent's ability to investigate the crucial facts, whether conflicting evidence implicating the need for cross-examination will be the major proof presented to the fact finder, the indigent's ability to present the case, the complexity of the legal issues and any special reason in that case why appointment of counsel would be more likely to lead to a just determination.

Id. at 61-62. As plaintiff is not indigent, the court is also required to consider plaintiff's efforts to obtain a lawyer. Cooper, 877 F.2d at 172, 174.

In the instant case, plaintiff has not met the threshold requirement set forth in *Hodge*. Plaintiff has presented no evidence whatever to support her claims regarding defendant's allegedly improper actions. Without presenting any evidence to support her claims, Harmon cannot meet the first requirement of the *Hodge* test described above. Accordingly, plaintiff's application is denied.

Given the early stage of these proceedings, it is possible that plaintiff eventually will be able to provide some evidence to support her claims. Plaintiff's application is therefore denied with leave to renew. If plaintiff wishes to apply again for the appointment of counsel, she must make some attempt to refer to evidence which supports her claims.

SO ORDERED.

S.D.N.Y., 1997.

Harmon v. Runyon

Not Reported in F.Supp., 1997 WL 118379 (S.D.N.Y.)

Not Reported in F.Supp., 1997 WL 118379 (S.D.N.Y.)
(Cite as: 1997 WL 118379 (S.D.N.Y.))

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Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.

United States District Court,

D. Connecticut.

Darnell L. WALKER

v.

STATE OF CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS NORTHERN CORRECTIONAL
INSTITUTION CORRECTIONAL HEALTH
SERVICES

No. 3:06CV165 (SRU).

March 15, 2006.

Darnell L. Walker, Somers, CT, pro se.

RULING AND ORDER

UNDERHILL, J.

*1 The plaintiff, Darnell L. Walker (“Walker”), an inmate currently confined at the Northern Correctional Institution in Somers, Connecticut, brings this civil rights action *pro se* and *in forma pauperis* pursuant to [28 U.S.C. § 1915](#). Walker challenges his medical treatment for rectal bleeding. Although he references two doctors in the description of his claims, he names as defendants only the State of Connecticut, the Department of Corrections, Northern Correctional Institution and Correctional Health Services. For the reasons that follow, the complaint is dismissed without prejudice.

I. Standard of Review

Walker has met the requirements of [28 U.S.C. § 1915\(a\)](#) and has been granted leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* in this action. Pursuant to [28 U.S.C. § 1915\(e\)\(2\)\(B\)](#), “the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that ... the action ... is frivolous or malicious; ... fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or ... seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” [28 U.S.C. § 1915\(e\)\(2\)\(B\)\(i\)-\(iii\)](#). Thus, the dismissal of a complaint by a district court under any of the three enumerated

sections in [28 U.S.C. § 1915\(e\)\(2\)\(B\)](#) is mandatory rather than discretionary. See [Cruz v. Gomez](#), 202 F.3d 593, 596 (2d Cir.2000).

“When an *in forma pauperis* plaintiff raises a cognizable claim, his complaint may not be dismissed sua sponte for frivolousness under [§ 1915\(e\)\(2\)\(B\)\(i\)](#) even if the complaint fails to ‘flesh out all the required details.’ ” [Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co.](#), 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir.1998) (quoting [Benitez](#), 907 F.2d at 1295).

An action is “frivolous” when either: (1) “the ‘factual contentions are clearly baseless,’ such as when allegations are the product of delusion or fantasy;” or (2) “the claim is ‘based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.’ ” [Nance v. Kelly](#), 912 F.2d 605, 606 (2d Cir.1990) (per curiam) (quoting [Neitzke v. Williams](#), 490 U.S. 319, 327, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 1833, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989)). A claim is based on an “indisputably meritless legal theory” when either the claim lacks an arguable basis in law, [Benitez v. Wolff](#), 907 F.2d 1293, 1295 (2d Cir.1990) (per curiam), or a dispositive defense clearly exists on the face of the complaint. See [Pino v. Ryan](#), 49 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir.1995).

[Livingston](#), 141 F.3d at 437. The court exercises caution in dismissing a case under [section 1915\(e\)](#) because a claim that the court perceives as likely to be unsuccessful is not necessarily frivolous. See [Neitzke v. Williams](#), 490 U.S. 319, 329, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989).

A district court must also dismiss a complaint if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See [28 U.S.C. § 1915\(e\)\(2\)\(B\)\(ii\)](#) (“court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that ... (B) the action or appeal ... (ii) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted”); [Gomez](#), 202 F.3d at 596 (“Prison Litigation Reform Act ... which redesignated [§ 1915\(d\)](#) as [§ 1915\(e\)](#) [] provided that dismissal for failure to state a claim is mandatory”). In reviewing the complaint, the court “accept[s] as true all factual allegations in the complaint” and draws inferences from those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. [Gomez](#), 202 F.3d

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(Cite as: 2006 WL 1981783 (D.Conn.))

at 596 (citing *King v. Simpson*, 189 F.3d 284, 287 (2d Cir.1999)). Dismissal of the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), is only appropriate if “ ‘it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.’ ” *Id.* at 597 (quoting *Conley v. Gibson*, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)).

*2 In addition, “unless the court can rule out any possibility, however unlikely it might be, that an amended complaint would succeed in stating a claim,” the court should permit “a *pro se* plaintiff who is proceeding *in forma pauperis*” to file an amended complaint that states a claim upon which relief may be granted. *Gomez v. USAA Federal Savings Bank*, 171 F.3d 794, 796 (2d Cir.1999).

II. Discussion

In order to state a claim for relief in a civil right action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Walker must satisfy a two-part test. First, he must allege facts demonstrating that the defendants are persons who acted under color of state law. Second, he must allege facts demonstrating that he has been deprived of a constitutionally or federally protected right. See *Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.*, 457 U.S. 922, 930, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982); *Washington v. James*, 782 F.2d 1134, 1138 (2d Cir.1986).

None of the defendants named in this action are “persons” within the meaning of section 1983. Thus, all claims against them must be dismissed as lacking an arguable legal basis.

The first defendant is the State of Connecticut. A state is not a person within the meaning of section 1983. See *Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police*, 491 U.S. 58, 67, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989). Thus, all claims against the State of Connecticut are dismissed.

The second defendant is the Connecticut Department of Correction, a state agency. It is well-settled that a state agency is not a person within the meaning of section 1983. See *Fisher v. Cahill*, 474 F.2d 991, 992 (3d Cir.1973) (state prison department cannot be sued under section 1983 because it does not fit the definition of “person” under section 1983); *Santos v. Department of Correction*,

No. 3:04cv1562 (JCH) (HBF), 2005 WL 2123543, at *3 (D.Conn. Aug. 29, 2005) (holding that Connecticut Department of Correction is not a person under section 1983); *Santiago v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs.*, 725 F.Supp. 780, 783-84 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (holding that state and state agencies are not persons under section 1983), *rev'd on other grounds*, 945 F.2d 25 (2d Cir.1991), *cert. denied*, 502 U.S. 1094, 112 S.Ct. 1168, 117 L.Ed.2d 414 (1992). Thus, all claims against the Department of Correction must be dismissed.

Walker also names Northern Correctional Institution as a defendant. Like the Department of Correction, a state correctional facility is not a person within the meaning of section 1983. See *Lovell v. Cayuga Correctional Facility*, No. 02-CV-6640L, 2004 WL 2202624, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Sept.29, 2004); see also *Whitley v. Westchester County*, No. 97 CIV. 0420(SS), 1997 WL 659100 at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.22, 1997) (“A prison facility, such as the Westchester County Correctional Facility or Jail, is not a person within the meaning of § 1983.”). All claims against Northern Correctional Institution must be dismissed.

The final defendant is Correctional Health Services. The court assumes that Walker intends to name the University of Connecticut Health Center Correctional Managed Unit, the division of the Health Center that provides medical care to Connecticut inmates. This unit is part of the University of Connecticut Health Center. Like other state agencies, the University of Connecticut Health Center is not a person within the meaning of section 1983. See *Stewart v. John Dempsey Hospital*, No. 3:03cv1703(WWE), 2004 WL 78145, at *2 (D.Conn. Jan. 9, 2004) (holding that John Dempsey Hospital University of Connecticut Health Center is not a person within the meaning of section 1983); *Cassells v. University Hosp. at Stony Brook*, 1987 WL 3717, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Jan.12, 1987) (holding that section 1983 claims against state university and university hospital fail because neither entity is a person within the meaning of section 1983). Thus, this defendant is not a person within the meaning of section 1983.

*3 The court can discern no possible amendment that would preserve any claims against these defendants. Accordingly, the complaint lacks an arguable legal basis

Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2006 WL 1981783 (D.Conn.)

(Cite as: 2006 WL 1981783 (D.Conn.))

and must be dismissed. *See Neitzke*, 480 U.S. at 325.

III. *Conclusion*

The complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to [28 U.S.C. § 1915\(e\)\(2\)\(B\)\(i\) and \(ii\)](#). Walker may file an amended complaint if he can identify appropriate defendants. Any amended complaint shall be filed within twenty (20) days from the date of this order. If no complaint is timely filed, the clerk shall close the file.

Walker submitted a stool sample with the complaint. Walker is hereby on notice that the court will not accept such submissions in the future. Should Walker attempt to file any excrement or other bodily secretion, the item will be destroyed and sanctions will be imposed.

SO ORDERED.

D.Conn.,2006.

Walker v. State of Connecticut
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2006 WL 1981783 (D.Conn.)
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Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2004 WL 885828 (S.D.N.Y.)

(Cite as: 2004 WL 885828 (S.D.N.Y.))

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Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.

United States District Court,

S.D. New York.

Reginald CONNOR, Plaintiff

v.

Officer John P. HURLEY, Officer Dale M. Bissonette,

Green Haven Correctional Facility (Medical Staff),

Green Haven Correctional Facility (Administration),

Defendant.

No. 00Civ.8354LTSJJP.

April 26, 2004.

ORDER

SWAIN, J.

*1 Plaintiff Reginald Connor ("Connor"), a prisoner in Collins Correctional Facility, brought this *pro se* action against two officers, the prison medical staff, and the prison administration. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Officers Hurley and Bissonette handled him with excessive force during an incident that occurred on September 13, 1997. Plaintiff alleges that the prison medical staff and administration provided him with inadequate medical attention for injuries sustained in his altercation with the officers. Plaintiff seeks relief in the form of monetary damages. Defendants move pursuant to [Rule 56\(b\) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure](#), seeking summary judgment in their favor on the grounds that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to bringing suit in federal court and also that Plaintiff has failed to properly name a "person" as defendant as required by [42 U.S.C. § 1983](#) insofar as he seeks to assert claims against Green Haven medical and administrative personnel.

BACKGROUND

Underlying Claim

Connor alleges that during a routine pat-frisk on September 13, 1997, Officer Hurley handled him unprofessionally, with excessive force and malicious

intent. (Compl. at ¶ 4.) According to Connor's complaint, Officer Hurley observed Connor put an object in his mouth, whereupon Hurley allegedly put his hands on Connor's throat and began to choke him. (*Id.*) Then Officer Bissonette grabbed Connor from behind and wrestled him to the floor. (*Id.*) Connor alleges that he sustained injuries to his neck, shoulder, arm, back, and leg as a result of this altercation. (Compl. at 6.) Connor further alleges that his several attempts to receive proper medical care for these injuries were met with insufficient attention. (*Id.*) Connor seeks compensatory and punitive damages in the amount of 60 million dollars

Plaintiff's Use Of Administrative Grievance Procedures

Before bringing this action, Connor attempted to use the grievance procedures available at his correctional facility. First, he alleges that he drafted an informal grievance on September 13, 1997. Defendants claim that this first grievance was never received by the Internal Grievance Review Committee ("IGRC"). (Tr. of January 24, 2003 Case Management Conference, at 2-3.) In the informal grievance Connor alleged that officers Hurley and Bissonette violated standard pat-frisk procedures. (Decl. of Laura Jones Ex. R.) In addition to the informal grievance, Connor sent a letter to Superintendent Christopher Artuz describing his confrontation with Hurley and Bissonette. (*Id.*, Ex. S.) This letter was not dated, but Artuz responded on September 19, 1997. (*Id.*, Ex. T.) On September 18, 1997, Connor wrote a letter to Commissioner Glenn S. Goord in which he once again described the September 13 incident. (*Id.*, Ex. U.) Then starting in December 1997, Connor filed a series of twelve formal grievances alleging inadequate medical attention. (*Id.*, Exs. W-HH.) Connor appealed these decisions to the Superintendent and then to the Central Office Review Committee ("CORC").

DISCUSSION

*2 Summary judgment shall be granted in favor of a moving party where the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2004 WL 885828 (S.D.N.Y.)

(Cite as: 2004 WL 885828 (S.D.N.Y.))

judgment as a matter of law.” [Fed.R.Civ.P. 56\(c\)](#). The moving party bears the burden of establishing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. [Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.](#), 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). In the summary judgment context, a fact is material “if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law,” and an issue of fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” [Holtz v. Rockefeller & Co.](#), 258 F.3d 62, 69 (2d Cir.2001) (internal citation omitted).

Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint on the ground that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to the claims against Officers Hurley and Bissonette. The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (the “PLRA”) provides that “no action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [section 1983](#) of this title, or any federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” [42 U.S.C., § 1997e\(a\) \(West 1994 & Supp.2003\)](#). In *Porter v. Nussle*, the Supreme Court held that the exhaustion requirement “applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.” [534 U.S. 516, 532 \(2002\)](#).

New York’s Department of Correctional Services has a procedure for dealing with prisoner complaints. This procedure is called the Internal Grievance Procedure (“IGP”). The IGP is mapped out in [7 N.Y.C.R.R. § 701.7](#). It is well settled that, in order for a prisoner to exhaust his administrative remedies, he or she must complete three steps, which have been summarized as follows:

First, an inmate must file a complaint with the Inmate Grievance Resolution Committee (‘IGRC’) within 14 days of the alleged event. The IGRC must then investigate and may resolve the issue informally within seven days. If there is no informal resolution, a hearing is held, and the inmate may appeal to the superintendent of the facility within four days of the IGRC’s action. Finally, after receiving a response from the superintendent, the prisoner may appeal that decision to the Central Office Review Committee (‘CORC’) within four days of its receipt. The CORC, in turn, must render a decision within 20 days.

Harris v. Totten, 244 F.Supp.2d 299, 233 (S.D.N.Y.2003) (internal citations omitted).

Defendants have carried their burden of demonstrating that Connor cannot be deemed to have satisfied the requirements of the IGP, and therefore did not exhaust his administrative remedies before filing suit in this Court. Even if the informal complaint that Connor allegedly filed on September 13, 1997, satisfies the first step of the IGP, Connor never satisfied the second or third steps by filing an administrative appeal to the superintendent or to the CORC. Connor claims that he never received a response from the IGRC after he filed his first complaint. (This is most likely because the IGRC did not have a record of ever having received the first complaint.) In any event, failure of the IGRC to respond is not material. In order to satisfy the exhaustion requirement, Connor must have appealed to the Superintendent even in the absence of a response from IGRC. The rules “provide that if the determination is delayed, the inmate may appeal to the next level of review, including CORC, without waiting for administrative action.” *Mendoza v. Goord*, No. 00 Civ. 0146(GEL), [2002 WL 3654855 at *2 \(S.D.N.Y. November 21, 2002\)](#). Furthermore, Connor’s letters to Superintendent Artuz and to Commissioner Goord may not be deemed substitutes for strict compliance with the requirements of the IGP. See *Hemphill v. New York*, 198 F.Supp.2d 546, [549 \(S.D.N.Y.2002\)](#) (“[A] letter to the Superintendent has been expressly held to be ‘insufficient’ to warrant considering a matter ‘effectively grieved’ ”); *Mendoza*, at *3 (Even though plaintiff “wrote letters of complaints to various prison officials, including the Deputy Superintendent of his institution, the Commissioner of DOCS, and its inspector general ... he does not exhaust his remedies as required by [§ 1997e\(a\)](#) unless he pursues the proper channels provided by the state for remedying his situation.”) Thus, with respect to Connor’s inmate grievances alleging misconduct by Hurley and Bissonette, Connor failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing a complaint in this Court.

*3 Connor did exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to grievances filed after December 1997. Plaintiff followed all three steps of the IGP and appealed

Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2004 WL 885828 (S.D.N.Y.)

(Cite as: 2004 WL 885828 (S.D.N.Y.))

the matter all the way up through the CORC. Plaintiff did not, however, name Officers Hurley and Bissonette in these grievances. Therefore, exhaustion of remedies with respect to those grievances cannot give rise to a right to bring suit against Hurley or Bissonette. The only other named Defendants are “Green Haven Correctional Facility (Medical Staff)” and “Green Haven Correctional Facility (Administration)”, but neither the “Medical Staff” nor the “Administration” of Green Haven Correctional Facility is a “person” within the meaning of [section 1983](#). Because [section 1983](#) expressly provides for a cause of action against “person[s]” who engage in deprivations of federal rights, the statute “has been interpreted to mean that a plaintiff cannot seek relief directly from the state or one of its agencies without naming a government official as a defendant.” *Ferguson v. Morgan*, No. 90 Civ. 6318(JSM), [1991 WL 115759 at *1 \(S.D.N.Y. June 20, 1991\)](#) (holding that since the correctional facility's “medical staff is not a person under [42 U.S.C. § 1983](#) the complaint is deficient and must be dismissed.”) Plaintiff's [section 1983](#) claims against Green Haven Correctional Facility Medical Staff and Green Haven Correctional Facility Administration must therefore be dismissed.

CONCLUSION

Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted, and Plaintiff's claims are hereby dismissed without prejudice. The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case.

SO ORDERED.

S.D.N.Y.,2004.

Connor v. Hurley

Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2004 WL 885828 (S.D.N.Y.)

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H

Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.

United States District Court,

W.D. New York.

Francisco PERALTA, 96-A-6821, Plaintiff,

v.

JOHN DOE, Medical Physician at Wende Correctional Facility, RMU Unit, Defendant.

No. 04-CV-6559P.

Jan. 24, 2005.

Francisco Peralta, Staten Island, NY, pro se.

DECISION and ORDER

INTRODUCTION

SKRETNY, J.

*1 Plaintiff Francisco Peralta, an inmate of the Arthurkill Correctional Facility, has filed this *pro se* action seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Docket No. 1) and has both requested permission to proceed *in forma pauperis* and filed a signed Authorization (Docket No. 2). Plaintiff claims that the “John Doe” defendant, the Wende Correctional Facility Medical Physician in the RMU Unit, violated his constitutional rights by improperly administering a dangerous drug without properly monitoring plaintiff’s response. For the reasons discussed below, plaintiff’s request to proceed as a poor person is granted, but unless plaintiff files an amended complaint as directed below, the complaint will be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A.

PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff alleges that while he was held at Wende Correctional Facility, the John Doe medical physician deliberately denied him adequate medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff states that he is a dialysis patient. The Wende physician allegedly administered Kayexalate without properly monitoring plaintiff’s response. Plaintiff subsequently suffered myalgia so severe that he was unable to lift his legs. Plaintiff notified the Wende physician that something was wrong, but he was not examined. A few

days later, Plaintiff was transported to a hospital for treatment. He claims that he suffered injuries to his right hand, feet and heart as a result of the John Doe physician’s failures to monitor plaintiff’s response to medication and to respond promptly to his complaints.

DISCUSSION

Because plaintiff has met the statutory requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and filed an Authorization with respect to this action, plaintiff is granted permission to proceed *in forma pauperis*. Sections 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(a) of 28 U.S.C. require the Court to conduct an initial screening of this complaint. In evaluating the complaint, the Court must accept as true all factual allegations and must draw all inferences in plaintiff’s favor. *See King v. Simpson*, 189 F.3d 284, 287 (2d Cir.1999). Dismissal is not appropriate “unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” *Conley v. Gibson*, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); and *see Chance v. Armstrong*, 143 F.3d 698, 701 (2d Cir.1998).

Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “To state a valid claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege that the challenged conduct (1) was attributable to a person acting under color of state law, and (2) deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” *Whalen v. County of Fulton*, 126 F.3d 400, 405 (2d Cir.1997) (citing *Eagleston v. Guido*, 41 F.3d 865, 875-76 (2d Cir.1994)). Based on its evaluation of the complaint, the Court finds that plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b) unless plaintiff files an amended complaint as directed below.

*2 Because plaintiff has not identified a defendant for service of the complaint, the complaint is subject to dismissal. Ordinarily, where *pro se* litigants have John Doe or unknown defendants, together with named defendants, the complaints are served on those named defendants and the plaintiff pursues discovery / regarding the John Doe defendants. “Plaintiffs, especially *pro se* incarcerated plaintiffs should be given an opportunity to identify ... unknown defendants through discovery.” *Brown v. Doe*, 1999 WL 893070, *2 (S.D.N.Y.

Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2005 WL 357358 (W.D.N.Y.)

(Cite as: 2005 WL 357358 (W.D.N.Y.))

October 18, 1999) (deferring defendants' motions to dismiss until they have provided the requisite discovery information and materials to the *pro se* prisoner litigant) (citing Valentin v. Dinkins, 121 F.3d 72, 76 (2d Cir.1997) (district courts must assist *pro se* incarcerated litigants with their inquiry into the identities of unknown defendants) and Billman v. Indiana Department of Corrections, 56 F.3d 785, 789 (7th Cir.1995) (where circumstances "make it infeasible for the prisoner to identify someone before filing his complaint, his suit should not be dismissed as frivolous")). Here, however, plaintiff has not identified any named defendant who can be served or through whom discovery can be pursued. Therefore, the complaint cannot go forward as drafted.

The Court will permit plaintiff to amend his complaint to name a defendant for service and discovery. Davidson v. Flynn, 32 F.3d 27, 31 (2d Cir.1994); Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a) (leave to amend "shall be freely given when justice so requires"). The Court notes that plaintiff pursued a grievance through the Central Office Review Committee regarding his medical treatment at Wende (Docket No. 1, Ex. A) and may have the identity of the John Doe defendant available to him. However, in light of plaintiff's current incarceration in another facility and the attendant difficulty that may pose to obtaining the name on his own, the Court will permit plaintiff to add the Superintendent of Wende Correctional Facility as a named defendant in order to have issue joined and make possible discovery of the John Doe defendant's identity. Valentin, 121 F.3d at 76 (district court "may pursue any course that it deems appropriate to a further inquiry into the identity" of the unknown defendant); and see Munz v. Parr, 758 F.2d 1254, 1257 (8th Cir.1985) ("Rather than dismissing the claim, the court should have ordered disclosure of Officer Doe's identity by other defendants named and served or permitted the plaintiff to identify the officer through discovery."); Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.3d 637, 642 (9th Cir.1980) ("the plaintiff should be given an opportunity through discovery to identify the unknown defendants, unless it is clear that discovery would not uncover the identifies, or that the complaint would be dismissed on other grounds").

Further, because the Court finds that the defendant is likely to be represented by the New York State Attorney General, the Court will direct the Clerk of the Court to send a copy of the complaint and this order to the Attorney General's Office to facilitate the identification of the John Doe medical

physician at Wende Correctional Facility, RMU Unit.

CONCLUSION

*3 Because plaintiff has met the statutory requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and filed an Authorization, his request to proceed *in forma pauperis* is granted. For the reasons set forth above, plaintiff's complaint must be dismissed unless he files an amended complaint by February 25, 2005 in which he includes the necessary allegations regarding his claims as directed above and in a manner that complies with Rules 8 and 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint is intended to completely replace the prior complaint in the action, and thus it "renders [any prior complaint] of no legal effect." International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 556 F.2d 665, 668 (2d Cir.1977); see also Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir.1994). Therefore, plaintiff's amended complaint must include all of the allegations against each of the defendants against whom the case is going forward so that the amended complaint may stand alone as the sole complaint in this action which the defendants must answer.

ORDER

IT HEREBY IS ORDERED, that plaintiff's motion to proceed *in forma pauperis* is granted;

FURTHER, that plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint as directed above by February 25, 2005;

FURTHER, that the Clerk of the Court is directed to send to plaintiff with this order a copy of the original complaint, a blank § 1983 complaint form, and the instructions for preparing an amended complaint;

FURTHER, that the Clerk of the Court is directed to send a copy of the complaint and this order to the Assistant Attorney General in Charge, 144 Exchange Street, Rochester, New York 14614;

FURTHER, that in the event plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint as directed above by February 25, 2005, the complaint shall be dismissed without further order of the Court;

FURTHER, that in the event the complaint is dismissed

Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2005 WL 357358 (W.D.N.Y.)

(Cite as: 2005 WL 357358 (W.D.N.Y.))

because plaintiff has failed to file an amended complaint by February 25, 2005, the Clerk of the Court shall close this case as dismissed without further order; and

FURTHER, that in the event the complaint is dismissed because plaintiff has failed to file an amended complaint by February 25, 2005, the Court hereby certifies, pursuant to [28 U.S.C. § 1915\(a\)](#), that any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith and leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals as a poor person is denied. [Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 82 S.Ct. 917, 8 L.Ed.2d 21 \(1962\)](#). Further requests to proceed on appeal *in forma pauperis* should be directed on motion to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in accordance with [Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure](#).

SO ORDERED.

W.D.N.Y., 2005.

Peralta v. John Doe

Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2005 WL 357358 (W.D.N.Y.)

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